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European children fighting for PKK, claims former ROJ TV chief

2011-11-13T17:54:00.000-08:00

Denmark: European children fighting for PKK, claims former ROJ TV chief

Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende continues to publish more information about ROJ TV and the PKK. Their most recent report reveals that the PKK is using children-fighters. Pictures taken by former ROJ-TV director, Manouchehr Zonoozi, show youth, the youngest of which is supposedly 14-16, and Zonoozi claims, he saw children in the camps as young as 8-9.

Putting aside the issue of using children as soldiers, Zonoozi makes another very interesting claim. He says that most children in the camps come from Iran or Europe, and don’t have their parents with them.

The youngest get school education, the older ones are trained in using weapons, fighting and Kurdish history, with emphasis on the PKK and the movement’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan.

“In an asylum camp in Iraq, I met a Syrian-origin Kurdish family. They were looking for their daughter, who fled to the PKK. But the PKK didn’t want to give her back to the family. I was really upset at that,” says Manouchehr Zonoozi.

May 26, 2010

Algerian Genocide Committed by France

2011-10-08T00:50:00.000-07:00

Genocide against Algerian Identity

1. Overview
According to the Algerian documents, between 350,000 and 1.5 million Algerians died during the Algerian War of Independence.[1] Algerians argue that the massacres should be named as genocide and France must apologise to the Algerians. Arab states and many Muslim countries, including Turkey, back the Algerian claims. However the French do not accept the claims. According to the French side, the number of killed Algerian civilians is about 350.000, but not more "France's Alledged Algerian Genocide". French Foreign Ministry responded to Algerian President Abdulaziz Bouteflika's call to France to repent for what France perpetrated in Algeria during the colonial period, by relegating such historical inquiries to historians' "France Left Algerian Genocide to Historians Again"

Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika said that French colonization of his country was a form of genocide.[2][3] In memoirs, some French officers have described torture of Algerians during the war. Edouard Sablier, for instance, one of the soldiers who took part in the repression, later described the situation: "Everywhere in the towns there were camps surrounded by barbed wire containing hundreds of suspects who had been arrested… Often, when we set out to inspect an isolated hamlet in the mountains, I heard people say, 'We should punish them by taking away their crops'."[4] A paper called Ohé Partisans, published by the French Trotskyists, described Sétif as an “Algerian Oradour”. Oradour was a French town where the Nazi occupiers had murdered over 600 people, including children..

Some Algerian intellectuals argue that the number of genocide against the Algerian people is not one but many. Prof. Dr. Ali Al-Hail for instance says "French constituted numerous genocides against the Algerians" - The French Definition of 'Genocide'. Similarly, Abdulkerim Gazali, editor of the Algerian newspaper La Tribune, likens France's occupation of an independent and sovereign Algeria to Nazi Germany's occupation of many European countries and claimed this was racism "Algerian Genocide - Algerian History

However France has never accepted its responsibility in tortures and massacres in Algeria. Paris says that the past should be left to historians. French President Jacques Chirac, upon harsh reactions to the law encouraging the good sides of the French colonial history, made the statement, "Writing history is the job of the historians, not of the laws." According to Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, "speaking about the past or writing history is not the job of the parliament."[5]

The Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika said in a speech in Paris on 17 April 2006 that "Colonisation brought the genocide of our identity, of our history, of our language, of our traditions".[6]

2. History

Algeria first became a colony of France in 1830. When in 1954 the Algerian people rioted against the French colonial rule, the French dispatched 400,000 troops to pacify the anti-colonial uprising.[7] The French colonial forces launched an air and ground offensive against several eastern cities, particularly Setif and Guelma, in response to anti-French riots. The crackdown lasted several days and according to the Algerian state left 45,000 people dead YouTube Video - "Algerian Genocide by France" European historians put the figure at between 15,000 and 20,000.[8] French attacks continued not only in Algerian territories but in France as well. The Paris massacre of 1961 was the most vivid example: On October 17 the French police attacked an unarmed demonstration of Algerians, who demanded the freedom of their country from French colonial rule. How many demonstrators were killed is still unclear, but estimates range from 32 to 200 people. The incident had not been officially confirmed until 1999.[9][10] The Algerian newspaper Liberté was seized by the Police on 19 October 1998, presumably in connection of an article about these events.[11]

There were executions and widespread arrests during the War of Independence. "Villages were bombed from the air and a town was shelled from a cruiser at sea. The attacks were more or less random. The point was not so much to punish the original rioters as to teach the whole Muslim population to know their place. Settlers set up their own unofficial death squads and killed hundreds of Muslims. German and Italian prisoners of war were released to take part in the massacre".[12]

As Le Monde Diplomatique put it, "as France celebrated victory in Europe on 8 May 1945, its army was massacring thousands of civilians in Sétif and Guelma - events that were the real beginning of Algeria’s war of independence."[13] Bouteflika also urged the Paris Government to admit its part in the massacres of 45,000 Algerians who took to the streets to demand independence as Europe celebrated victory over Nazi Germany in 1945.[14] French authorities then responded by playing down the comments, urging "mutual respect" French Foreign Minister Barnier told Algeria in an official visit to make a common effort to search history "in order to establish a common future and overcome the sad pages". Giving interview to El Vatan, an Algerian newspaper, Barnier said that "Historians from two sides must be encouraged to work together. They must work on the common past".[15]

After a war which ended in Algeria's independence in 1962, eight million Algerian residents were deprived of French nationality and hundreds of thousands of pieds-noirs (French who settled in Algeria and were re-patriated at the end of the war) were forced "home" to a place which was not home.

3. Commentary

Ahmed Ben Bella also argues that the French committed a genocide against the people and Algerian culture: "Algeria's indigenous population was decimated in the early years of French settler colonial rule, falling from over four million in 1830 to less than 2.5 million by 1890. Systematic genocide was coupled with the brutal suppression of Algerian cultural identity. Indigenous Algerians were French subjects, but could only become French citizens if they renounced Islam and Arab culture. A ruthless policy of acculturation followed, and the remaining Algerians were forced to cease speaking their native Arabic and use the French of their colonial masters instead. The indigenous Muslim population of Algeria was not permitted to hold political meetings or bear arms. They were subjected to strict pass laws that required indigenous Muslim Algerians to seek permission from the colonial authorities to leave their hometowns or villages."[16]

Abdulkerim Gazali, editor of the Algerian newspaper La Tribune, likened France's occupation of an independent and sovereign Algeria to Nazi Germany's occupation of many European countries and claimed this was racism.[17]

4. Recent developments

Algeria called on France to apologize in 2005 for crimes committed during the colonial era.[18] Amar Bakhouche, speaker of the Algerian Senate, similarly reacted that France did not apologize for massacres it committed in Algeria.[19]

The archives in France on the issue have been kept closed until now. The French collected all documents regarding the massacres and genocide. For many, the closed archives are another sign of the Genocide in Algeria. Amar Bakhouche, the speaker of Algerian Senate, reacted against the fact that France keeps the archives related to that period closed. He said the greatest majority of archives related to that period were brought to France and they were kept closed. "They are not open for French and Algerians. We urged to immediately open them for public", he said.[20]

In response to the action of the French parliament, making it an offense to deny the supposed Armenian genocide, the Turkish parliament is drafting a bill to make it illegal to deny that the French committed genocide in Algeria.[21] Turkish party leaders, including CHP, MHP, BBP and ANAP called France to recognise 'Algerian genocide'.

5. References

^ Wars of the World Algeria Independence France 1954-1962

^ BBC News Algeria leader in French hospital

^ The Scotsman Algerian leader calls colonisation 'genocide'

^ Socialist Worker Algeria — the war didn’t end in 1945

^ Zaman Online France in Favor of So-Called Genocide Resorts to Historians

^ The Scotsman Algerian leader calls colonisation 'genocide'

^ Al-Ahram Weekly Ahmed Ben Bella: Plus ça change

^ Al Jazzeera [1]

^ The Washington Post Back Issues A 1961 Massacre of Algerians in Paris - When the Media Failed the Test

^ Al-Ahram Weekly Bullets in the water

^ When the Seine was full of bodies

^ Socialist Worker Algeria — the war didn’t end in 1945

^ Le Monde Diplomatique Massacre in Algeria

^ Al Jazzeera [2]

^ Diplomatic Observer PARIS' GAME TURNS AGAINST DUE TO ALGERIA

^ Al-Ahram Weekly Ahmed Ben Bella: Plus ça change

^ Turkish Weekly Algeria Asks France to Recognize Algerian Genocide

^ Turkish Weekly France's Alledged Algerian Genocide

^ Diplomatic Observer PARIS' GAME TURNS AGAINST DUE TO ALGERIA

^ Diplomatic Observer PARIS' GAME TURNS AGAINST DUE TO ALGERIA

^ NTV-MSNBC Turkish parliamentary committee drafts law on Algerian genocide

By Sedat LACINER

Great Bluffing On Cyprus

2011-08-11T12:07:00.000-07:00

Prof. Dr. Sedat LACINER

Cyprus question presents a role like a litmus paper in Turkey and EU relations. It is possible to see the future of these relations by looking at Cyprus... If our hypothesis is right, it is clear that Turkey would never be a member of the EU. It is because European countries nearly ignored Turkey and violated international law publicly on Cyprus issue.

Since 2003 Annan Plan, Turkey has always acted in the accordance with the principle of to be a cut above. She said “yes” most of the proposals of international community and tried to the best of her ability to achieve peace and a “united Cyprus”.

As it will be remembered during UN (Annan) Plan Referenda on April 2004, while Turkish community approved the plan with a majority of 65 % vote, Greek Cypriot community rejected and said “no” to the united Cyprus with a overwhelming majority of 76 %.

It is also known that, before the referenda the EU and the US had made such promises; “If Turks vote “yes” in the referenda, isolation will be lifted and Turkish Cypriot community will be rewarded”. However, it appears that the rewarded side has been Greek Cypriots rather than peace-demanding Turkish community. Greek Cypriots has been accepted as a full EU member as if they were the unique and legal representatives of the island.

As a result of this, number of Greek states within the EU has been raised to two and Cyprus question has been evolved into an EU question. The EU accepted the Cypriots in the union by numerous wangles by manipulating international law. For one, they have violated their own principle by accepting a country which experiences border problems. It is also disregarded that Cyprus Republic had been established as a Turkish-Greek Cypriot state. Thus, while northern part of the island has been regarded as an EU land, Turkish community on this land has not been regarded as EU member.

Moreover, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey has been put in an “invader” position. Furthermore, on behalf of the EU, Brussels has forced Turkey to recognize Greek Cypriot Administration, which Turkey does not recognize. As a result, while Christians of the island become a part of the EU, Muslims were left outside. In addition, not only Turkey is wanted to be left outside of the EU but also wanted to be punished via Cyprus issue.

Turkey has called the EU’s bluff

Today, Turkey clearly sees that; Cyprus issue is at the ultimate point of our patience. The sea is over... There is neither other concession to be given nor another place to go. The EU has to make its decision. On the one hand, they would follow a realist and cordial full membership negotiation process with Turkey. On the other hand, they would frankly outspeak their real feelings. In Mevlana’s words, they would rather be seen as they are or be as they already are. It is clear that, one of the most important they would show their policy change is the Cyprus issue. Turkey, with her last action, does not leave a space to manoeuvre to the EU.

Firstly, Davutoğlu made a harsh speech like an ultimatum as he was appointed as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By continuing his attitude Davutoğlu also pointed a possible referendum for unifying island. Those were followed by Prime Minister Erdoğan’s strong declarations as; “Greek Cypriots should not expect to be taken into account by Turkey as a party. We will never seat at the same table with them”.

Prime Minister also stated that they would not even recognize the EU Presidency of Greek Cypriots.

Road to Independency

Up to now Greek Cypriots were in comfort. All steps have been expected to be taken by Turkey. It was explicitly told to Turkey that “if you wish to continue full membership negotiations, you have to recognize Cyprus first”. Now, Turkey is counter-striking and calling the EU’s bluff in that sense.

If Turkey resists on her stand, this process would even pave the way for independency of TRNC. Besides it is also seen that, in the last ten years Turkey has been making preparations for this independence mainly by trying to solve water and electricity problems of the Northern part of the island.

More importantly, Turkish government has tried -and still trying- its best to solve an untouched problem of the island; the property question. Those policy actions would also bring Greek Cypriots, who has never give a signal of change, into line. As the possibility of separation gains power, Greek Cypriots would stand up from comfortable EU seat and come to the negotiation table. However, it can be said that it is still early to make such kind of predictions before seeing Brussels reply to Turkey’s policy actions.

21 July 2011, Thursday
Star daily

Translated from Turkish by Cigdem BILEZIKCI

Turkey as a 'Companion' not a 'Model' to the Middle East

2011-02-28T05:42:00.000-08:00

Mehmet Yegin, USAK Center for American Studies

The situation in the Middle East is getting complicated with the spread of the societal movements to Yemen, Bahrain and Libya. It became more difficult to follow the developments in all these states. Yet, the attention shift to the uneasy countries should not cause losing the track of successful movements to overthrow the symbol names. The central concern is not the change of the names but the change of whole system. Thus, the international community that endorsed the democratic demands of the streets should also endorse them during the democratization process. In this regard, particularly Egyptian democratization process is crucial since it have the potential to influence the others.

The US Perspective

The US does not want to lose one of its crucial allies in the region. Egypt is vital in the regional balances and with its geostrategic position. Thus, the US understandably wants a transition that preserves its alliance with Egypt. The US was successful about nation building in Germany and Japan but it is hard to say the same for Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the US is unpopular among the masses in Egypt, its role in Egyptian democratization mostly relies on its relations with the Egyptian Army.

The formal links between the US and Egypt relies on the aid provided by the US and the military relations. Thus, most of the experts in the US are pointing the US military aid as a crucial leverage and oppose the idea to cut it off. Regarding the concerns for the stability in the country and keeping the Islamists in control the US regard the army as the guarantor of the transition. Therefore, despite the democracy promotion ideal, there is a tendency to heavily rely on the Egyptian Army in the post-Mubarak term.

The Role of Army and Muslim Brotherhood

The position of the army is crucial from the beginning of the protests. It is a major actor and is not eager to give up its privileged position in both political and economic spheres over night. Nevertheless, the army cannot act without the consent of society either. Thus, the Egyptian people should be careful in this process. For instance, asking for a military coup against Mubarak when he refused to step down signals a dangerous approach. The military assuming power for a secure transition is not a true path for democratization. This would further consolidate the tutelary position of the army in Egypt and prolong the transition to democracy. There are abundant cases for this situation.

Army may west an important role in the transition about security. A temporary government should be established with bringing all parties in Egyptian political spectrum. This may be a name whom all parties may agree on or a group of people as representatives of different groups. This coalition should not exclude Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an important actor in opposition. It should be underlined that MB is not demanding a chief or privileged role after Mubarak, at least immediately. This is an important chance to integrate a major opposition group to the system and raise moderate voices among the group members.

Turkey as a 'Companion' not a 'Model' to the Middle East

Talking about democratization in the Middle East, the eyes are turning to Turkey again as a model in the region. Most of the experts underline secular nature of Turkey with its Muslim population. They also think that the Justice and Development Party can be a model for the Muslim Brotherhood as well. Thus, they offer Turkey as model for Egyptian democratization.

Nevertheless, Turkey is not in claim to be a model for the countries in the Middle East. And Turkey is not eager to intervene in the domestic matters of other countries either. Turkey established relations with the countries in the Middle East in equal terms and wants to maintain this balance. On the other hand, as seen in the cases for facilitation and mediation, Turkey will not turn its back to the countries that ask for help and support.

Turkey may share its experiences with those countries asking for support. Turkey may be a companion for the Middle Eastern countries since both are in a democratization process. Turkey enjoys high popularity in the Middle East. According to TESEV Poll, Turkey enjoys a favorable image with 75% in general in the Middle East. Besides, 72% of Egyptian people have a favorable perception towards Turkey. Thus, an institutionalized interaction among Turkey and the countries in the region may inspire the fellow countries not to copy but to develop their own models. This interaction may push Turkey to see the democratic deficiencies of the country and work hard for reforms as well. In short, both sides may win out of such interaction towards democracy.

Too Early to Talk about a Middle Eastern Revolution?

2011-02-28T05:38:00.000-08:00

Gamze Coşkun, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

With the New Year, the Middle Eastern societies appealed the attention of the world public opinion with their actions which might change the fate of the whole region. The social uprisings started from Tunisia and spread over many countries of the region such as Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. The authoritarian leaders, the dictators, who were not even imagined to be collapsed with the help of public pressure have started to stand down and renounce their positions.

Many made various comments and different forecasts on these movements. However, it is seen that there is confusion on how to name these public actions. There are two main arguments on the conceptualization of these social uprisings. Some calls these actions as social movement, while some others prefer to name them as revolution from the beginning. The preferred term draws the road map of how to define the issue. At this point, in order to avoid such incomprehensibility, it would be much appropriate and healthy to describe the events going on in the Middle East after theoretically defining the concepts of revolution and social movement.

Concerning the Social Sciences literature, it would not be right to use the concept of revolution to define any kind of attacks against an established order or seizure of power. What is more, it is not proper to use the term revolution for military coups and anticolonial struggles either. Revolutions aim to establish a new moral and material world or order.[1] And this is the main point which separates revolutions from social movements. Revolution is also a deliberate process, and this project has a leader or vanguard acting within the framework of a certain ideology. It brings about the change of the dominant ideology as well as that of the state and class structures, and it is a bottom-up process. For example, Samuel P. Huntington defines revolution as a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government activities and policies.[2] In another perspective, Lenin says revolutions are the festivals of the oppressed and exploited. At no other time are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order.[3]

Different theorists put forward different arguments while describing revolutions. While many of them agree on that revolution must have a leader and ideology, some others like Theda Skocpol considers the issue from a different angle. For instance, by stating that he shares the idea of Revolutions are not made. They come, Skocpol points out that revolutions are not successful and effective thanks to their leaders who acts in line with an ideology but with the contribution of the efforts of differently situated and differently motivated groups groups not operating even under the shared rubric of a revolutionary ideology.[4] In this regard, leader and ideology are not seen so important at least during its stages of development. The leader and ideology become the influential power mostly following the collapse of the existing regime.[5] Yet all in all, all these theorists reach a consensus on that revolutions come into being with a structural and ideological stark change in the state system.

Many academicians assume that social unrest and dissolution occur because of rapid modernization and this will be followed by revolution. However, as Skocpol and Charles Tilly express that the mass, lower-class participants in revolution cannot turn discontent into effective political action without autonomous collective organization and resources to sustain their efforts.[6]

The process which ended or newly started with the stepping down of the leaders surely began as the people who were uncomfortable with the system took action. Economic inequalities, pressure of the regime, search for reform, change and democracy as well as various structural and international factors triggered these movements. Furthermore, it is seen that the leaders of these movements have not been the ones who act within the framework of a certain ideology but the peoples themselves.

It is not possible to call the incident as revolution while the events in Tunisia and Egypt have not been finalized yet and nearly the same political situation is maintained further than the absence of a certain ideology and leader. Other than that even if a full fledged democratic system could be established, it would not be easy to talk about a revolution in the strict sense at the end of the process as there would not be a radical change in the state structure, ideology and institutions. In contrast to the consensus reached on 1789 French, 1917 Russian, 1911-1949 Chinese and 1979 Iranian revolutions, the revolutionary characteristic of incidents in the Middle East could possibly remain disputed.

In short, with no doubt, the Middle Eastern region entered into a new phase. However, it is not possible to predict the future of the region and direction of these movements from now.A very new situation is expected to emerge in the region, yet calling the upcoming but still nonexistent situation as revolution would be too early. The framework we draw for the explanation of the issue is the precondition of a strong analysis. And a healthy analysis would come after an appropriate and healthy approach to the issue.

The Democrat ‘Sultan’ of Kazakhstan

2011-02-28T05:29:00.000-08:00

Gülay Kılıç, USAK Center For Eurasian Studies

“Today, without dramatizing the situation in those years, I openly declare you that in the beginning of the 1990’s, we were on the edge of a cliff.” This sentence was uttered by Nursultan Nazarbayev ten years after the declaration of independence of Kazakhstan. In the 1990’s, Kazakhstan was suffering an economy which was on the verge of bankruptcy, an insufficient infrastructure, a deficiency of expert staff (the expert management group in Kazakhstan migrated to Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union), and a governmental structure that was about to collapse. There were other factors which made the adverse conditions in the country even more serious during that period.

Almost all of the former Soviet regions have experienced similar problems and a transition period which was never experienced before. As a country which takes place among the other countries that show a maximum effort to overcome this period, Kazakhstan is at the forefront in several fields. Kazakhstan owes its success to its people in the first place and then to Nursultan Nazarbayev. Under the difficult conditions of the post-independency period, Nazarbayev not only started both the economic and politic structuring processes, but also ensured unity and solidarity in the country. The civil wars and ethnic conflicts which stirred the countries of the region did not reveal in Kazakhstan. As a matter of fact, Kazakhstan is a country that harbors approximately 130 nations from 45 different religions. Nazarbayev is the leader who has inspired the spirit of unity and solidarity to Kazakhstan.

Nazarbayev is a leader who is successful not only in the domestic politics, but also in the foreign policy. Today, Kazakhstan differs from the other countries in the region in terms of its stabilized foreign policy. For example, CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia) which was founded upon the initiative of Nazarbayev, is brought to the agenda today as one of the important organizations. CICA can be described as the Asian OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). CICA is an organization founded by Nursultan Nazarbayev; it fills an important gap in Asia and draws the countries together which could not be assembled by the efforts of other international organizations previously. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has implemented a considerably stabilized foreign policy against the West and Russia.

Nazarbayev played an important role also in the recovery process of Kazakhstan economy. However, at this point, we must not disregard the fact that Kazakhstan is a rich country with regards to its natural resources. While reconstructing its political structure, Nazarbayev has always aimed at making Kazakhstan a regional power. In short, since its independency, Nazarbayev’s efforts made on behalf of Kazakhstan cannot be underestimated.

Nazarbayev’s endeavors made also with respect to the nuclear security which lately became a subject frequently discussed throughout the whole world cannot be ignored. Kazakhstan’s leadership in the matters of the nuclear security and peace is very important, since during the Soviet Union era it was a country which possessed a considerable amount of nuclear power. It is Nazarbayev who has assigned his country to carry out this mission. During the foundation stage of CICA, Kazakhstan relinquished its nuclear power for the sake of the constitution of an organization which is founded to set a good example for the whole world. Nazarbayev received a great support from his people who had suffered a lot by the reason of the nuclear tests, and he was appreciated by the other countries and organizations, the United Nations (UN) coming in the first place. Nazarbayev went down in history as the first leader who has voluntarily relinquished the nuclear weapons, and in 2010, he received the fruits of his efforts made for the world peace by bringing in his country the Chairmanship of OSCE. Nazarbayev took very important steps also for OSCE and managed to attract the attention of the whole world to the region. After an interval which lasted 11 years long, Kazakhstan held the OSCE Chairmen Summit for the first time and gave acceleration to the activities of OSCE which was trying to carry on its operations within a structure almost totally inactivated. With regards to the world security issues and the solution of the regional problems, the country has incorporated the four basic principles -namely confidence, tradition, transparency and tolerance- into the structure of OSCE.

Undoubtedly, the most important name behind all achievements of Kazakhstan is Nazarbayev.

Referendum Discussions and Nazarbayev’s Position

Nazarbayev became the President who was given a broad authority within the framework of the 1995 constitution which was accepted by popular vote. In the constitution it had been stated that “the same person should not be elected as President more than twice in a row.” However, with the new regulations which were implemented in 2007, this rule has been invalidated for Nazarbayev.

Lately, the presidential election which will be held in 2012 became a current issue in the country. The discussions with respect to a possible referendum regarding the extension of Nazarbayev’s term of office came to the forefront upon the petition started by the non-governmental organizations. Previously, the President of the Kazakhstan Central Election Commission Kuanduk Turgankulov had announced that if 200 thousand signatures are collected, referendum would be held in March, 2011. On 12th of January, 5 million signatures which were collected during the petition were submitted to the Election Commission. Both the petitions and the referendum which is supported by certain parties are aimed at the cancellation of the 2012 elections and the extension of the Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s term of office by way of referendum (until 2020) without calling an election.

If the elections are held in 2012, most probably, Nazarbayev will stand for the election and he will be reelected. The most important point regarding the elections is the protection of the political culture of the society. Nazarbayev has vetoed the proposal for the referendum for the good of Kazakhstan’s future. However, the Kazakhstan Parliament and the Senate did not give up their attempts with regards to the realization of the referendum.

The critics in the West and especially in the United States argue that Kazakhstan cannot be ruled by Nazarbayev forever. Until today, Nazarbayev has acted prudentially and has implemented many projects in the interest of the country. If he continues his prudential approach with respect to the referendum which is today a current issue and persistently vetoes the proposal, he will be standing behind a decision that has a vital importance for the population of Kazakhstan. Existence of Kazakhstan in the future is closely related to its social and political culture. If the political culture is undermined, the results will be unavoidable. The elections are very important both for the people of Kazakhstan and the country’s international prestige.

Today, the “choices of the population” may not seem very important in a country which has announced its independence only 20 years ago, but in 20 years as of today, its importance will come into prominence. On the other hand, as a country that has undertaken the Chairmanship of OSCE, Kazakhstan should not compromise the universal values; in order to prove and sustain its power, it should develop and root its political culture as much as possible. If the previous political culture of Kazakhstan and its short history as an independent country are taken into consideration, a serious criticism cannot be performed with respect to matters such as the human rights and freedom in the country.

However, it is an undeniable reality that in the country serious steps with regards to development are not taken. Today, the measures which are necessary to be taken in the long run are being implemented by Nazarbayev. As a country which plans to be the leading country in Asia, in order to avoid a future chaos, Kazakhstan should protect its political culture and aim at increasing its speed of development.

*A short version of this op-ed is first published on Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review.

The Difference of Turkey

2011-02-25T15:07:00.001-08:00

Prof. Dr. Sedat LAÇİNER

Turkey, a country which has been criticized for an ‘axis shift’ until as recent as a couple of months, is now almost worshipped as a model country. It is presented as if it was the natural and should-be- model for the Middle East. The same critics can now point at Turkey as a good example. Should or can Turkey be a model for the Middle East? What is its difference and what can be its contribution to the region?

Multiplicity in the economy

At a closer look, Turkey’s economical multiplicity, which also sets the foundations of her democracy, seems to be its primary difference from Arabs, Iran and Russia. Turkey’s economy is quite pluralistic both in terms of its products and actors in economy. It is able to produce may be millions of different products considering that many economies in the Middle East is more than % 80 dependent on a single product (petroleum or gas), even in Russia the dependency on petroleum is over % 70. In Turkey however neither, textile or tourism nor automotive can solely dominate the economy. It is possible to refer to a balanced distribution. Similarly unlike Arabs, Iran and Russia, the economy is not in the hands of a few families, or a political group. Although with also the presence of the very wealthy, Turkish economy is supported by tens of millions of people.

We are a very productive people. Anybody with a bit of capital sets up a kiosk around a corner or establishes a manufacturing plant. This multiplicity is the assurance for both the Turkish wealth and Turkish democracy. In a society with such a balanced and self growth, it is not possible for a single party or democracy to dominate the country on its own.

Turkish Islam and Turkish Secularity

A second area Turkey can set an example, religion-politics relations. The understanding, which we may call the ‘Turkish Islam’ or ‘Turkish secularism’, is a living proof of possibility of the co-existence of needs of modernity and basic principles of Islam. With Turkey’s evolution from the militant secularism to an understanding of moderate secular state, the difference of Turkish Islam from the others appears more distinctly.

Turkish Islam doesn’t radicalize the people nor does it encourage the religious towards violence. More importantly it rescues Islam from being a stagnant religion of 1400 years ago to be a functional religion that renew itself in the face of modern problems. As a matter of fact, Turkey, in history, had undertaken such a function as to continue a relatively urban Hanafi tradition it used to follow. With the rise of self-confidence of republic in the face of religion, Turkish Islam once again starts to assume the roles it is expected to perform both in the country and in the region.

On the other hand, when Iran is considered, Shiism, like a strict ideology, both radicalizes the regime inside and aggravates the conflicts of sects in the region. Similarly the Saudi Vahabism and some other movements become to be the source of radical Sunnism. The bonds between the religion and modern life, in the relatively secular Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria, seem to have seriously been severed. It seems like the salaats that are performed or Koran listened to have no applicable constructive effect on the individual and the society. The religious rituals, without being noticed, have become parts of Arab folklore or some kind of shields against change in the hands of the masses fighting against the difficulties of the modernity (unemployment, urbanisation, isolation, not being able to democratize)

The Turk Who Can Say No

The third important and distinguishing attribution of Turkish ‘modal’ is its unique self-confidence and honorable stance in front of the West. No matter how unfair we may be to ourselves, Turkey is a country which, behind its discreet and pragmatic presence, can stand up for its rights and take them and challenge all the world shall it be necessary. Republic’s pacifist foreign policy is full of such examples. For example Cyprus Peace Operation is a real challenge. From Armenian problem to EU relations, Turkey has an honor that surprises West and East alike.

Turkey, putting ABD through multiple shocks in March 1st memorandum, could insist on what it thinks to be right at the expense of isolation in the discussions about the embargo towards Iran. Mavi Marmara and ‘One Minute’ crisis are the evidences of Turkey’s principled and honorable stance.

It is obvious that Turkey has courage and self-confidence way beyond its power. And this self-confidence rises by the day. It should not be expected from an Arab to perceive this easily and act accordingly in a short period of time. Because the recent history of Arabs is full of examples of abasements.

Even in the Palestine issue alone, the Arabs have been abased several times. The Arab leadership was quite harsh towards its own people yet as much tame in foreign relations. As a result of all these, there appeared ‘a type of Arab who cannot say no’ on legal grounds.

The Arabs, who could not seek their rights on legal grounds, spread around their abasements with organizations such as El Kaide, Hezbollah and Hamas. Thus Turkish self-confidence can be distinguished here, too, from the region. Turkey, when necessary, defends its rights at the risk of war while trying, as much as possible, not to get entangled in terror and violence. As a consequence, the Turkey- West relationship is, unlike Arabs’ yielding relations and Iran’s relations full of enmity, a relationship between equals. If Turkey makes it into the EU as a full member state, it will proceed to be the hope for the relationships of East and West from Palestine to Iraq or Lebanon to Afghanistan almost all of which are failing.

We will continue to observe these differences, which are real national wealth of Turkey, in the next article.

Translated by Çisil Okant

26 February 2011

Values, Hopes and Fears

2011-02-25T14:37:00.000-08:00

* Yavuz BAYDAR, Today's Zaman

“The European Union must rethink its relations with the Muslim world at its doorstep, beginning with accepting Turkey, whose membership would help usher the continent from the small-mindedness [Orhan] Pamuk describes. I’m not sure booming Turkey’s still interested; keep someone at the door long enough and that person will turn away. But a union with Turkey in it would not have responded to the Arab awakening with such tiptoeing awkwardness.”

The truth is knocking at the door.

The quote above, by Roger Cohen, a columnist with The New York Times, is just another reminder of this.

The tough reality in the Arab world has come as proof of what has been argued for deaf and blind EU circles for a long time.

Whether Turkey is an inspiration or a model for the tsunami of change that hit the old Arab regimes is an issue that is bound to be discussed more as events unfold, but one thing is already clear:

What happened so far has without a shadow of a doubt exposed the major differences in the nature of relations between the West and Turkey.

As my colleague, Sedat Laçiner, argues in a powerful article published in the Star daily yesterday, it is not a relationship based on inferiority before the powerful nations in the West, nor is it based on venomous enmity like the one between Iran and the West.

“It is a relationship between equals,” writes Laçiner and concludes more or less like Cohen:

“If Turkey can become a full member of the EU, it will continue to become a hope for West-East relations that are collapsing in places such as Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon.”

When Nicolas Sarkozy visits Turkey for the first time as a statesman, the hope is that he will at least leave with this seemingly tiny but crucial detail that will define global events in the new decade. He can be helped to discover a number of hints and clues in Turkey’s present reality, such as examples of better governance based on respect for what people expect and demand, a self-confidence of the citizenry over a predictable future and, as a basis for all of this, an economy that fulfills almost all of the Maastricht criteria (which many EU members still fail to meet).

Then there’s all this talk about religion. Pamuk, Cohen and many others are simply saying this:

Throw your old, misleading glasses into the dustbin because the reality they show is thoroughly distorted.

By insisting on looking through them you are also further feeding into the “us and them” mentality, putting more bricks in the wall of intolerance.

The reality is far from the nonsense uttered lately by politicians such as Franco Frattini, Italy’s foreign minister. What is taking place in the Maghreb or the Mashreq has little to do with religion. If anything, its role so far has been limited to helping a new renaissance of morality, and lighting the flames of justice and human dignity. The role of religion is in the deep background; what really matters for all those gravely discontented masses is a decent life, a free vote, an end to corruption and thievery, and a fair share of prosperity.

It is obvious that the masses involved in the Arab unrest somewhere in the explosive fury have had an idea of what is called a “silent revolution” in Turkey. They have felt it concretely by the Turkish products entering their poor markets, successful openings of Turkish schools here and there, openly challenging Israel’s anti-humanitarian mindset against Palestinians when no other Arab statesman dared to come close to doing so, and perhaps most of all, the glitter and glamour of a “new Turkey” depicted in enormously popular TV series.

If a predominantly Muslim nation such as Turkey can manage to prosper in a democratic milieu, turning into a pivotal power for globalism, this cannot go unnoticed by the average citizen in the Arab world. They have certainly found a lot of food for thought in the fact that a political party stemming from a rather radical Islamist background has managed to evolve from within and move into the political center, with a determination to evolve the entire “hard” system based on tutelage, while keeping a broad voter base on free will. From their perspective it is an amazing experiment that aims for a fine merger between religion and modernity.

A new world is in the making.

The closer key states such as Egypt get to achieving a representative democracy, the more it will trigger unrest and change in other locations.

This is only the beginning, and it is all irreversible. Parts of the “old” EU may continue to build their policies upon fear, but for the others, Turkey -- with its experience and wisdom -- should be the gate to a new world based on hope and respect.

http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=236580

25 February 2011
Today's Zaman

Have You Seen Didem Yaman?

2011-02-25T08:30:00.000-08:00

Didem YAMAN

Didem Yaman (31)

PhD student at University of Otago, Dunedin, cannot be reached after the Christchurch eartquake on February, 22.

We could not get any solid information about her location neıther from the Christchurch Police Department, nor the Red Cross or any hospital at Christchurch. Didem and her friend were last seen leaving the house at 1/38 Patten St Avonside, Christchurch (an inner suburb of Christchurch) to walk to the city about lunch-time on the day of the earthquake (earthquake was just before 1pm).

Since she is one of the 226 missing people, her family and relatives in Turkey and her friends in New Zealand are awaiting some information about her.

Please check the link about her below, which was put down by her friends in Dunedin, New Zealand.

http://christchurch-2011.person-finder.appspot.com/view?first_name=&id=christchurch-2011.person-finder.appspot.com%2Fperson.2196666&last_name=&query=Didem+Yaman&role=seek

If you saw her or any type of record about her in a hospital, police department or Red Cross please contact us:

Contact in New Zealand:

Gamze O'Neill

+64 3 453 3290

+64 21 1165 447

+64 27 5222 381

Contacts in Turkey

Gurol Baba

Tel: +90 533 446 42 89

E-mail: gurolbaba@gmail.com

International Strategic Research Organization, Ankara, Turkey

Tel: +90312 212 2886

E-mail: merkez.usak@gmail.com

It is Impossible to Understand Sarkozy’s Policy on Turkey

2011-02-25T03:56:00.000-08:00

Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

ANKARA- French President Nicholas Sarkozy pays a formal visit to Turkey on February 25. However, he is acting like this was a reluctant visit made by force.

The Foreign Ministry says Sarkozy will meet President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan concerning G-20 issues, Turkey's EU accession process and the issue of Cyprus.

Sarkozy will stay in Ankara only few hours and use the his title ‘G20 Chairman’ rather than ‘President of France’ this is unusual and unacceptable.

According to International Stratagic Research Organization (USAK)’s General Coordinator, Prof. Sedat Laciner, these kinds of visits are made with purpose of developing relations between countries. However, this awkward visit will damage relations instead of enhancing them.

“A disappointment occurred in Turkey. Under these circumstances, maybe if Sarkozy would not have come, he would contribute more to Turkish-French relations. To a certain extent, we may understand that Sarkozy does not want Turkey as a member of European Union, but Sarkozy’s opposition of Turkey has already exceeded the EU dimension. Sarkozy, almost in every respect, is acting like he had a personal hostility against Turkey. That is difficult to understand”, Laciner said.

France blocks Turkey’s talks with the EU on five chapters which are directly related to accession.

25 February 2011

Why Does Russia Support Karzai?

2011-02-05T00:38:00.000-08:00

Habibe Özdal, USAK Russia and Black Sea Studies

Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Moscow last month for the first bilateral summit between the two countries in two decades. The last official visit from Afghanistan to Moscow at the presidential level was during the era of Mohammad Najibullah when the Soviet Union withdrew forces. During his visit, Karzai invited Russia to rebuild Soviet-era facilities in Afghanistan.

"We want to give a new start to vital projects that were begun very long ago", Karzai, on his second visit to Moscow in six months, said at a news conference with President Dmitry Medvedev after their talks at the Kremlin.

The recently negotiated projects included the Salang Tunnel in the Hindu Kush Mountains as well as hydroelectric power facilities in Kabul and Baglan provinces, a customs terminal, and a university in the Afghan capital. During the joint declaration Russia expressed its readiness to participate in priority economic projects in Afghanistan, some of them dating back to the Soviet era. Current projects can be evaluated as a tool for broader Russian politics on Afghanistan, which have a long history and mainly relay on the idea that Russia is seeking to increase its influence in Afghanistan.

Karzai has turned to Moscow because Washington is displeased with Karzais moves to accelerate reconciliation with the Taliban, while his step challenges the United States regional strategies. On the other hand, Karzai is making persistent efforts to particularly develop ties with Russia, including military cooperation, so as to reduce his dependence on the U.S. by the 2014 timeline. Speaking to the graduates of the Kabul Military Academy, Karzai said that if Americans did not speed up the implementation of the program to supply armed forces, the task would be carried out by other countries. The Russian president expressed readiness to help the Afghan armed forces. Moreover, the White House has withdrawn support for Karzai also because the Barack Obama administration blames him for the drug-based economy and corruption.

As a result, Russia appears as an actor that is playing an increasingly larger role in the country and is gradually expanding the range and intensity of its engagement.

Why Afghanistan matters for Russia

First of all, the U.S. increased its existence in the Central Asia via military bases an act that Russia has perceived as coming at the expense of its security. However, after a while, Russian thinking has adjusted to the reality that the United States and its allies could not easily contain the Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan. It can be said that by 2009, Russian leaders started to become concerned that the Obama administration might suddenly withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan, which could result in Russia alone having to deal with the threat that a resurgent Taliban would pose to Central Asia and Russia itself. Russias internal conflicts, which have been continuing since the 1990s, coupled with its memories of the Chechen War and the USSRs experience in Afghanistan, mean the Kremlins sensitivity on rising Islamic radicalism might be better understood. Accordingly, Moscow decided to help the U.S. put together the Northern Distribution Network, a re-supply route that facilitates the overland transit of non-lethal goods from Europe to Afghanistan.

Moreover, the U.S. presence in the region is not the solution since it is only a military existence. Indeed, regarding Obamas decision in December 2009 to beef up the U.S presence in Afghanistan, from 33,000 to more than 60,000 troops, very few Afghans view the proposed increase as anything but a disaster. Considering that When Afghans look at the U.S. troops, they see killers, Afghans are citing the presence of U.S. forces as part of the problem rather than the solution.

Secondly, for the Kremlin, two main threats emanating from Afghanistan are drug traffic and terrorism. Russia sees the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan as a top priority since Afghanistan is the world's leading opium producer. Russia, which deals with demographic problems regarding alcohol and a low birth rate, is now facing the new, challenging issue of drug problems, especially with its young population.

Thirdly, while Moscow supports the U.S./NATO position in Afghanistan, it nevertheless tries to differentiate Russia from the West in ways that Moscow hopes will boost its standing in the eyes of Karzais administration in Kabul. While Obama-Karzai relations are at a low ebb, Russian policy has sought to emphasize Moscows long-term interest in a stable Afghanistan.

The Kremlin, by taking advantage of the tension between the Obama government and Karzai, is boosting cooperation with Afghanistan and strengthening its position as the pre-eminent actor in regional affairs.

In other words, Russia is appearing to cooperate with Western actors in Afghanistan, such as the U.S. and NATO, while also taking initiatives to strengthen its position sometimes in expanse of the U.S. since it has its own national interest which drives the Kremlin to take an active role in Afghanistan.

* This comment is first published at Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review

The Lack of Policy Entrepreneurship in Turkey-EU Relations

2011-02-05T00:29:00.000-08:00

Mustafa Kutlay, USAK Center for EU Studies

After experiencing a ‘golden age’ between 1999 and 2005, Turkey-EU relations plunged into deadlock in the post-2005 period. Many domestic and international factors contributed to the worsening of bilateral relations. On the European side, the failure of Constitutional reform, the problems emerged from the 2004 enlargement and the global financial crisis’ impact on Eurozone occupied the central agenda. On the Turkish side, the political turmoil in the pre and post 2007 general elections, the antagonizing Presidential elections and the ubiquitous Cyprus question automatically downgraded the importance of the EU in the eyes of Turkish policy-makers. Turkey’s changing foreign policy priorities, both as a reason and result of the tightening relations with the EU, also transformed the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations.

Having acknowledged the abovementioned structural factors, nevertheless, there are actor-level problems as well. Arguably, over the last five years, the structural factors have been heavily underlined. As a result, the importance and problem-solving potential of policy entrepreneurs are overlooked. In this context, the actor-level problems were set aside and constructive policies’ role in revitalizing the relationship was significantly underestimated.

Egemen Bagis: A man swimming against the tide?

One of the fundamental shortages in Turkey-EU relations is the lack of policy entrepreneurship on both sides. From Turkey’s point of view, a full-time negotiator at the ministerial level was appointed two years ago. Turkey's first exclusive Chief Negotiator and Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bagis, has devoted much ado in order to overcome the long-lasting misperceptions and prejudices. In these two years, 25 laws and 108 secondary legislations had been prepared and entered into force within the framework of the EU harmonisation process. The institutional footing of the Secretariat General for the EU Affairs (EUSG), the governmental body responsible from the coordination of the EU process, was strengthened. Mr. Bagis paid 76 official visits abroad, including Brussels. The EUSG under the directorship of Egemen Bagis appointed Deputy Governors in Turkey’s 81 provinces with the aim of increasing public awareness with regard to the EU and Turkey-EU relations.

So far seems so good and nobody should underestimate the success of Mr. Bagis. In an environment that the most influential European leaders are openly against Turkey’s EU bid and overwhelming majority of the general public in European capitals are hostile towards new enlargement wave, it would be unrealistic to expect policy entrepreneurs to solve all kind of structural problems. Nevertheless, we need to accept that many opportunities were missed.

Missed opportunities

Chief Negotiator is assumed to be a policy entrepreneur that has the skills and experience in mediating the parties and improving bilateral relations. There are mainly two characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, which are ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ roles. In terms of the first one, the policy entrepreneur is expected to coordinate the domestic interest groups around a common agenda so as to create nation-wide synergy. In our case, it refers to the unifying capacity of Chief Negotiator to converge different interest groups around the EU membership target. Arguably, EU membership is one of the most suitable common denominators for creating consensus between right-wing (dominated by the ruling party) and left-wing political strata (lead by main opposition party). The Chief Negotiator, however, did not adequately take advantage of this opportunity. Instead the EU process was used as a political instrument to tame the opposition groups. The overpolitization of the EU process in domestic politics partially exacerbated the political polarization in the country. Yet, with the help of an inclusive coordinative strategy, the EU target would have served as an instrument for dialogue and societal synergy. If the Chief Negotiator’s ‘above the politics’ position would have been used more effectively, the bilateral relations may be better managed.

Don’t throw the baby out with the bath water

The other characteristic of policy entrepreneur is communicative role. By this, the communication abilities of the entrepreneur with the outsides are underlined. In this context, the Chief Negotiator’s ability to communicate with Turkey’s European counterparts is emphasised. It is a fact that Mr. Bagis travelled frequently to European capitals and established close contacts with local interest groups. Undoubtedly, they were influential in shaking out the dusts of historical misperceptions and prejudices. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to evaluate them as part and parcel of a comprehensive communication strategy, calculated and implemented in terms of country-specific communication problems.

Over the last couple of years, the generalizations have turned out to be the currency in Turkey-EU relations. Most of the Europeans think that “Turks are Muslims, Muslims are fundamentalist and fundamentalism is bad. So they should be excluded from the European project” In a similar vein, most of the Turks assume the EU as a monolithic bloc that is against Turkey’s membership. Hence, most of the time, both parties have thrown the baby out with the bath water! The political elite, the Chief Negotiator inter alia, did not do too much to change this over caricaturization of anti-Turkish sentiments in Europe. No comprehensive communication strategy, project or plan was put into implementation, for example, to understand the specific root-causes of anti-Turkish motivations in Germany, France and Austria. As a result, the rhetoric dethroned reality and the white-black dichotomy triumphed in the reciprocal ‘blame game’.

In summary, the existing deadlock in Turkey-EU relations does not satisfy most of the integrationists in Turkey and in the EU. We can underline many structural obstacles for the existing stalemate. Especially, the political, ideational and economic turmoil in the EU occupies the central agenda. Nevertheless, there is still a large room for policy entrepreneurs to manoeuvre. Turkey’s Chief Negotiator is one of these policy entrepreneurs. Obviously, his team did many things in cleaning Turkey’s European path. Yet, they need to work harder in terms of ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’ strategies. Both Turkey and the EU must put emphasis on these issues in order not to throw the baby out with the bath water!

* This comment is first published at Todays Zaman.

P 5+1 and Iran in Vicious Circle of Negotiations

2011-02-05T00:24:00.000-08:00

Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, USAK Middle Eastern and African Studies Center

Another round of inconclusive negotiations between Iran and P 5+1 (the UN Security Council’s 5 permanent members and Germany) was held in Istanbul last week.

While the expectation about the result of Istanbul talks was not so high, this meaningless vicious circle of negotiations is overwhelming. Needless to say that the Iranian nuclear crisis is the best example of how such a technique issue could turn out to be a long lasting thorny political case.

It is really difficult to understand why the parts of this crisis insist on same inoperative demands, policies and pre-conditions rather than getting to the root of problem. This is very well known that the main problem among diverse of the crisis is the mutual trust problem. World’s major powers are concerned about the military dimension of Iranian nuclear activities and try to prevent Iran going nuclear. So for, for many in West, only solution to this widely discussed problem is a halt to enrichment activities of Iran. On the other hand Iran who has the main goal of "independent uranium enrichment" does not trust in Western countries and claim that the major powers’ intention is not dialogue or solution, but to deprive Iran from its legitimate rights. Besides in order to secure itself, Iran looks for as much as concessions that could be taken from Western countries.

Now what do we know about the result of latest Istanbul negotiations? Before anything else we know that it failed to produce any agreement or significant movement toward a compromise. In Iran’s words “the talks focused on creating common ground for cooperation”. Just God knows what it means! In major powers’ word this was not a conclusion they hoped for and it became clear that the Iranian side was not ready to negotiate unless others agreed on Iran’s preconditions.

As it was assumed before the negotiations, Iran had some demands. And after imposing two major demands as precondition, the talks deadlocked. Iran has made it clear that they will not give any concession about their inalienable right of enriching uranium. Therefore they demanded recognition for Iran’s right to enrich uranium. In addition they expect the world powers to lift the UN Security Council’s sanctions and abandon their dual track policy of diplomacy and pressure.

In return P5+1 countries were united in opposing these preconditions and they insisted that first, Iran must show its goodwill by taking confidence-building measures. They reiterated that their proposals -including a modified version of swap formula- were still in effect, but at first Iran has to choose to open talks without preconditions.

Well this process had faced nonsense barriers which consist of preconditions before. For example the Bush government who insisted on suspension of all enrichment activities before any negotiation. And as is seen this time, it is Iran’s turn to set preconditions. That’s for sure because much has changed in the nuclear dynamics between Iran and the West over the past years. It is necessary to underline that this change is a result of miscalculated policies and preconditions of the West.

Today Iran has the capacity of enriching uranium to 20 % and they also declared that they have the capacity of producing their own nuclear fuel rods. Well, this is the outcome of miscalculated policies. Right, Iran is more motivated and stronger than the past years in nuclear stage, but one need to remind Iran that preconditions act as barriers and deadlocks more than solutions.

Moreover, expecting West to lift the sanctions in a time that they believe the rounds of sanctions have begun to hurt Iran, will be nothing more than an extreme optimism. They believe that Iran’s increased isolation combined with a retrogressive economy suffering from fourth round of UN Security Council resolutions have begun to show its impact. That’s why they did not panic after the latest inconclusive negotiations. If one remind the parallel tactics such as cyber-attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, espionage activities and assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists it will be better understood that why the Western countries were relax. They did not expect the preconditions because they know that their alternative tactics to slow down the pace of Iranian nuclear program plus sanctions have worked. So this result provides them more time for talks. On the other hand, while expectations for the Istanbul talks had been low, in general 5+1 officials and many analysts hailed the unanimity of the six powers as significant achievement. Therefore if even they did not get anything concrete at the end of talks, they were satisfied about displaying a common stance which will be a message for future negotiations.

Consequently, it is obvious that the result of two days negotiations was indeed "nothing". Even if there were some agreed points nothing concrete was on the table at the end of talks. But at least neither Iran nor P5+1 closed the door for further negotiations. They did not set a date for the next round of the negotiations, but at least we must be happy that the diplomatic channels are still open and still there is a hope for a solution in the next rounds of that vicious circle. Who knows, may be one will come with the idea that this process needs a new breath and out-dated policies and initiatives do not work anymore! This is a significant criticism for both sides. As mentioned above, first both sides have to solve their mutual trust problem, later on they can move toward a win-win game based on the two sides' relative satisfaction.

A Historical Perspective for Obama's Re-election

2011-01-26T00:34:00.000-08:00

Mehmet Yegin, USAK Center for American Studies

The United States is still struggling with the economic recession. The Bush administration wrecked the economy which played quite an important role in the election of a Democrat president. Nevertheless, the U.S. could not leave the crisis behind with its new administration. Actually, the numbers are slightly better but the recovery is taking place at a slow pace. The voters underlined its inadequacy in the midterm elections by giving control of the House to the Republican Party. They may do the same for the Oval Office in 2012 as well.

The economy holds the top of the list as the most important problem of the country. According to a Gallup poll conducted on Jan. 7-9, 29 percent of Americans responded that the most important problem in the country is unemployment and 26 percent gave the answer of the economy in general. Thus, the main concerns pertain to the economy and this situation may continue for some time. Last week Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress that the recovery for the job market may take four or five years. From past experiences we know that the U.S. electorate tends to punish the incumbent presidents for bad economic performance and reward for their successes. Hence, the continuance of the current economic situation may end with a disaster for the Obama administration in the 2012 presidential elections.

In the parliamentary systems, the incumbent prime ministers may avoid the responsibility for economic failure in the coalition governments by blaming the other partners. Nonetheless, in the U.S., with the presidential system, the West Wing is almost always the clear address to be blamed for economic crises. U.S. voters punish the presidents in the elections even if the economic problems resulted from factors that are not under presidential control. For instance, the increased inflation during the Carter administration was mostly due to OPECs increase in the oil price but as the president he paid the price by losing the elections in 1980.

George H. W. Bush is another example for such punishment. Bush promised in 1988 that even in the case of repeated Congress pushes for taxes he would say, Read my lips: no new taxes. Yet, in order to cope with the budget deficit he had to break his pledge. According to the 1992 National Election Survey, seven out of 10 thought that the economy got worse during the Bush administration. In addition his opponent Bill Clinton campaigned heavily on the economy with his famous phrase, Its the economy, stupid! In the end, Bush lost his second chance to be elected despite closing the stage of the Cold War and ending the Vietnam trauma along with the Gulf War as foreign policy successes in his term. The Obama administration may face the same result with the delay of economic recovery. And the next president may well enjoy the recovered economy for reelection in 2016.

In the U.S., electoral behavior scholars suggest retrospective voting about the performance on economy. But there are examples of prospective voting as well. In short, the voters punish the incumbent for a bad economic performance but they also reward the presidents when they are successful. There are two major examples of this situation: the reelections of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. In the 1984 election campaign, Reagan reminded voters of the economic situation and reiterated the question that he wanted the voters to ask themselves before making their choice: Are you better off now than you were four years ago? And the majority of the voters responded to the question with Yes, which played an important role in defeating his Democrat opponent Walter Mondale. Clinton, in his first term, succeeded in upturning the economy. As Alvarez and Nagler pointed out, the perception of economic success played quite a significant role in Clintons reelection whereas in their hypothetical bad economic performance scenario he would have clearly lost the election to Bob Dole.

Is the economy, in short, the sole determinant of elections? Of course not! Economy is a vital factor but it is not the only or always dominant one. For instance, in the 2004 presidential elections the dominant issues were terrorism and moral values. The Sept. 11 trauma was still influential in that Bin Laden threats were increasing the security concern and the mission accomplished speech of the incumbent pointed to Bush as the better protector. Besides, the concerns on same-sex marriage and Bushs appeal to born-again Christians provided a mobilization of voters in favor of him. Thus, in the 2004 presidential elections economy performance was subordinated to the perceived performance about providing security against the threats to the country and identity.

Thus, in the case of threat, the voters primarily may evaluate the candidates for security reasons. Yet, at least for now there is not such a big threat posed to the U.S. Moreover, the public concern for terrorism is almost nonexistent. Thus, the economy seems to be the dominant theme in the 2012 elections. In retrospective or prospective terms the economy is a vital factor for the U.S. electorate. This is not simply because the Americans just think about their pockets. Indeed, Americans are mostly voting for the general well-being of the nation rather than their individual economic situation. But in either way the economy seems to play a significant role in the next presidential elections. Can the economy block the second term chances of the Obama administration? Yes, it can!

* This comment is first published in Hurriyet Daily News.

Ethnic Violence Raising Alarms in Russia

2011-01-14T01:40:00.000-08:00

Habibe Ozdal, USAK Center for Eurasian Studies

Russia has recently experienced multidimensional ethnic violence in the capital. The turmoil began in southern Moscow on Dec. 6 with the death of Yegor Sviridov, a 28-year-old fan of Spartak Moscows football club who was killed in a brawl with migrants from Russia's North Caucasus region, according to authorities. Five days later, about 5,000 nationalists and football hooligans clashed with Moscow police. The confrontation took place in Manezh Square, outside the Kremlin, and led to the arrests of 65 Spartak fans and more than 1,000 people, including members of both groups. Recent data shows that during 2010 there were more than 350 such violent incidents which resulted in the killing of 36 people. The number of incidents and killings indeed suggest that recent violence in Moscow is not coincidental and has nothing to do with sport. It is rather very much linked to the rising nationalistic and racist trend in the country.

As he often does, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once again lashed out at the liberal intelligentsia and blamed corrupt police officers for the release of a murderous North Caucasian gang for an all-too-obvious bribe, while Medvedev Tweeted that everything was under control.

The Russian government described the recent clashes in a very simplistic way, but the reality says otherwise; this is because recent, racially motivated violence reflects a real social problem in the country that has the potential to seriously disturb the stability of the Russian Federation in the long, if not short run. Russia, with its 140 million people, consists of almost 180 different ethnic communities. The latest violence based on ethnic difference draws attention by its extent. Indeed, similar incidents usually happen on a small scale in the forms of a specific murder and do not usually turns into protests as in this case. There are different explanations for the recent incident. For some, the protests reflect popular revolt at the regimes corruption and ineptitude. According to the head of the Moscow police department, migrants are responsible for 70 percent of the crime in the city. From this standpoint, it is said by Russian analysts that cultural norms and public behavior are quite different between people of Slavic origin and newcomers from the mountains, which leads to the incredible combination of social, legal, ethnic, and cultural conflict.

According to them, on top of this combination comes the horrifying corruption of Russian governmental and law enforcement officials. From this point of view, recent protests were a call for security services to take necessary steps to solve the Caucasian Problem. What all this expresses is that there a fixed view of otherness in Russia toward the people from the Caucasus region, and it seems like the Russian government is having a very difficult time dealing with it.

There is also another argument that these events are social conflicts rooted in the reality of life in Russian cities where money can buy everything while many young people find themselves without clear prospects for the future, due to poverty and anger. This can make sense especially if we consider that the Russian economy is still unable to provide prosperity for the masses among whom unemployment is rampant. From this standpoint, the basic argument usually used to explain racism and xenophobia in Europe could be the case for Russia as well. With a much more diverse, complex and problematic Russia, this can create much heavier burdens if the people of Slavic origin start facing similar attacks in the regions where they are in a minority.

Russia's Security Dilemma

From 1991 onward, the Russian government had two options to maintain unity in the multiethnic Russian Federation:

The first was the main understanding of the Boris Yeltsin era, which initially offered the regions as much sovereignty as they could swallow. But the Chechen War became the main obstacle for such a policy. Since then, the freedom promised by Yeltsin has been gradually replaced by authoritarian policies which strengthen the Kremlin over the regions, especially during Putin term.

The second was the governed democracy understanding that Putin has started to apply. However this policy paved the way for a type of government to the government that controls the country by force. As a result, the Kremlin has not only failed to bring stability to the country, but also raised the question of whether Kremlin has legitimacy in some parts of the federation. Therefore, the lack of public support for the Kremlin in those republics has raised the perception of threats to Russias stability in the eyes of policy makers in Moscow. All these mean that Russia, especially under Putin, has created a dilemma in which the more Moscow has sought stability, the more it has become an instable country.

Whatever the reason or the explanation is, it seems that racial and ethnic hate crimes are a growing problem in Russia and have the potential to create more trouble for the multiethnic federation of Russia. This is a new political challenge that the Russian elite and the Kremlin will have to deal with in the foreseeable future. The most crucial part of the problem is the acknowledgement of its gravity because without this, any solution would be insufficient.

Moreover, it is vitally important to control ethnic tensions in Russia, since it has the potential to threaten the unity of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, previous instances of state-society tension, which has continued since the 1990s between the Kremlin and the North Caucasus, could turn into inter-society tension that would then be very difficult to control. It seems that developing a successful policy for a young and multinational Russia is significantly important in controlling the rising nationalism targeting ethnic citizens.

Tunisia: Spark of Civil War or Urge for Change?

2011-01-11T03:34:00.000-08:00

Gamze Coşkun, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

There is a general belief that citizens of Middle Eastern countries are all suppressed, so accustomed to the policies of their governments and lacking a tradition of rising up against authority. Nowadays, one of these countries’ citizens are challenging this common understanding/prejudice: the Tunisians.

Tunisia, considered a police state in which rallies and riots normally do not take place, has been struggling with public unrest for more than a week. The protests started in Sidi Bouzid and directed attention to economic but in particular unemployment problems plaguing Tunisia. That the state has neglected its citizens’ social and economic needs became more apparent with the recent developments.

Being one of the first countries in the region to open up its markets to the global economy, its economy dealt with the 2009 global economic crisis well according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists. However, it seems the country was unsuccessful in lowering the unemployment rate and generating new jobs for educated newcomers.

The country’s economy is highly dependent on the European Union, Tunisia’s main export partner. The economy has proven fragile because it relies on foreign investment. This is in addition to its inability to create new job opportunities.

With its popular touristic places, beaches and desert, one of Tunisia’s foremost income sources is tourism, which along with textiles and agriculture establishes the main driving forces behind the country’s economy. In this respect, it is hard to say that these sectors provide new jobs for new graduates entering the labor market. The economy, mostly based on exports to the EU and the aforementioned low-skill sectors, does not draw a reliable and sustainable economic portrait. With this economic strategy, it is for sure that the balance between job seekers with a high education and employment opportunities will not be reached in the near future.

Another important problem is the lack of transparency, which limits protection for new local investors and in turn leads to weak entrepreneurship. Therefore, it poses another obstacle to job creation.

There also seems to be a corrupt system in which Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his cronies reap the benefits. President Ben Ali, who came to power in 1987, was re-elected in 2009 for a fifth term by getting 89 percent of the vote and defined protestors as a “minority of extremists” who act against the interests of the country. However, considering the data and the driving force behind the protests -- unemployment -- it is questionable that the unemployed people can be seen as a minority within the country. Although the Tunisian economy grew by 3.8 percent last year, the unemployment rate, which is around 14-15 percent according to official data, could not be reduced.

The patronage system common to most Arab countries and Ben Ali’s loss of connection with the people of Tunisia corrupts the system as well. What is more, Ben Ali silences the opposition and restricts human rights within the country. Tunisian media are strictly controlled. The regime is obsessed with controlling information and applies heavy censorship on the Internet as well. Therefore, bribery, favoritism and injustice apparently rule the country.

There is also obvious misdistribution and unequal development between the cities. While many cities sparkle with luxurious hotels and malls, golf and thalasso spa centers, many others, such as Sidi Bouzid, are not included in the models of development and distribution. The southern parts of the country receive very little in terms of social services and infrastructural support while the north becomes relatively wealthier, mostly thanks to tourism.

An economic miracle?

The country is always considered a miracle in the region in economic terms. If the economic progress was this high, what happened to the money flowing into the country then? Many people think the money fills the pockets of Ben Ali and his family.

As a consequence of all these pitfalls of the Tunisian economic system, public reaction culminated with the protests spreading from one city to another, although it is not common to see rallies in Tunisia. First, educated young people and their hopelessness became apparent with grief-stricken suicides. Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old university graduate, set himself on fire on Dec. 17, 2010, accelerating the unrest within the society. Unable to find a job, Bouazizi sold fruits and vegetables from a street stand that was then confiscated by police because it lacked a state license. It was the first recent outcry of the unemployed youth of Tunisia. Tension increased when another jobless young man, Lahseen Naji, electrocuted himself. Following these incidents, Ramzi al-Abboudi killed himself over unpaid debts. This then led Sidi Bouzid and surrounding towns to start a riot against the government.

On Dec. 29, President Ben Ali announced a cabinet reshuffle. The minister of communication was replaced with the former youth and sports minister and the religious affairs minister with the trade minister. However, it is questionable how effective this cabinet reshuffle will be. Are the unemployed youth interested in these replacements? The protests obviously did not aim to make a change in the cabinet but in the problematic system.

All in all, all these developments show that Tunisia needs new kinds of policies which will take the needs and demands of the population into consideration as well as leave space for criticism and tolerating public dissent. A viable strategy needs to be planned and followed in order to integrate the country’s excess human capital. It is debatable whether all these can be achieved in the Ben Ali period; however, all these protests are hoped to bring a positive economic revolution within Tunisia.

Note: This op-ed is first published at Today's Zaman.

Qatar National Bank (QNB) Branches and ATM Locations in Doha Qatar

2011-01-08T17:56:00.000-08:00

Branches

Al Sharq
Ras Abu Aboud
Fax +974 4256871

Main Branch
Cornich Road
Fax +974 4415020
QPost Office
West Bay (Al Dafna)
Fax +974 4930971

Ministry of Education Office
West Bay (Al Dafna)
Fax +974 4839093

Al Gharafa
West Bay Al Shamal
Fax +974 4862151

Ritz Carlton Doha
West Bay Al Salmyia
Fax +974 4835694

Grand Hamad
Al Ganim Al Qadem
Grand Hamad
Fax +974 4378501

Al Sadd
Fax +974 4446296

Al Rayyan
New Rayyan Street
Fax +974 4806909

Al Wakra
Southern Wakra Main Road
Fax +974 4645679

Mesaieed
Fax +974 4771062

Al Shamal
Fax +974 4731503

Al Sadd Ladies
Fax +974 4421206

Ras Laffan Industrial City
Fax +974 4739554

Ras Gas Office
Ras Gas Admin Building
Fax +974 4738066

QP Al Sadd Office
Al Sadd Street
Fax +974 47 8295

QP Head Office
West Bay
Tel +974 449 1253
Fax +974 483 1081

Al Khor
Tel +974 4720127
Fax +974 4721625

Dalala
Muntazah
Fax +974) 4677086

City Center
Al Dafna
Fax +974 4831228

QTel Office
West Bay (Al Dafna)
Fax +974 4113720

Urban Plan Office
West Bay (Al Dafna)
Fax +974 4835174

Musheireb
North Musheireb
Fax +974 4415021

West Bay (QNH Building)
West Bay Al Cornich
Fax +974 4407975

Industrial Area
Souq Al Dossari
Fax +974 4600427

Shahaniya
Al Shahaniyah Dukhan
Fax +974 4718635

Qatar University
West Bay
Fax +974) 4835082

Air Force Base
South Area Air Force Base
Fax +974 4622724

Doha Marriott Gulf Hotel
Southern Ras Buabood
Fax +974 4329041

Sheraton Doha Hotel
West Bay
Fax +974 4831469

The Mall
South Area
Fax +974 4677086

Qatar Gas office
Qatar Gas Admin Building
Fax +974 4736002

Qatar Foundation
Education City
Fax +974 482 1842

H.M.C
Al Saad
Fax +974 4415022

Doha International Airport Office
Departures Lounge
Tel +974 462 1100
Fax +974 462 1929

Salwa Road(QNB Al Islami)
Al Saad
Alnaser
Tel +974 4352111
Fax +974 4355021

ATM Locations

Meera Oneeza 1
Al Dafna Area

Al Meera South Khalifa
Khalifa South Town

Doha Sheraton Health Club

Rayan Petrol St
Area Zone: 53
Street No: 350
Al Rayan Al Jadeed

Exhibition Center ( 2 ATM )
Area Zone: 61
Street No: 200
Conference Center

Qtel Tower
Area Zone: 61
Street No: 200
Al Corniche

Al Meera North Khalifa
Khalifa Town

AL Meera Dafna
Al Dafna Area

VIP Terimnal Doha International Airport
Doha International Airport

Al Meera Mesaeimeer
Mesaeimeer Area

AL Meera Yarmouk
Bin Amran Area

Qipco Holding Tower
Wast Bay

Grand Hamad Building 5th Floor
QNB Buliding

AL Meera Nasraia
Al Nasria Area

Al Meera Shahania
AL Shahania Area

New Horaizon
Al Halal Area

Abu Fantas Electric Station
Al Wakrah Road

Islamic Br. ( Ramada Junction )
Area Zone: 39
Street No: 340
Fereej Al Nasr- Salwa Road

Abu Samra (Departure)
Area Zone: 96
Abu Samra Border

Ras Gas Office
Area Zone: 75
Street No: 506
Ras Gas North 6558

Wakrah Br. ( 2 ATMs )
Area Zone: 90
Street No: 311
Al Wakra Area- Main Road

Womens Hospital
Area Zone: 37
Street No: 150
Al Rayyan Road

Marriott Hotel Br.
Area Zone: 28
Street No: 210
Ras Abu Abood Street

Kahrama Building
Area Zone: 44
Street No: 250
D Ring Road

Waseel Petrol Station
Area Zone: 69
Street No: 233
Al Jamiaa Street

Traffic Depertment
Area Zone: 32
Street No: 950
Al Najda Street - Madinat Khalifa North

Al Khaleej complex
Area Zone: 23
Street No: 221
Khaleej Street, Fereg Bin Mohmud South

Mushaireb Br. ( 2 ATMs )
Area Zone: 3
Street No: 140
Mushaireb Road

Industrial Area Br. ( 2 ATMs )
Area Zone: 57
Street No: 351
Industerial Area- Street 2

Markhiya Shopping Complex
Area Zone: 33
Street No: 370
Khalifa Street

Sadd Plaza Office
Area Zone: 38
Street No: 343
Al Sadd Area- Al Sadd Street

Doha Golf Club
Area Zone: 69
Street No: 234
Doha Gulf Club Street

UmSaeed Mall
Area Zone: 92
Street No: N/A
UmSaeed

Hayatt Plaza / Giant Stores
Area Zone: 54
Street No: 364
Khalifa Stadium Street

Rumailah Hospital
Area Zone: 21
Street No: 910
Al Romeila Area- Romeila Street

Post Office
Area Zone: 60
Street No: 213
Majlis Al Taawon Street

Shahania Br.
Area Zone: 80
Street No: 382
Al Sheehaniya- Dukhan Road

City Center ( 3 ATMs)
Area Zone: 61
Street No: 850
Conferences center's Street

QF AL Jazeera Children Channel

Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Tadamoun P.S

QAPCO Mesaieed

Mall Wall

Waqood Mesaimeer 1 P.S ( 2 ATMs )

University Active Hall

Mobile Branch

Gulf Helicopter

Four Seasons Staff Complex

Ministry Of Education Office
Sadd Ladies
Area Zone: 39
Street No: 947
Al Marbad Road

Al Meera Oneez 2
Al Dafna Area

Airport Arrivals
Area Zone: 48
Street No: 910
Doha International Airport

Rayan Br. ( 2 ATMs)
Area Zone: 52
Street No: 640
Old Rayan- Al Shagab

AL-Gharafa Br. ( 2 ATMs )
Area Zone: 51
Street No: 686
Abroug Street

QatarGas
Area Zone: 75
Street No: 102
Halul Street

Ashgal
West Bay

Al Jazeera Children Channel
Area Zone: 52
Street No: 602
Jeri Al Rosha Street

Al Meera - Al Muntazh Br.

Al Meera Shamal
Al Shamal Area

Al Meera Hilal
Al Hilal Area

Al Meera Khor
Al Khor

Dalalah Brokerage & Investment Holding

Al Meera Mansoura (2 ATM)

Al Baraha Complex

Weil Cornell University
Area Zone: 52
Street No: 602
Jeri Al Rosha Street

Abu Samra Arrival
Area Zone: 96
Abu Samara Arrival

Qatar Transport Company (Karwa)
QTC Industrait Area

Qatar Sport Club
Area Zone: 62
Street No: 380
Al Markhiya Street

Granada Complex
Area Zone: 36
Street No: 362
Al Jazira Al Arabiya Street

UmSaeed Br.
Area Zone: 92

University Ladies Br.

Area Zone: 68
Street No: 233
Al Jamiaa Street

Ritz Carlton
Area Zone: 66
Street No: 52
Al Safliyha Street

West Bay Br.
Area Zone: 60
Street No: 850
QGPC Street

AL Meera Cooperative - Zghawa.
Area Zone: 51
Street No: 595
Zikriet Road / zghiwa

Main Branch
Area Zone: 7
Street No: 810
Abdulla bin jassim Road

Duhail Petrol St.
Area Zone: 30
Street No: 253
Al Duhail Area- Al Shamal Street

Hamad Hospital
Area Zone: 37
Street No: 232
Ahmad Bin Ali Street

Shamal Br.
Area Zone: 79
Street No: 253
AL Shamal City

Landmark
Area Zone: 31
Street No: 380
Umm Lekhba Area- Al Markhiya Street

Sadd Men Br. ( 2 ATMs )
Area Zone: 39
Street No: 343
Fereej Al nasr - Al Sadd Street

Grand Hamad Street Br. ( 2 ATMs )
Area Zone: 5
Street No: 119
Grand Hamad Street

Doha Sheraton Br.
Area Zone: 61
Street No: 390
Al Funduq Street

Waab Petrol St.
Area Zone: 55
Street No: 364
Al Waab Street

Town Center
Area Zone: 37
Street No: 232
Ahmed Bin Ali Street

Dasman Center
Area Zone: 26
Street No: 310
Airport Street

Muntazah P. St.
Area Zone: 40
Street No: 230
New Slata Area- C Ring Road

Airport Departure Office
Area Zone: 48
Street No: 910
Doha International Airport

Merweb Hotel
Area Zone: 39
Street No: 343
Fereej Al Nasr- Al Saad Street

AL Thayen Muncipility

Urban Planning Office

Rivera Compound

AL Khor Coastal P.S

University Men

Grand Hamad Islamic Br. ( 2 ATMs )

AL Khor Hospital

Qatar Foundation

QP Westbay

Abu Hamour Petrol Station

Air Force Br.
Area Zone: 47
Street No: 310
Airport Road

Doha Petrol St.
Area Zone: 14
Street No: 330
Al Montazah Road

Banks in Doha Qatar

2011-01-08T17:51:00.000-08:00

Qatar National Bank
Call center: (+974) 440-7777

Email : ccsupport@qnb.com.qa

Retail Banking Tel (+974) 440-7777
Corporate Banking Tel (+974) 440-7321
Fax (+974) 443-1036
Private Banking Tel (+974) 440-7177
Fax (+974) 440-7636
Investments Tel (+974) 440-7339

Timings
All Branches : Sunday - Thursday: 7.30am-1pm

City Centre / Mall : Saturday - Thursday: 10.15am - 10.15pm
Friday: 4.15pm - 10.15pm Doha

Marriott/Sheraton/Ritz Carlton
Sunday - Wednesday: Morning 8.30am - 12.30pm
Afternoon 5:30pm - 8:00pm
Thursday 8:30am - 1:30pm

Friday and Saturday: Off

Bank Saderat Iran

PO Box 2256, Doha
Tel 974 4414646
Fax 974 4430121

Al Ahli Bank of Qatar

Suhim Bin Hamad Street, P.O.Box. 2309, Doha

Tel: 4232507
Fax: 4130992

Weekly working days: 7.30 am – 1.00 pm (Sunday to Thursday)

View Al Ahli Bank Branches and ATM Locations

Mashreq Bank Qatar

P.O. Box 173,
Old Al-Maghreb Area, Jabor Bin Mohammed Street, Doha

Tel +974 4413213 Fax +974 4413880

Doha Bank Limited

PO Box: 30828
Tel +974 4715634/4715631
Fax +974 4715618/31

HSBC Qatar

Tel 442 HSBC ( 442 4722) / 4382100

View Qatar HSBC Qatar Branches and ATM Locations

Banque Paribas - Qatar

Al Fardan Office Tower, 6th Floor
61 Al Funduq Street
Diplomatic District, West Bay

PO Box 2636 Doha - Qatar

Tel : (+974) 4 537537
Fax: (+974) 4 537453

Qatar Central Bank Qatar

P.O. Box No. 1234
Al Corniche Area Doha
Tel: + (974) 445-6456
Fax: + 974 443-0490 / +974 441-3650

Qatar Islamic Bank

Call Center: Tel. 4448444
Email :info@qib.com.qa

Qatar Industrial Development Bank

Grand Hamad Street
PO Box 22789
Tel 4421600
Fax 4350433
Email contact@qdb.org.qa

Arab Bank

Tel : 438 7878

Standard Chartered Bank Qatar

Doha Main Branch
Abdulla bin Jassim Street,
P.O. Box 29 Doha, Qatar
Tel + 974 4414252 / +974 4410973

The Commercial Bank of Qatar

Head Office
Grand Hamad Street

PO Box 3232, Doha

State of Qatar

Telephone: +974 449 0000
Facsimile: +974 449 0070
Telex: 4351 TEJARI DH
Swift Code : CBQAQAQA

General enquiries: info@cbq.com.qa

United Bank Limited

PO Box No 242 Doha
Tel +974-4254444
Fax +974-4254401
Email doha_branch@ublme.com

Is the European Union against Turkish Language?

2011-01-07T10:44:00.000-08:00

By Sedat LACINER

The European Union (EU) has an understanding of fostering multilingualism. EU institutions encourage EU citizens to speak as many languages as they can, as well as make significant contributions to the languages of minorities within the Union. The same stance is seen when we take the official languages of the EU into consideration: The languages of the member countries are also included in official languages of the EU. In this respect, 23 languages (German, English, French, Italian, Bulgarian, Czech, Dutch, Danish, Finnish, Greek, Hungarian, Portuguese, Spanish, Slovak, Slovenian, Romanian, Polish, Irish, Maltese, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Swedish) are accepted as official languages of the EU. In addition, Catalan, Galician and Basque are semi-official languages of the Union.

Some of these languages are spoken by only a few hundred thousand people. For example, Maltese is a micro-language spoken by only 300,000 people, yet it is one of the official languages of the 'enormous' EU. Irish is known by just 300,000 people, but the number of people who really use this language daily is around 40,000. Only 1.1 million people speak Estonian etc.

To sum up, the EU gives significant importance to languages in Europe and accepts even the languages spoken by just a few hundred thousand people as official languages to be able to keep the diversity. Too much money, time and energy are consumed while translating all the legislation into these languages.

Within these circumstances, there is a big language disregarded by the EU: Turkish. Turkish is the official language of one of the EU members: the Republic of Cyprus. If you take a look at the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, it is written that the official languages of the state are Greek and Turkish. Greek and Turkish are side by side both on Cypriot money and the stamps. Do not misunderstand; I am not referring to the state founded in the north. I mean the south! One of official languages of the EU member Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Side) is still Turkish.

Turkish language is not only one of the two official languages of Cyprus, but also millions of EU citizens' mother tongue. Millions of Bulgarian Turks, hundred thousands of Greek West Thrace Turks and almost 5 million Turks dispersed over Western Europe speak mostly in Turkish in their daily lives. Today the number of EU citizens whose mother tongue is Turkish and who speak Turkish in daily life exceeds 3 million people. Turkish is the thirteenth most spoken language in the EU countries.

In short, Turkish is not a language to be overlooked. So why does the EU exclude Turkish from its official languages in spite of all these realities? Why does the EU, which accepts Northern Cyprus as an EU territory by violating its own laws, and made the Greek Cypriot side an EU member despite all the objections and the rule of law, not accept the official language of a full member state as an official language of the EU? Is Brussels allergic not only to the religion of the Turks, but also to the language of the Turks?

It is obvious that according to the EU laws Turkish has to be accepted as one of the official languages of the EU. This is not matter of negotiations. If the EU is a law-institution, the EU authorities have no right to neglect Turkish language. In 2004 the Muslim people of the island were kept outside of the EU, while the Christian Cypriots were accepted as EU citizens. The Brussels should not follow such a racist way in accepting the Turkish language.

Reform in United Nations and Turkey

2011-01-07T10:37:00.000-08:00

By Sedat LACINER

All agrees that the United Nations (UN) needs reform. The UN was established after the Second World War and based on the balance of power of that time. The US, USSR, UK, France and China became permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power. However the balance of power dramatically shifted during the Cold War era: Japan and Germany emerged as ‘economic superpowers’; UK and France became more ‘ordinary powers’; new power areas appeared, like Asia-Pacific etc. The Cold War competition curtailed the need for structural change, yet with the end of the Cold War, the new ‘actors’ demanded more rights in the UN system. The 5-big have resisted the reform calls in the 1990s. However the Iraq War clearly showed that the current UN System cannot provide dialogue and co-operation between the big economic, military and political great powers. In another word, the UN cannot properly play a balancing role. The US did occupied Iraq without receiving French, Russian and Chinese supports. The rest of the Security Council, except the UK, was also against the American occupation in Iraq.

Now, anyone accepts that we need a more representative UN. Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (Group Four) have tried to persuade the US and other permanent members for the change. According to the Group Four’s proposal, four permanent seats go to the four countries, with two other new permanent seats to go to African nations. All these states argue that the world needs a UN which shows the real balance, and a more representative UN Security Council. Many in these countries perceive the UN as a body which has just served the US. However all of them know that they have to first convince the Americans to save a seat in the Council. The Germans in particular are aware of that the Americans are skeptical about a permanent German seat in the UN. Therefore German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder did anything possible to persuade the US President Bush in his Washington visit. Schroder argued that his country deserved a Security Council seat in part as recognition for the contributions it was making to peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans and the help it was providing to train Iraqi security forces.

“Since we are doing all these things internationally, we would very much hope that at some point in time we could also have the right to representation on the Security Council if there were the space,” Schroeder told Bush.

The US also accepts that the UN has served the American interests, however Americans too are not happy enough about quality of the ‘UN services’: Ann Patterson, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, for instance said “In its first 60 years, the United Nations has served us well. Clearly, however, it needs improving and now is the time to do it and do it collectively, acknowledging the process will be arduous and will take time."

Washington prefers a controllable UN Council. The Americans may accept Japan membership; however it seems that Washington opposes a larger UN Security Council. Washington has rejected a plan for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan to become permanent members of the council, and President Bush declared last week that “the US wants the world body to adopt broad reforms before seeking to expand the council”.

UN and Gap between Civilizations

It can be said that the US will resist and bargain will possibly last more. However a UN reform is a matter of time. Japan, Germany and some more states will receive the seats they seek. However Japan or German membership will not make the UN more representative, because all these countries can affect the global politics without the UN Security Council seat. They are at least economically powerful enough to be considered by the US and other countries. However the main gap is between the ‘civilizations’. Muslims in particular cannot reach the American or European policy-makers. One billion-Muslim world believe that the West is not sincere in its policies towards the ‘greater Middle East’, and it has not goodwill towards the Muslim countries. And most of the thorny problems are on the Muslim territories. The greater powers and the UN Security Council try to solve many formidable problems in the Middle East, Balkans, Central Asia, North Africa and other Muslim territories without real partners and representatives from the region. The result in Iraq is clear. Without any representative of the Muslims in the UN Security Council, the greater powers cannot reach long-lasting solutions, but mostly political disasters.

Global politics in the 21st century will be shaped mainly by relations between the civilizations. And the Security Council must show this balance between civilizations. To do this it needs a Muslim country on board. However, none of the key Muslim states - Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, are currently represented, nor Iran, also one of the greatest Muslim states. We should accept that none of these countries are strong enough when compared with Japan or Germany. However the Muslim world needs to be represented. Otherwise the gap between the East and West will be deepened and the world becomes more chaotic.

In this framework, it can be argued that Turkey could be an ideal candidate for the UN Security Council. Not only its religious, cultural and historical background but also its special role between the East and West make Turkey more important candidate than Germany or Japan.

Egypt, Pakistan or any other state also could be the representative of the Muslim world in the UN Council. However none of them could be representative and influential as Turkey could be. Egypt for instance, while clearly an increasingly important mediator, it is problematic as a representative of the Islamic world - it is weak, economically and politically. Turkey, on the other hand, has political and economic power: it has good relations with the Arab world, which date from the times of the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey’s Possible Contribution

As a modern democracy and economic power which links Europe and Asia and the Christian and Muslim worlds, Turkey would be an ideal permanent member of an enlarged UN Security Council as it can bridge the gap between Western countries and Islam better than the other major Muslim nations. Turkey, a secular Muslim democracy whose economy has been growing by an average 5 percent in recent years, is due to start membership talks with the European Union this year. It is the biggest economy in the Muslin world. Apart from this, it is a well-known fact that Turkey is the most pluralist and most democratic country among the Muslim countries.

Turkey has also showed its independence in foreign policy on several occasions, most recently in its refusal to allow the United States to launch attacks on Iraq from Turkish soil - forsaking US aid worth 30 billion dollars as a consequence. Yet it has been one of NATO's most loyal allies. In Afghanistan, it has participated with very great success in stabilizing the Western world. There is no reason for the US to block Turkey's entry to the Security Council. The US knows that Turkey will not be a ‘silent’ or ‘yes-sir’ member, and will not accept everything the US asked and if the US wants a 'silent' member, it naturally will not want Turkey in. However the US also knows that Turkey is a real friend of the West and the East. Turkey has representation power of Muslim world, east and its region as a whole and even of the Arab world, though it is not Arab. Syrian Prime Minister Naji Otri confirms that:

“We see Turkey as representative of the Arab and Islamic world in the EU, and this gives authorization to it”(1).

In brief, Turkey has great potential to increase the UN’s representative power. Moreover Ankara is not reluctant to take such a role: According to a recent opinion poll in Turkey, some 60 percent of Turks support reform of the current Security Council structure. Most of the Turks perceive the UN structure as unrepresentative of the current balance of power. Turkish Government too welcomes the reform of the United Nations to make it more democratic and representative of the world's changing geopolitics, and to this end welcomes the enlargement of the UN Security Council. Turkey is a part of a 22-nation group - spearheaded by Italy and including Arab league nations, plus many small African and Asian countries - which favors an increase in the number of non-permanent Security Council members and an extension of their mandate. It is a counter-offensive against the other reform proposal, that would add six new permanent members (Germany, India, Brazil, and Japan, plus two African states, probably Egypt, and South Africa) to the existing five (Britain, the United States, France, Russia and China).

***

International relations have been changing, and the power of Indo-Pacific countries is growing. Germany, Brazil and many other growing countries should be represented in the global governing system. However the UN system should not only reflect the balance of military or economic power. Even the superpowers should know that they cannot govern the whole world without asking the other civilizations. The Un needs representatives from the Greater Middle east too, and Turkey could be the best candidate for the Middle east seat in the Security Council.

Wednesday, 29 June 2005

Loss of Social Memory and its Effects on Foreign Policy

2011-01-07T07:35:00.000-08:00

Dr. Havva Kök Arslan, USAK Peace Studies Center

It is a common psychological self-defense mechanism to forget, deny or repress a negative experience such as a rape or form of sexual harassment that happened in a younger period of our life, or the sudden and unexpected death of a loved one.

When a person cannot cope with traumatic pain he or she will deny or repress it. However, the memories we alienate from our consciousness disturb us and play out in various forms of behavioral disorders in daily life. The pain in the subconscious stays with us in our dreams and in our daily lives in the form of behavioral disorders.

Do societies also deny or repress their pain? If we accept that societies also have memories, then it is possible to observe similar reactions at the social level. For example, did we not, as a nation, forget, deny or repress the trauma of the Balkan Wars that took place between 1912 and 1922?

In our recent history the biggest social trauma was the defeat in the Balkan Wars. In this defeat we lost Rumelia – the Balkan Peninsula – which constituted half of our lands. The western boundaries had to be withdrawn from the shores of the Adriatic Sea to Adrianople. Most of the cities lost were as Turkish as Bursa or Edirne. The architectural and social structure of Thessaloniki, Skopje and Sarajevo was not very different from that of Anatolia. Even today substantial similarities can be observed.

Our national and social consciousness has repressed the pain of the defeat in the Balkans and wants to forget it. It is even more bizarre that we have taught a lie in our school textbooks for years: that we were not defeated on any front in World War I, but were accepted as defeated because of the defeat of our allies.

The opposite of our reaction to what happened in the Balkans can be seen today among many Armenians. In 1915, only three years after the loss of all of those Rumelian cities in the Balkans, with the fear of a similar loss in Eastern Anatolia and of the establishment of an independent Armenia (which possibly could have been formed with the help of the Russian army and armed Armenian organizations), Armenians were relocated to southern parts of the Ottoman Empire – in what is today’s Syria.

Talat Pasha, the mastermind of this relocation, wrote in his memoirs that this turned into a tragedy. No matter what we call it, it is quite certain the whole event is one of the greatest pains of humanity. We psychologically buried this fact until our diplomats were allegedly assassinated by terrorists from the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, or ASALA, in the 1970s.

Today, “genocide” for Armenians, or “relocation” for Turks, is perceived differently by both sides. It has two dimensions: a psychological-humanitarian one and a political one. For Armenians, the Turkish denial of what they see as fact is met with anger because, they say, they were deported from their motherlands where they had lived for thousands of years and hundreds of thousands of them lost their lives during the deportation.

The political dimension of the fact is, however, much different. Armenians behave as if Turkey invaded an independent Armenia in 1915. The fact is that Armenians were Ottoman subjects and they were one of the Empire’s minorities. Most Armenians believe the cost of this genocide can only be compensated by the annexation of Eastern Anatolia to Armenia in accordance with the Sevres Treaty. Some of them also say they would accept some form of compensation payment.

If we browse Armenian websites we cannot find any evidence of Armenian demands for Turkish citizenship, or any wish to return to the land as Turkish citizens like their grandfathers. Instead of this, there is every indication that the ideal of Eastern Anatolia’s annexation to Armenia is firmly situated in their hearts.

It is a fact that most Armenians do not recognize the border drawn by the Gümrü and Moscow treaties after the battles between the forces of the Turkish Parliament and the Armenian Army, but rather see Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia under occupation.

At the state level, they use Mount Ararat as their national symbol and claim it back from Turkey. This point of view is not only unrealistic but also shows the existence of a pathological national memory. If one moves with the same logic, Turks should not recognize the Karlovitz Treaty and dream of expanding our western borders to near Vienna. No sensible Turk has such a dream. Armenians may get angry with this metaphor, however there is no end to nationalistic daydreaming and many irrational claims that would bind Turkey’s presence in Europe to the Huns and Etruscans.

When we look at Turkish-Balkan relations today, Balkan immigrants who make up a sizeable proportion of Turkish society today are not grieving over the loss of the lands they were once masters of. Nonetheless, Turkey is returning to the Balkans, but this return is not on the back of an army, but through the Ziraat Bank, which was originally established in the Balkans.

Turkey not only supports the Balkan Muslims who were its allies in the region, but also tries to win over the Serbs who confront them and therefore tries to reestablish peace between nations. In this respect, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu will definitely be recorded in history. With a very correct approach, Turkey tries not to repossess its former Rumelian provinces but tries to make the existing borders transparent and therefore establish peace and mutual understanding between nations.

What is to be done on the Armenian question then? First of all, we have to help Armenians quit their pathological reaction. For this, we should first end our own pathological reaction which says: "What can we do? What is done is done. You rebelled against us and killed our compatriots too." Whether they were Turkish, Kurdish or Armenian, those who died were our own citizens.

We have to express our sincere grief for the loss of our civilian Armenian citizens. This could be done in several ways. For instance, a monument for the victims of relocation could be erected in Eastern Anatolia. April 24, when Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul were arrested in groups, could be accepted as a day of commemoration for the victims of relocation. We could organize a day of fraternity with the Armenian Patriarch on that date. With such initiatives, April 24 could become a day of peace rather than a day of hatred as it is today.

With hate replaced by peace, borders will become transparent. Granting the right of citizenship to Armenians of Anatolian origin, who really are sincere in the desire to serve the common motherland should be seriously considered. What would Turkey lose if a street in Bitlis is named after William Saroyan, who was born in Bitlis? Or the world-famous duduk performer Djivan Gasparyan was given the key to the city of Mus, where he was born, along with Turkish citizenship and a passport?

*This comment is first published on Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review

Model Partnership in the Middle East: Turkish-Syrian Relations

2011-01-05T06:47:00.000-08:00

Gamze Coşkun, USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

Turkey has come to the forefront due to its policies on improving relations with Middle Eastern countries in recent years, especially with its neighbors. In this respect, one of the most significant steps has been taken in Turkish-Syrian relations. The exemplary relations have been going through a phase of transition from competition to integration for almost a decade.

With the 1998 Adana Protocol and the following developments, relations started to become normalized and have been proceeding toward a model partnership for the rest of the region. The second meeting of the Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, or HSCC, held on Dec. 20-21, 2010, was one of the most concrete/tangible signals of the progress concerning bilateral relations.

The first HSCC meeting held on Oct. 13, 2009, in Aleppo and Gaziantep created many historical opportunities for cooperation, such as the signing of 51 treaties which had previously not been realized by either country. No more than a decade ago, it was almost impossible even to imagine that the prime ministers of these countries could sit around the same table and discuss cooperation possibilities. However, nowadays the prime ministers sign social, economic and political agreements, make efforts to deepen relations and try to accomplish a mutual vision for the future of the region.

The trade volume between Turkey and Syria, which had not exceeded even 1 billion dollars just 10 years ago, is now expected to reach around 5 billion dollars in a few years. The trade volume, which was 1.4 billion dollars during the first ten-month period of 2009, has increased to 2.1 billion dollars within the same period of 2010. Furthermore, thanks to the visa exemption policy, the number of mutual visits between peoples of the two countries has skyrocketed. In 2010, 750,000 Syrians entered Turkey while the number of Turks visiting Syria reached 1.35 million people.

Within this framework, 11 agreements were signed between Turkey and Syria during the second meeting of the HSCC with the participation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian Prime Minister Naji al-Otari, accompanied by a number of ministers from both countries. Following the meeting, both parties reached an agreement on documents concerning cooperation on social services, child protection, the supply and distribution of electricity and sustainable energy, energy protection, real estate, environmental protection, development and housing. All of this was in addition to the cooperation among the State Planning Commission, the Turkish Development Bank, the Turkish Finance Ministry and the Turkish Undersecretariat of the Treasury. These developments that added new dimensions to the matter are all signs of the establishment of deep-rooted relations. What is more, the construction of the Nusaybin-al-Qamishli Customs Gate and a friendship dam on the Asi River, the establishment of a Turkish-Syrian bank and the provision of high-speed train services between the southeastern Turkish province of Gaziantep and Aleppo show the great progress reached in a very short time span.

In addition to all these far-reaching improvements, the two countries, which once came to the brink of waging war against each other because of terrorism issues, have now agreed on cooperation on counter-terrorism, as both have declared terrorism a common enemy and decided to pursue a decisive policy against the threat.

In this respect, Syria has already extradited at least 110 terrorists to Turkey. In the same way, operations against members of terrorist organizations are being conducted in line with Turkish demands.

Beyond the advantages of all these bilateral efforts for Turkey and Syria, it is of vital importance that these developments could set a precedent for other regional countries. In this regard, Syria is seen as the locomotive country of the region. As it is considered an important gate to the Arab market, it is highly likely that any sort of improvement in relations with the country will have a spillover effect and be taken as a model by others. That is to say, one of the most effective ways of encouraging other countries to take initiatives is to establish such a model partnership with Syria. As a result, countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt have reiterated their will to see Turkey successful cooperate with them as it does with Syria.

With the establishment of better relations with regional countries, Turkey aims to do more than simply take care of its own interests. There is a much broader aim of expanding the atmosphere of prosperity and welfare to the whole region. These policies have gradually brought fruitful consequences. One of the striking examples is the establishment of a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon for the creation of a long-run strategic partnership and free-trade zone between the countries.

Therefore, it seems that the Turkish-Syrian model partnership will be able to transform the region into a more prosperous, developed and livable place. Although Turkey has not been able to realize its model partnership with the United States, it is clear that it has not stayed idle while waiting for U.S. President Barack Obama.

Note: This op-ed is first published at Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review

Attack to Turkish Mosque in Netherlands

2011-01-03T08:14:00.000-08:00

By Gizem Yeldan (JTW)

The Sultan Ahmet Mosque which was connected to the Religious Foundation of the Netherlands (HDV) was attacked by unidentified persons in the New Years Eve. Financial damage has occurred in the mosque.

Ramazan Gul, the president of the mosque association, stated that the attack was done deliberately referring to police reports. “The mosque has been attacked for the first time. We have a good dialog with Dutchs. The attackers are unknown. They broke windows by removing shutters with iron crowber and then they escaped”, he added.

By Gizem Yeldan (JTW)

3 January 2010

Turkish President: If I Knew Kurdish I would Speak

2010-12-31T04:06:00.001-08:00

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

Turkish President Abdullah Gul sent out messages of unity during his trip to the Turkey’s southeastern province of Diyarbakir.

President Abdullah Gul said, "Turkish is and will be the official language of the Republic of Turkey. Also, Turkish is the language of the state and public institutions and our common language and added, “We will remove terrorism and gun from Turkey’s agenda. "

While he is traveling to Diyarbakır, journalists asked President Gul if he would speak Kurdish or not, “If I knew Kurdish, I would speak” he answered.

“I had said that good things would happen; now it is happening. But if terrorism, violence and blood smudge in politics, we damage our own people. Nothing can be gained with violence, terror, or weapons. I am calling out to businesspeople from here: A lot of investments should be made here. Diyarbakir has a great potential,” he added.

Gul's trip to Diyarbakir, comes amidst rising political controversy over the call for autonomy for Turkey's Kurds, and the use of two languages in the southeast, made recently by Democratic Society Congress in Diyarbakir.

According to Assoc. Prof. Havva Kok International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) Peace Studies expert, the official visit of the President shows how much he gives importance to Diyarbakir.

Diyarbakir is the largest city in southeastern Turkey. The population of Diyarbaiır is made up predominantly of Kurdish people.

31 December 2010

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

The Case of Bashkortostan: Impacts of Moscows Centralization Efforts

2010-12-31T01:06:00.000-08:00

Gulay Kılıc, USAK Center for Eurasian Studies

This year in last July, the President was replaced in the Republic of Bashkortostan. The replacement was realized silently, yet it is not in total concord with democracy because, Rustem Khamitov has been appointed as the president in replacement for his predecessor Murtaza Rakhimov by Russia. The replacement has been realized as follows: first, following the negotiations in the parliament, the list of the candidates determined by the ruling party of Bashkortostan was sent to Russia. Then, Moscow notified the most appropriate candidate to Bashkortostan to be approved in the parliament. The candidate started his new duty with the parliaments majority vote. The same process is implemented also in the other federate countries.

In Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov started his duty as the President in the perestroika period and performed until 2010; within this period approximately 15 years long, he was elected as a president of the republic three times successively via referendum. But the last replacement is realized in consequence of an appointment instead of an election. Moscow appointed the acceptable candidate as the President of the Federal Republic. As Bashkortostan was not the first country subject to this interference, this appointment did not make a tremendous impact in Russia. Within the framework of the administration reform made on the grounds of relatively centralized politics of Putin, also in Tatarstan and Dagestan such appointments have been realized. According to this administrative system the administrators of all regions are elected by Moscow and submitted to the parliaments. If a majority vote cannot be obtained in three voting, the parliament is abolished and a new election is held. This then means that will of people about whom they want their president is actually influenced or so to speak forced by Moscow in line with the powers linking.

For Moscow Bashkortostan is an important federal state; foundation of certain economically powerful and influential to companies in this region is the most important reason of Moscows desire for controlling the region. In line with this purpose, Moscow wants to increase its central control in the republic in question. Within this scope, instead of directly interfering the internal affairs of the federal republics, by putting new systems and laws in effect, it indirectly tries to change the situation in favor of Russia. This centrist policies which may be considered to be natural so far as current Russian political structure is concerned is not indeed received well by the federal republics.

When we address Bashkortostan as an example, we see that appointment of the President by Russia without an election is accepted with hesitation. The First President of Bashkortostan Rakhimov seemed to have an approach supporting Moscow; however he managed to balance the situation with the help of his uniting and protective attitude towards his people. For a certain period, in the press there was news about realization of a velvet revolution in Bashkortostan against Rakhimov similar to the examples which took place in Central Asia, Caucasian and Eastern European countries, but the majority of the intellectuals supporting the opposition preferred to follow the legal paths.

For this reason, contrary to the expectations, the policies of Russia implemented in the federal republics aiming at central empowerment may not result in favor of Russia, but against Russia. Because, the President who comes into power as Moscows supporter divides the country into two and creates unrest in the country. Whereas, if Russia had created a system in the federal countries where the public took part in the administration, by means of economic, cultural and social relationships it would be able to integrate these countries within the Russian Federation more easily. At this point there is an important fact which must be kept in mind; in every federal country there are Russian residents. Russian people are an important to trump cards for Russia. By means of the Russian people living in the region, Russia can establish its authority in a more moderate manner. On the other hand, even if their President is a supporter of Russia, for the people of Bashkortostan it is more important that the President comes to power democratically by means of election. The importance of democracy and freedom in Bashkortostan was emphasized once more during the 3rd World Bashkir Congress held in June. Among the decisions taken at the Congress, there are the issues regarding the modernization of the political system in Russia and activation of the democratic rights and freedoms. Besides the history, culture and traditions of the Bashkirs along with the necessity for protection and continuation of democracy is underlined. When the period following the end of the Soviet Union is examined, it is observed that such federal republics as Bashkortostan, Tartarstan and Chuvashia, which declared themselves as federal republics started performing their internal affairs independently from Moscow. Comparing with the federal rights of Chechenya before it declared independence; Bashkortostan had already had a broader autonomy. So, now Bashkortostan has insisted on keeping that large autonomous rights and the political system they have secured for Ufa. There are however serious hurdles before putting these rights into the reality in the republic. Particularly the FSB, successor of renown secret service, KGB of Soviet State, often refers Bashkirs as terrorists especially they have raised their rights, including federal, against Moscow. As a matter of fact, as long as Moscow supports such approaches, it indirectly contributes to a kind of political formation that would be, in fact, against Russia in the region, in the long run.

The case of Bashkurdistan tells that, even though the living conditions has been improved in Russia, especially in the last years it went into a decline with regards to improvement of human rights and freedoms and did not exhibit a democratic approach regarding the federal republics. Implementation of centralist policies for the purpose of ensuring control on the federal republics has disturbed them. On the grounds of this fact, it can be said that maintenance of democracy and pluralist election system in the federal republics will be more convenient for the healthy political & social development of the Russian Federation itself and every individual republics in it.

Turkey's Nuclear Ambition in the New Era

2010-12-31T00:58:00.000-08:00

Hasan Selim Ozertem, USAK Center for Eurasian Studies

Throughout the previous decade, one of the main rhetorics in Turkish diplomacy was to become the fourth energy artery for Europe. Parallel to this motto, Turkey pursued a pro-active policy in the Middle East and Caspian Basin. However, it had to face political constraints in Iran and Iraq, whereas in the Caspian Basin could only succeed in finishing several projects in its own modest way.

Even though Turkey is yet to succeed in becoming an energy hub, it is an important country for energy potential and existing policies. However, again mega projects like Nabucco, South Stream, Samsun Ceyhan and the Trans-Caspian Pipeline cannot be imagined without Turkey. Thus, looking back, Turkey strengthened its position on an international level and became one of the main actors in the energy sector in its region.

Over the years, Turkey's strategy has shown energy business that it has a multidimensional character which is not only technical, but includes detailed policy that incorporates issues of the economy, foreign policy and security. In this sense, these policies while helping Turkey to strengthen its geostrategic position also contributed to Turkeys energy security. However, it seems Ankara has to take more serious steps to safeguard its immediate future in the sector. Thus, it could be argued that national motives will gain a greater importance in Turkeys energy strategy, while the international dimension of Turkish energy policy remains high on the agenda.

Focusing on energy policies for national purposes

In the last decade, Turkey has tried to increase the share of the countrys national resources used in its energy consumption. In this regard, hydropower policies and renewable energy investments, along with thermal energy, recently gained impetus. Accordingly, the Turkish state reformed the legal basis and its policies in order to stimulate projects and create a favorable environment for both foreign and Turkish entrepreneurs.

Even though Turkish strategy is to support investments using national resources, the problem is that Turkey has limited resources, and apart from coal reserves, renewable energy and hydropower, is open to fluctuations because of seasonal effects. Moreover, despite promises it represents, renewable energy seems to be secondary in the countrys strategy when compared to conventional energy resources. In this sense, Turkey is in need of sustainable, stable energy resources. However, its dependence on foreign resources places the issue of diversification high on the agenda.

In terms of diversification, Turkey's is hardly one of the success stories. The country is particularly dependent on Russia for natural gas from which it obtains 65 percent of its gas requirements as well as other partners such as Iran, Azerbaijan and a number of African states, and it hardly has the capacity to substitute Russian dominance in the Turkish market. Moreover, among energy partner countries, Iran seems to be the least reliable partner because of problems of stability in the colder winter periods.

In general terms, Turkey is dependent on imported energy to a level of 70 percent and increases in demand sit at around 5.5 percent to 6 percent per year. In times of economic prosperity this may reach to 8 percent. Thus, Turkey is facing a compromise between growth and increasing its capacity in energy generation. Considering the fact that Turkey will be growing at around 5 percent to 6 percent annually over the next three years and aims to climb the steps of the G20 by 2023, a second option for Turkey is not on the cards.

Nuclear ambitions: Seeking for partners in the East

Turkey wants to minimize fluctuations in energy generation and needs big scale investments in the new period. In this sense, over the next decade Ankara intends to include nuclear technology in its portfolio without any delays. However, there is the urge of diversifying its partners in energy sector as well. In this regard, Russian nuclear power plant in Mersin Akkuyu seems to be the first investment with the capacity of 4800 MW and Turkey is looking for another investor in the Black Sea coast of Turkey, Sinop.

The Russian project is important for Turkey as being a reference model for other projects. However, it has its own constrains. First of all, the interdependence between Russia and Turkey will be increasing in energy sphere apart from Turkey's existing dependence on Russian hydrocarbon resources. Turkey intends to balance this situation by persuading Moscow to provide the necessary financial source to the project. In this sense, while bringing foreign direct investment to the country, Turkey also aims to minimize the risk.

It seems that Russia perceives the project more strategic than commercial and decisive in terms of finalizing the project. When finalized the power plant will be active for 60 years and there is a state guarantee that Turkey will buy the generated electricity for 20 years. Even though 20 years is perceived as a long-term commitment, the $20 billion dollar of investment of Russians and depreciation of price due to time lag makes it understandable.

However, there is another risk that arises in the security sphere of the Russian project. Even though the project seems attractive, Russian political cultures not being liberal is causing some concerns about the future. The Russian reflex in a possible regional conflict between Russia and Georgia is hard to imagine if Turkey pursued a different strategy to Moscow. However, the Turkish government continues to support the project as both economically and strategically beneficial for Turkey.

As mentioned, Turkey is aiming to find new partners in the energy business. Accordingly, Energy Minister Taner Yıldız is looking for new investors in the Asia Pacific region. The shuttle diplomacy between Turkey and the countries in the region has gained impetus recently. Even though Turkey failed to ink an agreement with South Korea, it seems that Japan is appearing as another promising potential partner. Turkey and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding in Tokyo to build a nuclear power plant in Sinop. Another meeting will be made between two partners to discuss the terms and conditions of the parties in three months time. If parties sign an agreement the security and dependency problem will be overcome, up to a certain extent, for Ankara. Japan, as a country specialized in nuclear technology, is known to be building reactors resistant to earthquakes and the countrys disciplined business culture could be an asset to Turkey. However, Turkey should continue to look for other partners in the world to create a dynamic environment and culture in nuclear technology. Considering the fact that efficiency and lower cost is the main essence of competition, Turkey would benefit from these partnerships.

Turkey aims to generate between 5 percent and 10 percent of its energy needs from nuclear technology over the next decade. In this sense, Turkey needs a consistent and sustainable nuclear energy strategy. Recent steps taken should be analyzed carefully and the energy ministers steps should also be supported by diplomatic channels. The agreements should be made in terms of mutual benefits and it should be underlined here that these initiatives are vital not only for Turkey. Considering the global financial crisis and slowing economies, mega projects are also important for investor countries.

Moreover, the Turkish private sector should take an active role in these projects. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkish engineers learned how to build hydroelectricity power plants from Western engineers. Now, Turkish companies are not only building hydroelectricity power plants in Turkey but also taking over big projects all over the world which shows the competitive capacity of the Turkish economy.

Note: This op-ed is first published at Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review

Student Protests and Reactions: Shall We Talk for a Minute?

2010-12-26T23:37:00.000-08:00

Dilek Aydemir, USAK, Center for Social Studies

Turkey has been the scene of student protests in the tail of 2010 such like Europe. Protests which were sparkled with the Turkish prime ministers Dolmabahe meeting with university rectors went on for weeks and turned into egg throwing acts toward a number of politicians, businesspeople, writers and civil society representatives. The protests have been characterized in our minds with tough police response, aggressive fights between police and protestors along with flying eggs in the background.

While organizers in Central London promise more student protest in the next month, enduring student protests in Turkey also ensure that the issue will continue to occupy media headlines in the coming year. Thus, there is an urgent need to understand the societal causes of these protests. When we direct a close eye toward the protests in general, violence and use of force have diverse determinants, which more or less stem from a systemic attitude against these factors, while a lack of social communication channels between the parties of the dispute has to be underlined as one of the social aspects of the issue. Moreover, the question of who is going to adopt violence? also needs to be evaluated.

How to describe the state of mind?

In the Weberian conceptualization of the state, the police appear as one of the basic state apparatus endowed with the legitimate power to use force. In this regard, the police is portrayed as an organic mechanism like a bodily system is defined as the fist which is directed against outside threats to the system. In this analogy, the police are the embodied form of this very system which is materialized against the threats to social order. Hence, the problematique does not end with the questioning of the police force, since it does not start there. Indeed, if we scratch the faade of violence and the use of force, it would not be hard to realize that they are mostly fed by legitimization in the system more than personal outbursts.

From students perspective, young people encounter the states police face in these protests. A lack of diverse communication channels between the state and students may to be underlined as the most problematic aspect of these encounters. Although student protests have also been criticized in numerous media outlets for being outdated, what about considering this once more: No one goes to a protest because they hope to be beaten by the police. Yet, social distress, which finds its form in street protests, can be read as a symptom of peoples loss of faith in diverse mechanisms to voice their demands. On the other hand, whether some like it or not, nobody has the right to interrupt anothers self-expression with an egging. The rise of such an act as the protest of groups who are seeking the enhancement of democratic rights destroys the significance and forcefulness of their demands. In this brief picture, the main problem related to states part can be defined as the legitimization and internalization of the violence and use of force by the system. From the systemic aspect, states mostly approach social movements and protests in two paradigms.

According to the first paradigm, protests and shouting due to social distress is perceived as an anomaly, a pathology damaging the social order. This approach leads us to either ignore or terminate the problems raised by the protestors. Even so, from the second point of view, the expression of social problems via diverse ways and facing clash of ideas bearably is a path for negotiation.

What we see in general is that states instrumentalize the first paradigm and look upon the social distress raised by young people as an inevitable generation gap. This approach, which is heavily based on a mundane neglect of social problems, is not only unable to provide answers to wide critiques which are embodied in the form of street protests, but also dwarf in examining the public tension of social problems. In this regard, the movements and protests which are thought to have been abolished from the scene reappears in time, especially when politicians agree that they finally have a smoothly functioning society.

Why not keep on protesting?

As a matter of fact, universities, and especially big cities, are the basic spaces of opposition and social struggle not only in Turkey but all around the world. The rise of alternative protests and the search for diverse rights are not scary and surprising, but rather necessary in democracies. A neglect of the problems of youth and their demands does not provide long-term solutions to the state. Hence, instead of clamping down on protests with use of force, the right to social opposition and struggle should be backed as a democratic right and alternative mediums for negotiation must be created.

Street protests should not be promoted as the only medium of raising a voice and affecting political decision-making processes as well. Instead of street protests which can easily turn into discourse and violence games, civic initiatives between the state and society need to be enhanced. Moreover, these mediums can serve for the representation of diverse social groups not limited to university students, but also include movements asking for the elimination of socio-economic inequality, expanded human rights and a solution to large unemployment problems.

Unless these complex structural and social dynamics of protests are considered and channels for wider communication are provided, raising a systemic critique to the problem of the use of force and violence will not be an easy task.

* Dilek Aydemir is a researcher in the field of sociology at the International Strategic Research Organization, or USAK, Center for Social Studies in Ankara. She can be reached at

daydemir@usak.org.tr.

First published in Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review

‘Towards an Israeli-Turkish War’

2010-12-23T04:40:00.000-08:00

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

ANKARA - Greek Cypriot Government and Israel signed an agreement aiming at facilitating the search for mineral deposits in the east Mediterranean, where huge natural gas reserves have been discovered by a US firm last week. However, the agreement disregards the rights and jurisdiction of Turkish Cypriot State (TRNC).

Turkey's Foreign Ministry stated that Turkish Cypriots have also rights and jurisdiction over the maritime areas of Cyprus Island. The statement indicated that countries in the regions should not back moves “that would have a negative impact on the comprehensive settlement negotiations” and that “agreements signed by the Greek Cypriots with countries of the region are null and void for Turkey.”

According to, Ardan Zenturk, a Turkish columnist, Turkey’s attitude is so clear about this issue; “it is impossible to carry out that kind of conventions without a permanent agreement which guarantees Turkish Cypriots’ rights on the island”. “If related companies would attempt to search for natural gas in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) marine space, based on the agreement with Greek Cypriots, they will find Turkish navy against themselves. If Israel would attempt to extract natural gas in this sensitive area, and be unfair against Turkish Cypriots, like it has been doing so in Palestine and Lebanon, a new war in eastern Mediterranean Sea will be inevitable”, he said.

Cyprus was split into a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north in 1974 when Turkey sent troops to the island in response to a military coup by supporters of a union with Greece. The island joined the European Union in 2004, but only the internationally recognized south enjoys membership benefits. Though the EU promised to remove isolation over the Turkish Cyprus when the Turks voted ‘yes’ to the UN peace plan, the EU has not keep its words since then. Talks aimed at reunifying the island have produced only limited progress since they began more than two years ago.

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

23 December 2010

Turkey's Struggle against Ethnic Terrorism-I: From PKK to KCK

2010-12-16T05:24:00.000-08:00

Suleyman Ozeren, JTW Columnist

From the PKK to the KCK: What is New?

The purpose of this article is to examine the current situation of the PKK in terms of its organizational and ideological perspectives. These series will try to summarize the historical background, structural changes within the organization as well as the current situation of the PKK. Basically it will be an overview of the PKKs cyclical tendencies, especially, from 1999 to 2010. This time period is very critical in understanding the PKKs current situation. The author is aware of the fact that taking such a time frame might be problematic, so the next piece will be a summary of the PKKs modus operandi between 1978 and 1999. The issue of the KCK will be one of the main topics we will discuss later on, and debates about the DTK, KCK, and BDP will also be examined.

Turkey has been witnessing rather a dramatic change in many aspects, including social, economic, cultural, and political. One of the things that represent such a change is how Turkey perceives its terrorism problem. Turkey is one of the countries, which has been struggling against different terrorist organizations with variety of ideologies. From Hezbollah terrorist organization, which has been exploiting religion and left wing terrorist organizations, including DHKP/C, TIKKO, MLPK to separatist terrorist organization, the PKK.

While fighting against the PKK, Turkey has gone through different counterterrorism policies. Usually Eruh attack on August 15, 1984 is considered as the first attack of the PKK terrorist organization. From 1984 to up until early 1990s the term has passed as a denying-learning stage for Turkish policy makers, politicians, and security forces. However, starting from early 1990s, it has been realized that terrorism threat is not something that regular security forces could cope. This realization led to establishment of Special Operations Units and SWAT teams within the Police and Gendarmerie. These units has played significant role in dismantling terrorists during the operations. Throughout 1990s, Turkish governments, regardless of their political background, have defined terrorism problem as a security problem. Consequently security-oriented policies, programs, and projects have been the major focus. In addition, it seemed that these governments had preferred to transfer the responsibility and authority of countering terrorism to the security forces.

During late 1990s, however, it has been recognized that terrorism is not limited to security issues; rather, there have been inherent problems which have been fostering terrorism. These problems included social, economic, cultural, political, and psychological issues, all of which have existed in the East and Southeastern part of Anatolia. So the governments then have started to develop social and economic projects to overcome the aforementioned problems. This impetus has created a kind of understanding that terrorism problem is not just about dismantling the terrorist camps, members of the PKK, and their infrastructure. Accordingly, underlying political, socio-economic, and cultural problems, which have been exploited by the PKK, have been taken into consideration. Thanks to the efforts toward accession to the European Union, Turkish governments introduced new democratization packages or political reforms, and the Turkish Parliament has amended significant number of legislations. Some of the political reforms under such attempts included the Turkish Penal Code and its articles on freedom of expression and association; the death penalty; the State Security Courts; and the National Security Council, the transparency of the public sector and the violations of human rights.

Terrorism problem now and for the last 7-8 years has been related to not only socio-economic and cultural problems but also democracy in Turkey. In this context, developing democratic standards in Turkey has become a major concern; however, it has also potential risks due to chronic nature of long-lasting terrorism problem in this country. Regardless, the ruling party had decided to take the risks, and they have launched a big project, called democratization initiative or National Togetherness and Brotherhood Project.

The PKK, on the other hand, replied the aforementioned policy changes of the Turkish government in different ways. Mainly, the terrorist organization has developed strategies and tactics according to the social and political conditions in Turkey and abroad. As being a leader-centered organization, the PKK has been led by Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in prison in Turkey since 1999.

The next piece will focus on the general overview of the PKKs ideological and tactical transformation. It will specifically analyze the historical perspective of PKKs adaptation to changing nature of political and social environment in Turkey and abroad.

Christian Brother Killed Inter-Religious Couple

2010-12-14T03:33:00.000-08:00

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

ANKARA - A young inter-religious couple were shot to death in Istanbul’s Fatih district on Saturday by bride’s brother.

According to reports from the crime scene, the murder took place on Cevdetpasa Avenue in the district’s Seyitomer neighborhood. Police teams identified the victims as a Turkish Armenian woman, Soney Vural, and Muslim Turkish man, Zekeriya Vural who had married despite opposition of the bride’s family. The crime scene report suggests the murderers fired one bullet at each victim, targeting their heads.

The murder suspect Gonay Oymen, bride’s brother told the police that his sister had said him that Zekeriya Vural became a Christian and they would have a wedding ceremony in church. According to his testimony, the suspected to meet with the couple to discuss the issue. In the meeting, however, as Zekeriya Vural stated it was a humiliation for his family to hold a wedding ceremony in a church and reportedly arqued with the suspect. Following the incidents, Gonay Oymen committed the crime.

After the murder, primary school graduate Gonay Oyman was arrasted and taken into custody. He later admitted that he murdered Zekeriya and Soney Vural because of their revileing to his customs.

General Patriarchal Vicar Archbishop of Turkish Armenians, Aram Atesyan, reacted to the murder by saying that “no matter what the reason was, we are facing with an example of ignorance, we will pray for our son and daughter”.

14 December 2010

Racial Harassment in a German High School: You’re Turk, You Have No Right Here

2010-12-11T08:38:00.000-08:00

By Nilgun GULCAN (JTW)

A German teacher in a Lower Saxony state insulted his Turkish student. The high school teacher told the 16 year-old student “you are Turk and you have no right here” when the student asked permission for toilet. According to the Bild daily, the class was Human Rights.

The Turkish student wanted to go to toilet and asked for permission. However the German teacher did not allow him and said “the class has just started”.

The student replied “this is human rights class and I ask you to allow me to visit toilet as a human need”. The reply made the teacher angry and yielded “you are Turk, and you have no right here”.

When the news was published the teacher apologized from the student and the family of the student.

The State education department launched an investigation about the teacher.

Racial harassment is in dictionaries defined as "The targeting of an individual because of their race or ethnicity. The harassment may include words, deeds, and actions that are specifically designed to make the target feel degraded due to their race or ethnicity."

11 December 2010

The USAK House - USAK headquarter in Ankara

USAK, Turkey's Leading Think-Tank

Why is the Chatham House Prize in Ankara?

2010-12-08T06:04:00.000-08:00

Ihsan Bal , USAK Center for Security Studies

Turkish President Abdullah Gul was awarded by the leading think tank of United Kingdom, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. The Chatham House Prize is an annual award presented to the statesperson who made the most significant contribution to the advancement of international relations in the previous year and was deemed worthy by members of the institute due to his/her achievements in foreign affairs. The selection process draws on the expertise of Chatham House members and invited to vote for the winner in a ballot. The winner is presented with a crystal award and a scroll signed by the Queen. Previous year, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, had been awarded with Chatham House Prize. There were also important candidates competing for the prize this year as well, including Christine Lagarde, Finance Minister of France and Stjepan Mesic, ex-President of Croatia. However, this year Abdullah Gul, the President of Turkey, has been honoured to be awarded by 2010 Chatham House Prize.

Chatham House's official website wrote on why Turkish President Abdullah Gul won 2010 Chatham House Prize as follows;

President of Turkey was awarded the 2010 Chatham House Prize. President Gul was recognized for being a significant figure for reconciliation and moderation within Turkey and internationally, and a driving force behind many of the positive steps that Turkey has taken in recent years. Mr Gul has worked to deepen Turkey's traditional ties with the Middle East, mediate between the fractious groups in Iraq and bring together the Afghan and Pakistani leaderships to try to resolve disputes during 2009. He has also made significant efforts to reunify the divided island of Cyprus and has played a leading role, along with his Armenian counterpart, in initiating a process of reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. President Gul is also recognized for being an unwavering proponent of anchoring Turkey in the European Union. Under his leadership, Turkey is consolidating civilian democratic rule and undergoing extensive political and legal reforms to bring the country closer to European standards of democracy and human rights.

Taking my place at the delegation of Abdullah Gul, I participated in the award ceremony organized by Chatham House. I had opportunity to observe the atmosphere in UK and to evaluate both the questions and the responses and attitude of Gul. The way that this award was presented was seen as important as receiving it. This prestigious award was offered to the President by the highest-ranked diplomatic protocol of the world. Furthermore, a convoy escort which has been organized for only few statesmen in UK so far also accompanied President Gul.

There were also some speculations and rumours on the reasons behind why Gul has been chosen among the other candidates. Some asked, "is Turkey flattered as it received this award?" or "did Gul really deserve this prize?" The answers were more self-evident especially for those who have known what Gul has done so far. It seems that UK, one of the leading countries of the world, has very well observed Turkey's constructive politics to preserve and to maintain peace both regionally and globally and has seen Ankara worthy to be honoured by this prize. There is no need to be extremely humble or sceptical on this issue.

Why the UK so Interested?

There are many concrete reasons behind why the UK, but not the other states, offered this prize to Turkey. Above all, Britain has played significant role on world politics and diplomacy since centuries. More importantly, as the hegemon of the 19th century, Britain has been enough experienced in distinguishing who has risen and fallen in the world, in terms of power, and in deciding in which part it should be sided. Besides, Britain has bizarre ability to remain friend with countries once it had colonized under its rule.

Secondly, Britain's acquaintance with Middle East has a very long past. Moreover, its practices on the region have very deep and historical background. Furthermore, UK has observed Turkeys steps and initiatives closely. In particular, it did close observations on the development of Turkey and the conflict between new and old elites.

Thirdly, in terms of its perceptions towards Turkey and Middle East, UK is different from the United States despite the latter's long-standing strategic alliance with Turkey since the Cold War. US has generally simple and shallow analysis over Turkey and on the region in general, so the Americans are used to obtain misleading results to evaluate the Middle East. In this regard, it can be said that US has an unnecessary arrogance and it seem to have been poisoned because of its power. Therefore, due to this illness preventing a country from thinking properly, US could not make any significant improvement in its relations with Turkey. On the other hand, despite the disputes between Turkey and UK in the past, UK could succeed to develop an empathy with Turkey's power in the region to a great extent. Maybe this explains why Britain became able to realize from the very beginning the fact that Turkey's power has continuously increased in the Middle East.

Finally, besides the historical link and its positive impact on establishing empathy between Turkey and Britain, English academicians' efforts to contact with Turkish academia and to build strong links are also important achievements. In addition to this, while Turkish-American relationships were based merely on security, Turkish-English relations are very multidimensional including economic and technological spheres and so on.

Questions Session

Another important aspect of the meeting was the speeches and attitudes of Turkish President as well as the questions addressing to him. During the meeting, the President sincerely answered all questions and criticisms particularly related to the freedom of press in Turkey. However, neither the statements of the President nor the questions directed at him were related to domestic problems of Turkey. To be clear, It was interesting that there was not even a single question asked to the President on human rights, minority issues, the Greeks, and practices of torture. The questions generally were about Turkish foreign policy towards Africa, East Turkestan and Turkey's stance towards the dispute between China and Taiwan.

The variety of these questions asked to Gul was important in terms of displaying two important points. Firstly, Turkey exerted great effort to maintain stability and peace at its own home and tried to solve the problems. Seeing the dedication of Turkey and its strides to solve its own problems, the foreigners ceased to harshly criticize the country. Secondly, Turkey started to produce new politicies related to the other parts of the world and felt itself ready and powerful to be involved in the other issues of the world.

Turkey has pursued an active foreign policy, used its own soft power from Kosovo to Afghanistan and tried to consolidate its own democracy at home. These all strengthened Turkey's hand in face of the world powers. In addition to all, we cannot underestimate or disregard the great economic strides of Turkey and its developing economy in this process.

It was announced in the official web site of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey:

President Abdullah Gul also gave a lecture on The Islamic World, Democracy and Development at Oxford Universitys Center for Islamic Studies located in London. Touching upon the Islamic traces in Europe and the Renaissance, the President shared his thoughts with his audience about the relation between Islam, democracy and development. The ideas of democracy and development, he noted, are the legacy of European Enlightenment. Nevertheless, he said, due to the negative legacy of colonialism, most of the Islamic countries and societies felt alienated from these notions. He further stated that the rich Islamic intellectual and civilizational tradition also combines the influences of the vast Mediterranean basin, as well as Persian and Turkic influences, the Indian sub continental tradition, and the Chinese heritage. Hence, he continued, the diversity of Islamic tradition is still vibrant today. Referring to what Turkey has achieved in recent years, President Gul said it has become a source of inspiration as a shining and rare example in the Islamic world as a vibrant democracy and a flourishing free-market economy and drew attention to the roles of Turkey has assumed in the international organizations. The Muslim world has the potential to do what Turkey has achieved, he said.

Turkey has conducted lots of constructive policies to solve chorological disputes among the other states so far. In particular, it tried to eradicate the hostility in the Balkans and to bring the Middle Eastern states together. Moreover, it contributed a lot to the Syrian- Israelian negotiations. It tried to establish direct links with Armenia through the normalization process. It also carried out an active diplomacy with Iran, Iraq and Cyprus especially by taking some initiatives in Annan Plan in the latter.

Turkish-Serbian rapprochement can be seen as an historical success in terms of developing good relations and establishing confidence among the regional states. By taking an initiative during Bosnian crisis, Turkey turned its role from being a partner of Bosnia into being a leader of common platform which was to be established to discuss Balkans problems. Thanks to the Turkish President's efforts in the last 7-8 years and Turkey's soft power over the Balkan states based on history and culture, trust which has been the most necessary value but has long been missing in the region, has been re-established.

In the past, Turkish Presidents could not make any comments on the establishment of international system since Turkey was a weak country which had to encounter many accusations such as of using torture. It was also experiencing many difficulties in separating its friends from enemies. For example, if the Guardian published something on torture or abusive practices, it generally used Turkey's name on that story. Therefore Turkey had a very small influence and unimportant presence in international arena in the eyes of other big states. However, now, Turkey is changing. It seriously started to discuss its Kurdish problem and aimed to find solutions to it. Moreover, it changed its counter-terrorism policies from war on terrorists to struggle on terrorism. Lastly, Turkey made significant changes on its National Security Document; it does not accuse or label its own citizens anymore.

Ironically, while the Chatham House was awarded, George Bush, the former President of US, was giving statements to many prestigious newspapers around the world. In these statements, he declared that he has not repented of his approval on the use of torture and even tried to justify the practices of torture. He stressed upon the effectiveness of torture to be used as an instrument for counter terrorism operations. In this regard, if there is any axis shift in the world, this is probably an axis shift in terms of advocacy of human rights organizations. This shift is much more in favour of Turkey that encourages the human rights and freedoms in both its domestic and foreign policy. In our modern world where democracy and human rights have been globalized, Turkey became an important example and response for those who insistently continue to argue the incompatibility of Islam with democratic values. During this ceremony, the world received an important message through the Presidents wife who accompanied her husband with her headscarf.

In sum, the deeds and words of Turkey, as a country provided regional stability and tried to develop its democracy and economy in accordance with Western values, have consistency and decisiveness. Certainly Turkey has succeeded in recreating itself both economically, politically and diplomatically. Turkey embraced universal values, frankly expressed their own ideas and gained opportunity to have a say in the other parts of the world as well. These all are much related to the advancement and maturation of Turkish democracy. Chatham House Prize was offered to the Turkish President Gul thanks to his numerous cross continental official visits, constructive speeches as well as Turkey's internal and external dynamics and its great potential. This prestigious prize has been deservingly presented to Turkey which exerted great endeavours, efforts and made many sacrifices on that way.

Why not Turkey to Take Action in Yemen?

2010-12-06T05:10:00.000-08:00

Gamze Coskun, USAK Middle Eastern and African Studies

In one-year period, Yemen has become one of the significant issues of the world politics agenda even though its place on the map was not known well. Yemen is struggling with many issues including rebellions, secessionist movements, and Al-Qaeda terror. The country suffers from weak governance which makes these rebellions, secessionists and terrorist actions to be mobilized much easier. Weak governance accompanied with high illiteracy and poverty rates, corruption, inefficient social services, and insecurity escalates the unrest within the country.

Apart from government’s corrupt structure, becoming the hotbed of the rising international terror drew the attentions to this country. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) chose Yemen as its one of the two main bases together with Saudi Arabia. In addition to Yemen’s incapability to cope with this issue alone, it is also claimed that Saudi donors are also the biggest financiers of AQAP.

Many Yemeni people see AQAP as the reflection of their anti-American stance along with the public dissatisfaction with the government and social services. Therefore, Yemenis, as they do not see it as a threat to themselves and do not want any kind of U.S. intervention within the country, are not so willing to stand against AQAP. The news stating that the U.S. strikes caused deaths of the civilians more than Al-Qaeda militants also increased the anti-American sentiment among the Yemenis. Additionally, American-Israeli relations have an important impact upon this anti-American sentiment. And since the people have much stronger ties with their tribes more than the inefficient government, any kind of tribal support to Al-Qaeda brings the people’s support together, as well.

On the other side, Yemeni government is naturally more focused on dealing with Houthi rebellion and secessionist movements in the south besides the efforts to stay in power. Furthermore, most of the regions, mainly except from the capital Sana, cannot even be controlled by the government. The uncontrolled area is increasingly becoming a free space or “safe haven” for the extremists and terrorists; therefore, the violence threatening both domestic and international politics.

-Inefficiency of International Efforts to Deal with the Situation-

Although some of the regional countries and other international actors like “Friends of Yemen” supply aid to the country, some part of these aids are being used for other purposes by the government. Therefore, it is obvious that neither in terms of good governance nor in terms of war on terror, the aids cannot be the only solution as there are many structural problems within the state system. The state probably diverts these aids to be able to stay in power and dealing with secessionists and rebellions rather than for combating with terror or providing social services to its citizens.

The current situation within the country shows that the recent policies did not work well enough, as there is no significant change. The priority should be given to the strengthening of governance in the country as well as meeting the public needs. Establishment of viable state institutions can strengthen the ties between public and state; only then, war on terror within the country can make sense. Moreover, economy’s shift from dependence on oil resources, provision of jobs for the citizens, and reforms for better living conditions for Yemenis can also improve the stability. In this respect, neither the aid programs nor the military exercises prove to be enough. There should be a switch to social programs that public directly can get benefit rather than military actions and military aids regarding the role of international actors.

-Turkey’s Probable Role-

Already dealing with the traumas of Iraq and Afghanistan within the American society, the U.S. does not seem ready to get involved in a new military adventure in another country. Moreover, the matter whether the American military intervention could have solved the problem remains disputed. However, the current policies of the U.S. have not brought any development. In addition to American public opinion, there is the aforementioned massive reaction against the U.S. within Yemeni society as well. As the process of war on terror requires more than the change of state policies, and people’s support of the terrorist organizations plays a crucial role in the organizations’ strength, the public perception aspect should be taken into account more seriously.

Although the U.S. has already been involved in a partnership with Yemen, this partnership is not fully supported by the citizens. The American-Yemeni partnership is denounced by most of the Yemenis; however, there is no legal basis within the state system for the people to reflect their opposition against it. Unfortunately, the terrorist organization is fully aware of it and abuses this need of discharge within the Yemeni society.

The opposition in Middle Eastern countries generally turns into violent movements, as there is no legal space left for criticism towards the existing governments and policies added to the lack of improvements. The same applies for the Yemeni case. Furthermore, the government cooperates with the enemy –the U.S.- in the eyes of the Yemeni people. Since there is no space for critique, the violence accelerates within the society and people get closer to the terrorist organizations and resistance movements.

If all these issues are taken into account, rather than a Western involvement, a much “friendly” and “acceptable” power’s taking the initiative could bring progress. In this respect, Turkey can be suggested to be the initiator as it is willing to play a stabilizing role in the region. Turkey’s constructive and reliable role within the region was recently proven by the positive public reactions during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s official visits to regional countries. Furthermore, Turkey’s criticisms also provide a platform to discharge people’s reactions as it represents these people’s stance in many cases –i.e., concerning Turkey’s critical stance towards Israel–. Turkey, being the rising power of the region, can be a credible actor in the formation of a new project to stabilize the country. Through the utilization of Turkey’s Muslim identity and more accountable position within the region, the public support of terror can be reduced. In this regard, a Middle Eastern “Counter-Terrorism Council” to be conducted by the Muslim countries may be established and may create more fruitful and desired results. Such a partnership would be more desirable since the U.S. perception within the region is not so encouraging at all.

Turkey’s common culture, history and religion with Yemen could make Turkey a more reliable partner. Due to these commonalities, Turkey has the capacity to empathize with the country much better than the Western powers. Except from the formation of a “Counter-Terrorism Council”, Turkey can also take part in promotion of social services to meet the country’s urgent need of structural changes. Turkey can also make contributions to the issue in following sectors:

- Turkey can construct schools and hospitals with the initiative of business people and state institutions, and send doctors and teachers.

- Yemen can utilize from Turkey’s experience in security sector. Turkish Security Forces can train the Yemeni forces in the way that they do in Afghanistan under ISAF.

- Turkey can take the initiative in reconstruction of Yemen with its knowledge on construction sector.

- Turkey can establish industrial areas and create a free trade zone with Yemen.

The countries of the region should not leave Yemen to its fate. Regional countries should take initiatives as well because, maybe they are aware or not, any kind of failure of Yemeni government will severely hit these countries first. Therefore, without waiting the Western powers to take the first step, the Middle Eastern countries should learn to come together to solve their problems.

The Ubiquitous Crisis of the EU: Lack of Visionary Leadership

2010-12-06T03:16:00.000-08:00

Mustafa Kutlay, USAK Center for EU Studies

Does history make great men or do great men make history? This is one of chicken and egg questions in social sciences. A probable answer, following the agent-structure approaches, will be both of them make each other. Its at least the case if one studies the history of European integration. The European Economic Community was established in a very special episode of modern history. The war-torn countries of continental Europe exhausted to kill each other and they had consumed all of the means to further harm each other. Moreover, their economies were in cul-de-sac in the sense that the continent was incapable of producing even the very basic consumption goods. In such a kind of environment, cooperation dictated itself. In other words, from a structural point of view, the European countries had to cooperate to overcome the existing havoc at that time.

Explaining European integration by just relying on structural factors, however, may be an inadequate attempt. The agency factor also influenced the course of European history in the post-war period significantly. It was true that the structural conditions, including the attitudes of hegemonic power of the time, were in favour of European integration. Yet, they were the visionary leaders who exploited this opportunity in order to make a dream come true. The founding fathers of European integration saw a window of opportunity in the wake of continental wide crisis and took advantage of the existing situation to kick-off European integration process. Only by the vision of these leaders, ever closer Union came into existence.

Today, the same Union is facing multiple-crises concurrently. On the one hand, theres a financial crisis, which severely shakes the very fundamentals of European Economic and Monetary Union. On the other hand, the EU encounters with domestic and international legitimacy problems. The financial crisis first hit the Greek shores seriously. The first reaction of the leading EU member country leaders was ignorance. Especially Angela Merkel dismissed the idea of bailing-out Greece in order to punish Athens irresponsible economic management. The level of economic and financial integration within the EU, however, was more sophisticated than Merkel assumed. It turned into a matter of moment issue for the crisis to spread out other Southern European countries. At the end of the day, Merkel declined her insistence and Greece was bailed-out with a joint IMF-EU operation. The lack of visionary leadership was at the epicentre of the entire process because it is because of the self-interested and short-sighted polices that the crisis exacerbated in EU. It is obvious that the economic problems of the EU are not only about Merkel, Sarkozy or anybody else. The visionary leadership crisis is the common problem of almost all EU member countries. In other words, its ubiquitous!

The same situation is also the case for EUs international stature and external relations. The EU-US relations are at a very unsatisfactory level; the EU-Russia relations are fragmented and polarizing; the EU-China relations are not pleasing even the minimalists in the EU; Turkey-EU relations had plunged into deadlock over the couple of years. It is really hard to see the EU as a normative power that provides creative solutions to the Hobbsian world of Middle East.

Similarly, the posts which were created by the Lisbon treaty to improve EUs visibility at the international fora were fulfilled by low-profile figures that are neither capable of converging the diversified internal conflicts nor able to sit on the table on equal footing with big states like US, China, and Russia on behalf of the EU. Naturally, the same problem is observable again: The EU suffers from the lack of visionary leaders! Not only in the economic sphere but also in the political platforms, there is an obvious coordination and cooperation crisis due to ubiquitous visionary leadership problem.

Here, it is not argued that the only problem of the EU is about the agents. On the contrary, there are very structural problems that restrict the ability of Brussels to become a more active international player. However, this only exacerbates the wobbling position of the EU because under a period in which EU encounters structural problems, the need for visionary leadership becomes much more imperative than the ordinary times. It seems that only by visionary leaders and far-sighted politicians, the EU may continue its journey. Otherwise, it would seem to be a daunting task to satisfy the European citizens and EU member states in the medium and long term.

The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (By Kenneth M. Pollack)

2010-12-04T01:33:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Tugba Ozden (Journal of Turkish Weekly)

Review:

Iran, constituting one of the top global-agenda items of both the Middle East region and the globe; and being one of the most deep and well rooted states and civilizations of the world, can only be elaborated in a fine blend of history and political scrutiny. Iran, besides own intrinsic perplexing history, has also developed pretty undulant relations with the United States. While Americans are mostly recalling Iranians with the hostage crisis and the Islamic Revolution; Iranians still muse over America with Operation Ajax of 1953, or their alliance with Saddam in Eight-Years-War.

Kenneth M. Pollack, in his book The Persian Puzzle, is providing this mélange to shed some light on hectic relations of America and Iran by appending his insider’s -Kenneth Pollack served in National Security Council and CIA as Persian Gulf military analyst- sight. Now he is the Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institute. He is also the author of the The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq.

Even though the mentioned book is published in 2004, since the US-Iran Relations are in the focus of the world, keeps popularity and actuality. The Persian Puzzle is composed of 13 chapters, where initially a historical milieu is provided commencing from the ancient epoch to contemporary times. In this regard, Pollack’s Persian Puzzle can be compared to Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men, Mark J. Gasiorowski’s Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, and Nikki Keddie’s Modern Iran, where in all the mentioned scripts political analysis coalesce the history scenery and present a complete picture. Whilst documentation, we witness Pollack using a huge scale of bibliography from government documents to books, articles in addition to various meeting and symposium reports, Ph.D. Dissertations et cetera. However, Pollack’s sources are one sided, since the only sources from Iran are those that are ready translated, but we do not witness any government documents or any archival appraisals from Iran; but the only Persian sources are those translated are. Still, The Persian Puzzle is a useful script for research purposes.

Following the depiction of the ancient history till Pahlavi era, he dedicated a chapter for Reza Shah, his early contacts with the US, modernization process and his fall to portray the atmosphere in Iran. Pollack, before bestowing a vision for the prospective Iran-American relations, gives a detailed narrative and account of the past relations, where he tries to keep his objectivity and to be fair, by being neither offensive nor defensive. In the third chapter, namely “The Ugly Americans”, the author does not hesitate to criticize American administration for the “good intentions but mixed implementation” (p.43) besides criticizing leading figures as Arthur Millspaugh, who “contributed to the unfavorable impression of American s left in the minds of many Iranians” (p.42) in addition to Muhammed Mosaddeq who “misjudged the Americans” (p.64).

From the last Shah to the Islamic revolution, seizure of the Tehran Embassy, Iran-Iraq War, Salman Rushdie affair, the Gulf War, K. Pollack brings the relations, mainly within the frame of nuclear challenge, under Bush Administration, in chapter 12, “Coming Full Circle” and makes foreign policy suggestions in addition to assessments in the last chapter “Toward a New Iran Policy”. Pollack considers devising a solution to be “complicated and painful” (p.375). He still, strictly advises American administration to put off the passive approach. He assesses the strategy pursued in Iraq, or as Israel realized in 1981 by bombing Osirak, but he is not in favor of this strategy due to the locations of the plants To bring some realistic outcomes by eliminating the military option, he offers the triple track option, where the first track is to open the Grand Bargain “to convince the Iranians to disband their nuclear program and end their support for terrorism” (p.401); the second track is actually a European pattern; a true carrot-and-stick approach , where the model is to persuade Europe and Japan besides Russia and China for sanctions and rewarding the progressive actions in nuclear and terrorism issues. The third track is preparing for a new containment regime, which can be implied in case the first two tracks fails.

Pollack calls the nuclear Iran problem to be the “problem from Hell” (p. 422). He underlines the fallacious hopes to believe that a different government in Tehran to discontinue the nuclear program or regime change in Tehran; by assessing the structure of Iran, he claims the regime change to happen by own volition. One other element of the Persian puzzle is the American mistakes half a century ago, that today constructs the psychological and political taboos, exaggerated by the Iranian imagination. One further element can be considered by Pollack as; United States, being the principal benefactor of the current international order, must lead multilateral efforts to address; which is complicated as well. The messages, solution proposals are clear, feasible, to the point and built on reliable documents.

Note: This book review was previously published in the Review of International Law and Politics.

about book:

In his highly influential book The Threatening Storm, bestselling author Kenneth Pollack both informed and defined the national debate about Iraq. Now, in The Persian Puzzle, published to coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Iran hostage crisis, he examines the behind-the-scenes story of the tumultuous relationship between Iran and the United States, and weighs options for the future.

Here Pollack, a former CIA analyst and National Security Council official, brings his keen analysis and insider perspective to the long and ongoing clash between the United States and Iran, beginning with the fall of the shah and the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979. Pollack examines all the major events in U.S.-Iran relations–including the hostage crisis, the U.S. tilt toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iran-Contra scandal, American-Iranian military tensions in 1987 and 1988, the covert Iranian war against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf that culminated in the 1996 Khobar Towers terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, and recent U.S.-Iran skirmishes over Afghanistan and Iraq.

He explains the strategies and motives from American and Iranian perspectives and tells how each crisis colored the thinking of both countries’ leadership as they shaped and reshaped their policies over time. Pollack also describes efforts by moderates of various stripes to try to find some way past animosities to create a new dynamic in Iranian-American relations, only to find that when one side was ready for such a step, the other side fell short.

With balanced tone and insight, Pollack explains how the United States and Iran reached this impasse; why this relationship is critical to regional, global, and U.S. interests; and what basic political choices are available as we deal with this important but deeply troubled country.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly,

Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication. USAK is an Ankara-based Turkish think tank.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink (By Francine Friedman)

2010-12-04T01:25:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Sadık Tabar (Journal of Turkish Weekly)

Review:

The book, titled Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink and written by Francine Friedman who is Professor of Political Science at Ball State University, mainly focuses on Bosnia’s history with a very different perspective unlike many arguments in which ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ is deemed as the main motivation for tragedy happened during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Friedman examines how a country which was formerly the centre of Yugoslavia geopolitically and economically could become the puppet of greedy political and economic elites who are on the pursuit of just solidifying their own power. The international community has failed in easing tensions during the Bosnian war and the following troubles. This book consists of 5 chapters which are also composed of several subheadings.

In the first chapter, the author begins with the Bosnia’s historical foundations. According to the author, the historical background of Bosnia should be outlined with two criteria to assert the significance of its history for the contemporary Bosnia. As first criteria, Friedman reminds that there is no indication about the conflict based on nationalities of ethnic groups among Serbs, Croats or Muslims living in Bosnia under the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, since the medieval era Bosnia had been waiting for its independence until the end of 20th century. Within the Ottoman Empire, religion was the most central defining feature instead of a specific national identity. The author infers that tensions among Bosnians were not the outcome of ethic hatreds despite existence of their ethic differences. At the stage of history, Bosnia has shown up as an autonomous part of the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire until the beginning of 20th century, as witnessing Yugoslav Kingdom and being exposed to some sanctions of the Communist state manifestations and finally releasing as a nation-state. Despite passing into the hands of many different authorities, the country was ethically cohesive within its varied communities. For instance, the Bosnian population was dragged into the war to encounter at different sides, on the basis of their locality rather than any ethnic orientation during the First World War. However, when nationalism was flourished by republican elites for gaining support to surpass the communist partisans, even these elites could not predict how these propagandas would result in. The collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe had a critical role on the economic decline in Yugoslavia. With saying “…the conflict that dissolved Yugoslavia was mostly a result of the stresses caused by the transformation of a socialist society to a market economy and democracy”, Friedman means that social and economic problems were increasingly seen as the fault of other nations within Yugoslavia and that finally led to the ethnic conflagration.

In the second chapter, the continuous process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution at the end of the 20th century is widely analyzed. Friedman cherishes a broader and detailed viewpoint, in particular factual background, due to the realization in how international principles could let a province within Europe drifted. That is so; the historical background of the Bosnian war can be referred to recite this chapter. The nationalist agendas were exploited by Serbian political elites to incite against other ethnics to arrogate Serbian sovereignty. These incidents resulted in kind of perception within other ethnics as Slovenian, Macedonian, and Bosnian as to seek for independence from federal and therefore finally communist Yugoslavia disintegrated by the independency proclamations of Slovenia and Macedonia. After these independences were proclaimed and immediately recognized by both EC and USA, Bosnian Muslims also asserted a claim of having right for independency. In the meantime, Bosnian Serbs realized the imminent independence of Bosnia and instantaneously declared the independence of Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That interference can be interpreted as the determination in holding at least Bosnian territory. On the other hand, while political and social tensions become violent, the international community declared the chaos in the Balkans as seemingly an internal problem within Yugoslavia for a while. Maybe, the attempts to gather all parties of conflict and conclude a treaty such as under a plan developed by Lord Peter Carrington, The Badinter Advisory Commission plan, Lisbon Conference or Vance-Owen Peace Plan can be conciliatory but lack of sanction. When The UN Security Council imposed embargo on whole Yugoslavia, they overlook a point that the power of Bosnian Muslims to resist against full-armed Yugoslavia was also destroyed. Thus, Bosnian Serbs were encouraged to realize the Greater Serbia dream and enforce Bosnian Muslims to get out of the land Serbs claimed. Thereby, unforgettable and aggravated murders happened in just a few days. Eventually, international powers urge parties to agree on a ceasefire. Actually, when analyzing the conjuncture it seems that central claims of the author, which indicated that the deferred intervention of international powers will not purge parties and they are still as guilty as the parties in war, are creditable.

Friedman emphasizes that according to Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) that puts an end to three and half year long Bosnian War, it was believed that Bosnia Herzegovina would become a democratic state which able to conduct its own affairs without need for less international intervention. All theoretical and institutional frameworks were done in accordance with the reconstruction and reformation of Bosnia in this agreement under the control of representatives of the US and the EU. However, in her book, Friedman states that while the international community was striving to democratize Bosnia, they basically failed to efficiently put into practice democratic restructuring as mentioned in the DPA. Western interference as a peacekeeping force caused an intensive reaction in Bosnia, which will also cause to put back the efforts of the peace-building process. Nearly a decade later, troops under the control of NATO are still in the country to enforce the peace. In addition to the failure of the US and the EU during post-war period, Friedman also accuses the elites of establishing a nationalist media network before the Balkan wars, which encouraged ethnic identity and further underpin ethnic tensions. On the other hand, as is the case in influences of European countries on Bosnia, Bosnian politics have also influenced Europe.

In conclusion, the book is seemingly beneficial in analyzing how the international community can be unsuccessful in nation-building especially within the Balkans. It is actually true that “When the Berlin Wall came down, it fell on Bosnia Herzegovina.” Now a province in the middle of Europe, the choices of its elites may well force Bosnia either to a secure future, integrated into an expanding European entity, or to a future filled with insecurity, conflict, and adversity. With its content covering the country's history, economics, international relations and politics, this book, in general, is highly recommended to social scientists and researchers to shed light upon contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we need to summarize the book with one of expressions of Friedman, it should be like that: “All the things that were said about the various ethnic and religious groups being at odds for centuries are nonsense… The communists wanted to hold onto their power base. They turned one group against another and everything, we now observe, happened.”

Note: This book review was previously published in the Review of International Law and Politics.

about book:

This book traces the development of the Bosnian territory over the last hundred years. It begins with Bosnia's existence as an autonomous entity within the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires at the beginning of the century, take you though its Yugoslav Kingdom/Communist state manifestations and culminates with Bosnia's emergence as a nation-state at the end of the century.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly,

Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication. USAK is an Ankara-based Turkish think tank.

The Stakes: America in the Middle East (By Shibley Telhami)

2010-12-04T01:09:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Zeynep Sengul (Journal of Turkish Weekly)

Review:

It is easy to estimate that 9/11 attack was painful for all Americans, yet the importance of the fear that the attacks caused is greater than the pain. This book builds on this fear and other reflections which appeared after the attacks He tries to answer the basic questions that are of vital importance. He aims at finding out the nature of the terrorist threat assessing the role of Islam in Middle East terrorism.

Such kinds of questions are answered with the help of six divisions, each of which focus on a single topic.

In the first chapter, “Understanding the Terrorist threat”, the author discusses the nature of the threat the United States faced and explores the consequences of what had transpired for America’s relations with the Middle East. He claims that the United States has experienced many radical swings in its foreign policy in the autumn of 2001. He describes the security policy of the US giving five important differences of security policy between the United States and the rest of the world. The author challenges that the first difference results from the decision making process.

He says that much of the world empathized with America’s pain and supported its right on self defense in light of the horrific attacks but did not see the right of America to unilaterally define global terrorism beyond the immediate threat to its own soil.

The second difference is that The United States focused its effort in fighting terrorism on confronting the “supply side of terrorism” without equally addressing the “demand side”. The United States regarded terrorism as the product of organized groups that could be confronted and destroyed, without regard to their aims or to the reasons that they succeed in recruiting many willing members.

The third difference is that the way of the United States looking on terrorism. The United States regards terrorism as an ideology rather than an instrument. In the ensuing months, the Bush administration has been waging the global war on terrorism as if terrorism is a movement, an ideology, or a political coalition with little differentiation between cases. However, much of the world sees terrorism differently; as an instrument, not a movement. To reduce its occurrence, according to this approach, terrorism must be internationally delegitimized and the conditions under which it thrives minimized.

The fourth difference arises from the view of the role of states versus non-state actors. While the threat posed by Bin Laden was in part dependent on a sponsoring state, it is clear that al-Qaeda is a non-state organization that operates even in nations where it does not receive official support. The United States, State Department typically issues lists of terrorist groups and also of “the terrorist states”. This focus on confronting hostile states as a priority of the war on terrorism has not been equally shared in the broader international community because the attacks of 9/11 highlighted the vulnerability of states to non-state terrorism in the era of globalization.

The fifth difference is the public discourse. The public discourse in America has associated terrorism in the Middle East, especially the suicide bombings, with aspects of the Islamic religion, even as President Bush has been careful to reject this notion, whereas many around the world see both the motives and the means of Middle Eastern terrorism to be less about Islam than about politics. In the second chapter “Why do they hate us so much?” the author tries to examine the public discourses and perceptions of America in the world. He claims that while many governments around the world lent support for the American war in Afghanistan in its early stages, including even unfriendly states such as Iran, opposition to the war among the public was by no means limited to the Arab and Muslim world and was prevalent in the developing world, especially in the Latin America and Africa. He focuses on the historical overview. He compares the relationships of the Europeans and the America in terms of Middle East.

Whereas Europeans had long-standing connections with the Middle East, the United States was geographically far removed from that region. He claims that there is a pervasive resentment of the United States in Arab and Muslim countries, and this resentment is mostly related to American foreign policy. There is a gap between some core American values and those held by Arabs. To the author’s opinion, the intensity of resentment of the United States among Arabs and Muslims is higher than that in other regions. However, he claims that Al-Qaeda has a special case that requires its own explanation. Before that organization, resentment of the United States in the Middle East has not historically been translated into anti- American terrorism. Except for Al-Qaeda, the Middle East has not led other parts of the world in terrorist attacks against American targets.

In the third chapter, “Does Public Opinion in the Middle East Matter?”, the author analyses the responses of the publics in the Middle East. For instance, When Egypt and Israel came together at Camp David, Maryland, in September 1978 to negotiate the terms; there was a great amount of confrontation. The author claims that the authoritarian governments in the region are always able to shape public opinion, or at least to resist it when necessary, regardless of how intense public anger is. Yet, the writer also says that despite the record of stability of authoritarian governments in the region, there have also been marked episodes of consequential public opposition. Whatever the logic, the author defends the idea that President Sadat ultimately paid with his life for his courage.

The author thinks that the changing media also changes the role of the state. In the past, Arab governments have been able to limit the emotions of their publics by limiting their people’s exposure to painful pictures. With the media, the governments felt less secure. Globalization and public empowerment also shape the ideas in the region. He claims that although states have by no means lost their centrality, and although most will likely find new ways to deal with the challenges posed by globalization, there is little doubt that they face new challenges. Moreover, he maintains that in addition to political and economic sources for public anger, the issue is exacerbated by the Arab- Israeli.

In the fourth chapter, the author examines the role of the Arab-Israeli issue. He says that after American attacks, Usame bin Laden ended a speech intended to rally Arab and Muslim support by suggesting that his terrorism was motivated by the pain in Palestine. Yet, he and other many Islamists around the world viewed the nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Palestinian national movement in general, with distain, for they themselves sought a borderless Islamist world. He also states that ever since the creations of the state of Israel, Arab governments have often used the Palestinian issue for their own political ends, sometimes to mask internal problems. Yet, the Saudi and other Arab governments have increasingly understood the growing public anger in their countries over the Palestinian issue. The author maintains that the Palestinian issue is important because Palestinian refugees in the host countries such as Lebanon, Kuwait, and Jordan. To the author’s opinion, they caused problems in that country. He also assesses the Camp David II negotiations. He tries to find out what went wrong in Camp David or why the negotiations failed. He evaluates the consequences for the Middle East and for U.S foreign policy. The author points out that each side had a different vision of the negotiations. Since the Israelis were in control of the West Bank and Gaza, they saw every piece of land from which they offered to withdraw as an Israeli concession, as something they were “giving” to the Palestinians. Thus, the agreement was out of question. He also thinks that there was insufficient preparation for the Camp David meeting. He also discusses psychologies of weakness and insecurity. He says that to most Arabs, especially Palestinians, Israel is all too powerful.

It has repeatedly defeated combined Arab armies, therefore the fear is understandable. Yet the writer emphasizes that the Israelis also feel insecure. The horror of holocaust has much to do with it, yet the author underlines the history of Israel, seen through Israeli eyes, is also a factor. In the end, he mentions the role the United States to him, we should not underestimate the continued importance of U.S positions on the Arab- Israel issue in shaping perceptions of America not only in the Middle East but also in other parts of the world, especially Europe. He says that under the influence of the United States, there may be a compromise if Arabs and Israelis coexist peacefully.

In the fifth chapter, “The role of the Persian Gulf Region”, he examines the continuing importance of Gulf Oil. He also says that authoritarianism in the region prevails. He also says that although there are historical and domestic reasons for the continuation of authoritarianism in the region, foreign policy has also been a considerable factor in recent years. Still, the goal of achieving more democracy in the region is complex and challenging. Though the United States can play a role in a process of political reform in the region, no power can bring it about alone. In the region, much of the resentment of the United States is based on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been a visible sore point in the U.S-Saudi relationship since the collapse of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. As recent surveys have indicated, most Saudis, like other Arabs, resent America for its policies, not its values, and they see the Palestinian issue as a central issue of contention.

In the sixth chapter, the author makes conclusions. He maintains that American interests in the Middle East will continue to be important in UNITED STATES policy into the next decade and beyond. The commitment to Israel binds America to the Middle East inescapable ways, and the continued importance of oil for the world economy, coupled with the region’s domination of the world’s oil reserves, means that the Middle East will remain strategically important to America. To sum up, the author comments on issues very critically, giving the historical background. It provides a well-reasoned, comprehensive analysis on the basic issues in the hot debates.

about book:

Could the United States defeat Al-Qaeda but still lose the broader war on terrorism? In The Stakes: America and the Middle East, Shibley Telhami, one of America’s most in-demand commentators on the Middle East, provides a concise and penetrating analysis that explains Arab and Muslim attitudes toward the United States and shows why there is much reason for concern. In an insightful, passionate, yet balanced analysis, Telhami provides new perspectives on the collapse of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the attending escalation of violence. He shows why the Arab-Israeli conflict remains central to the war on terrorism and to international stability, and considers American policy toward Iraq and the Persian Gulf. He demonstrates the need for political change in the region’s oil states and suggests how best to achieve it. The Stakes provides a well-reasoned, calm analysis that will be essential reading for anyone who wonders where America should go from here, amid the dangers and opportunities in the ever-volatile Middle East.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly,

Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication. USAK is an Ankara-based Turkish think tank.

Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora (Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale)

2010-12-04T01:01:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Muharrem Eksi (Journal of Turkish Weekly)

Review:

The book titled Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and Diaspora mainly focuses upon the transnationalism and diaspora in the Post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus in terms of historical perspective. The book also sheds light upon the role of diaspora in the process of the re-emergence of national identities in the regions of the Central Asia and the Caucasus. It particularly deals with the geopolitics of the regions and transnational linkages in regional and multinational interests globally in the formation of the new nation-states.

The book consists of 11 chapters written by 10 different mostly prominent academicians on their fields.

In the first chapter of the book as an introduction, Touraj ATabaki presents an excellent brief background for the formation of diaspora communities in the regions within a theoretical framework. He argues that population dislocation; mass migration and immigration were among the consequences of the dissolution of both the Tsarist Empire and Soviet rule on socio-political terms (p.1). Tabaki also analyzes the demographic consequences and the formation of new independent nation-states.
In the context of the population dislocation process, Soviet rule applied the adaptation of ethno-administrative division policy which staunchly divided the entire region into three national territorial entities (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmens) at first in terms of historical aspects of the former three khanates (Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva). Nevertheless, this demarcation led to the betrayal of Tajiks and Kyrgyz. Additionally, this situation engineered the partition of the national identities within the territorial base. Thus, Soviet policy of nativization created the recognized ethnic minorities utilizing cultural freedom.

On the other hand, gradual contstructed and sovietized titular ethnic cultural distinctiveness tended to encourage non-titular ethnic groups for declaration of national identities. In other words, Soviet regime’s ‘sovetskj Chelovek’ (Soviet person) the ideological embodiment, concealed and stimulated gradual developing ethno-nationalism which is one of the Soviet paradigms (p.2).

Briefly, ethno-nationalism is the outcome of this peculiar ethno-federalist administrative structure. For that reason in this local administrative hierarchy, ethnic minorities strove to consolidate their presences. Further upon industrialization policy, displacement of labor migration created gigantic population dissolution.
The other point is that the reformed identity by soviet policy caused ‘the other-izing’ (p.6). It means that this policy displaced and alienated ethnic groups from Soviet and Russian communities. In this way, it would be said that this alienation crafted new diaspora identity and, it traced and created a new form of ethno-communal allegiance that accentuated into the reconstruction of a homeland for minorities (p.7). As mentioned above, alienation among ethnic groups led to crafted new separate diaspora identities.

In a nutshell, Atabaki analyzes how the ethnic minorities were formally recognized by that way they utilized partly restricted cultural freedom and titular groups were granted a de facto privileged status, while smaller ethnic minorities and those without formal recognition deprived of the same rights (p.2-3).

In chapter two, Jolle Demmers finds out the role of diasporas in the process of de-territorialization of conflict (p.10) and discusses the forms of diasporas with the political weight of diaspora in intra-state conflict that had increased drastically throughout the late twentieth century and they often play a further critical role in contemporary conflicts (p.11). Hence, she theorized the role of diasporas in contemporary debate on the basis of the conflict theory.

What's more, she argues how and why diaspora communities are involved in intra-state conflicts, and endeavors to classify the units of analysis to understand the role of diaspora in the transnational aspects (p.10-11).

Besides, in making an effort to venture to define diaspora term consequently, she puts forward that challenging the dispose of ‘ideal-type’ for diaspora term, preferably seeking to identify groups as ‘more’ or ‘less’ diasporic (p.13). To a certain extent, it ought to be understood as signifier of political struggles to define the local as distinctive community in the historical context of displacement.

More to the point, she attentively distinguishes diasporas from transnational communities with the former being ‘globally dispersed’, while also maintaining a ‘triadic relationship’ between groups, territorial states and homelands (p. 13).

Demmers examines that how we can conceptualize the process of de-territorialization and delocalization of conflict on diaspora term. However, she analyzes diaspora in terms of conflict, locality, long-distance nationalism, and conflict dynamics. For instance, in the context of the locality, the political struggle, she scrutinizes socio-cultural networks in the new forms of communication with globalization on a global scale within social formations term.

Consequently, she provided an analysis of diaspora with conflict theory focusing on locality, minority nationalism and the construction of transnational communities in the historical and theoretical standpoint.
In chapter three, Shirin Akiner regulates her essay as three parts such as the first part about the ethnic survey, the second part regarding the analysis of ethnic diaspora formation and the third (last) part concerning a typology of diaspora. In such sense, Akiner studies the formation of diasporas in Kazakhstan and provides a distinguished analysis of the patterns of the multi-ethnic construction of Kazakhstan in the historical experience (p.21).

Likewise, she differentiates diasporas on the subject of type, cause, and chronology of formation in the historical background and reference (p.55). In view of that, she systematically analyzes the formation of diaspora and the extraordinarily complex demographic structure in a broader framework. She additionally puts forward the difficulty of the establishing an organizational framework to serve an analytical implement for examining group dynamics (p.21).

In the first part, Akiner surveys the formation of Kazakhs entity in the formation of diaspora in a historical spot. In the second part, she analyzes the diverse varieties of diasporas such as administrative diasporas in the formation of transnationalism and different parameters of diaspora. In the third and last one, Akiner provides a typology of diasporas, which she categorizes it such as the formation of diasporas and chronology to convey an insight into the dynamics of minorities.

In order to set this in a broader context, Akiner confers comparison with the British Empire which analyzes similarities and differences within the European colonial era. That's why, she proceeds a new typology including four categories such as imperial agents, settlers, auxiliars and deportees in a broader dimensional and conceptual framework (p.56-57).

Consequently, Akiner presents an explanation of a post-Soviet diaspora pattern of behavior in the reconfiguration of socio-political space in contemporary Kazakhstan. Akiner concludes with several clarifications upon the typology of diasporas in former Soviet Kazakhstan as analogized with the British Empire and thus she analyzes various unique features of Kazakhstan.

In chapter four, Kulbhushan Warikoo analyzes the Russian Diasporas in Central Asia and challenges that these have experienced as a consequence of the loss of their privileged status in historical context (p.67). That is to say, he evaluates drastic demographic changes in the Russian minorities of Central Asia throughout the seventy years of Soviet rule.

Moreover, he emphasizes demographic structure drastically altered with the re-emergence of Central Asian states with the national rediscovery and the process of cultural revivalism which led to the balance of power shifting throughout the dissolution of the Soviet Union (p.69). In addition, Warikoo supportively utilizes the statistical data upon the Russian migration and an analysis of migration patterns between Russia and Central Asia would have indicated that Russian migration began to decline in the early 1990s (p. 72). He furthermore asserts on the one hand, there was a visible declining in Russian community; on the other hand there was a noticeable increasing ethno-centrism in Central Asian states with the Russian disengagement in Central Asia.
Notwithstanding, the inter-ethnic tensions and disharmony created a tenancy situation for the Russian diasporas in Central Asia. As a final point, Warikoo assesses a diverse sociopolitical indigenization and how the Russian community perceived as a reluctance to assimilate, and their impact upon the gradual decline of Russian diaspora (p.77).

In chapter five, one of the most interesting essays, Stephan Astourian notices an introductory debate on the concept of diaspora and its functioning definitions. In that case it followed by a detailed study on the formation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani diaspora and their functions. Besides, he propounds that political and religious polarization provided as a means of structuring the diaspora communities (p.83). On the case of Armenia, diaspora had a long history in its agenda and diaspora was reasoned by the genocide to some extent (p.86).

Astourian also deals with the relationship between Turkey and Armenia on the matter of genocide and Karabakh. It follows that these issues are shaping the relationships and they are the preconditions to diplomatic ties (p.89). Therefore, disregarding the genocide is impractical, but it is achievable to leave it to historians for the normalization of the relationship (p.87).

On the other hand, the main distinction between the Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas is that Armenian diaspora is developed in the absence of a state and tends to be fairly autonomous from the Armenian state. On the other hand Azerbaijani diaspora is shaped in the context of Azerbaijani independence and state, in other words Azerbaijani diaspora is the state-sponsored mobilization (p.103). The other point is that Azerbaijani diaspora is a late- phenomenon. As a consequence of distinction from the Armenian circumstances, Azerbaijan is a paradigm of state-centered diasporization or even diasporization from above (p.103).

However, he explores the tensions between the Armenian government and the diaspora over the function of the latter to support not just Armenians in the homeland, but the political administration and its policies.
In chapter six, Armine Ishkanian scrutinizes the impact of transnational diasporic activism on Armenia’s post-Soviet transition within the framework of globalization and global civil society in a theoretical perspective. Furthermore, she notices Armenian diaspora created the genocide that shaped the identity construction in the transformation process of this diaspora.

Subsequently, she examines the impact of American-based non-profit diasporic organizations on Armenia. Although she argues that NGOs assisted Armenia’s transition from communism, there was an ambivalent relationship between Armenia and diaspora communities regarding cultural, ideological and political priorities (p.113). To sum up Ishkanian analyzes the impediment confronting Armenian diaspora activisms in proceeding its agenda.

In chapter seven, Natalya Khan analyzes the relationship between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and evaluates Uzbekistan’s refugee policy in the course of the case-study of Afghan refugees. More importantly, she argues that ‘the absence of refugee legislation in Uzbekistan, together with strict regulations on foreign and stateless citizens’ legal status, resulted in almost no legal protection and difficult living conditions for Afghan refugees in a republic with a struggling transnational economy (p. 141).

Khan concisely surveys on the drastic and catastrophic political changes in Afghanistan which have had far-reaching effect for Russia and the Central Asian states. In that case, there was a gradual formation of Afghan diaspora community in Uzbekistan and it could be understood by focusing upon the inter-state relationship in the region.

In chapter eight, Ablet Kamalow analyzes the Uighur diaspora in the context of Sino-Soviet relationship and by focusing upon how the demise of Soviet had fractured the ties among the Uighur communities in Central Asia. Subsequently, he scrutinizes how the Soviet collapse modifies the Uighur’s communal identity both in the former Soviet Central Asia and in China within historical background.

He puts forward that the Uighur communities and diaspora are the de-territorialized nation and, they are still decisive factor both in Chinese-Russia relations and in Central Asian states. The other point is that Islam began to play an interesting role in the cultural and ethnic identity of Uighur communities (p.165).
In chapter ten, Dru Gladney attempts to comprehend the circumstances of Muslim by taking into consideration for their ‘transnational and transgressor identity in terms of their accommodation to or resistance against the dominant Chinese host culture and political milieu’ (p.184). Moreover, he provides an introductory comprehension on the roots of Islam in China and he asserts that Islam was profoundly influenced by exogenous trends. Subsequently, he argues that Muslims acutely menaced in terms of preservation instinct with an Islamic identity in China.
Gladney concludes his insightful analysis that post-modern contraction of time and space stimulated by the prospect of further brisk accommodation to the diasporic circumstances does ‘not bode well for the integration of Muslims into the Chinese leviathan’ (p.211).

In chapter nine and eleven, Eden Naby initially analyzes the Afghan diaspora by providing general background and he underlines that the Afghan community, fragmented society, are ethnically and religiously fractured with the communal divisions.

Furthermore, Naby emphasizes that there are gradual patterns of Afghan identity in diaspora and mutual correlation with the host country. Nevertheless, their possible role is reshaping the political process in Afghanistan.

Naby lastly examines the Assyrian diaspora that they confronted with losing their culture and language due to being stateless. For this reason, the Assyrian diaspora is in danger and their survival is doubtful without a homeland. Nevertheless, Naby used the outdated census and migration data along with he could not explicitly clarify content of the essay.

In conclusion, this volume is a vital source of collections in analyzing the role of diaspora in the emergence of national identities within the theoretical conceptualization of transnationalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Nearly all authors virtually agree that the role of diaspora is exceedingly significant for the transnational linkages and the formation of national identities in the region.

As a critique, it is probable to state that several essays depend upon the outdated data. This collective work proceeds the language problem that is common in its equivalents; by doing this it secured its probability of artificiality of analyzing.

In general, this book is highly recommendable to academic circles and also it sheds light upon the less researched empirical cases.

Note: This book review was previously published in the Review of International Law and Politics.

about book:

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of linkages have been established between newly independent Central Asian states, or populations within them, and diaspora ethnic groups. This book explores the roles that diaspora communities play in the recent and ongoing emergence of national identities in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The loyalties of these communities are divided between their countries of residence and those states that serve as homeland of their particular ethno-cultural nation, and are further complicated by connections with contested transnational notions of common cultures and 'peoples'. Written by highly respected experts in the field, the book addresses issues such as nationalism, conflict, population movement, global civil society, Muslim communities in China and relations between the new nation-states and Russia.

This innovative book will interest students and researchers of transnationalism and Central Asian studies.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly,

Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication. USAK is an Ankara-based Turkish think tank.

Zarqawi: The New Face of Al Qaeda (By Jean Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez)

2010-12-04T00:52:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Gokce Arslan (Journal of Turkish Weekly)

Review:

Jean Charles Brisard is a French counterterrorism expert and author of many publications including Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth. He had been appointed as the head of the international investigation on behalf of the families victimized by the September 11 events. Currently he is the director of JBC Consulting International that provides business and strategic intelligence. Damien Martinez is an expert on Islamic terrorism.

The book opens with a preface indicating the originality and credibility of the documents and information that Brisard receives and declares through the course of the narration. The book consists of four main parts which are divided into chapters. Beginning with the first part titled as “Genesis”, the author analyzes the portrait of the terrorist as a young man. In accordance with his early life, the emphasis is on the socio-political background of Jordan in 1990s. The increasing fanaticism in Zarqa that is at the crossroads and the unrest in the region due to the legalised Islamist parties are depicted in detail. The following chapters deal with Zarqawi in his youth. The comments on his drinking habit, weird tattoos on his body and his mediocrity in terms of education are given as the effects on his personality and stands for the evidence of lack of a blind sense of belief in Islam and its teachings. He was surrounded by New Palestinian refugees living in Zarqa and he easily adopted the role of a leader. The personality of a fighter flourished when he visited Afghanistan soon as the Soviet regime is completely over and he attained military training of a mujahidin in Sada, Afghanistan. Before he returned Jordan Maqdisi, the founder of many Sunni terrorist organizations, and his ideologies were influential on Zarqawi. Brisard continued to shed light to the activism of the Afghans who denounced Jordan’s involvement in the American talks. The veterans were now taken seriously by the Jordan authority because the rhetoric of “Jihad” was on the forefront: “Democracy is a religion that is not the religion of Allah.”

Zarqawi soon later got arrested in 1994 in connection with illegal documents and false passports as well as Maqdisi, who provided the supporters with religious instruction, condemnation of Jordanian regime and celebration of Salafist ideology (one should lead his life in accordance with the teachings of Koran.) Zarqawi showed his anger and hatred on every account. He objected having a lawyer and even refused to listen to the judge. Yet the prison was a new light for him since his comrades in prison were following the rigid body of rules set by Zarqawi. The 5th chapter echoes Zarqawi’s reconciliation with Allah and teachings of Koran by shedding mirror to the clash between the early years of Zarqawi and his years in prison.

The second part depicts the occupation of Zarqawi as a full-time terrorist. The succession of King Abdullah to the throne in 1999 was a significant climax in the history of Jordan. The new king was a westernized leader, having a desire to liberate Jordan. The domestic policy was to compromise with Islamists including Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, which began controlling social institutions. This new milder policy of the king demanded Jordanian officials to release Zarqawi and other 12 militants. This release on the other hand gave way to Zarqawi’s moving to Pakistan since the government kept on investigating him and eventually his entering Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. A new holy war was in the offspring when he took the oath of allegiance to Bin Laden:

“The oath of God is mine, to listen to and obey the superiors, who are carrying out this work with energy, vision and difficulty or ease for the man who is superior to him, so that the voice of God may be strongest and his religion victorious”

At this point, Brisard provides the reader with a general profile of Al Qaeda as having three levels: the top-including Bin Laden and right men, a managerial staff and the members trained in the camps. In accord with the documents proposed in 1999 Zarqawi joined the second circle thanks to his charisma and perfect knowledge of Jordanian networks. From then on, he received financial and material support from Al Qaeda

The 8th chapter opens with his moving to Herat in 2000 and the emphasis shifts to the strategic significance of Herat as opening the way to Iraqi Kurdistan via Iran. Later on, Zarqawi attempted terrorist attacks yet the suspects were captured in Van, Turkey in 2002. Settling down his dominance in the organization, Zarqawi was beginning to get free from Bin Laden. He even controlled some strategic roads to Kurdish camps. He made himself a reputation on the regional level.

The second part of the book also includes the deeds of his supporters. Supporting this, one of the followers of Zarqawi, Suweid prepared an attack against the U.S. on October and an American diplomat was killed in his garage. This action was the first of its kind directed against a foreign diplomat so that Zarqawi not only put his ideology into practice but also became the concern of international agenda. For the first time, “threat and fear” as the two dimensions of terrorism was created and felt among the public.

Being the most notable terrorist attack in the history of U.S., September 11 opened to way to the U.S “Operation Enduring Freedom” that aimed at destabilizing Al Qaeda in the region yet Zarqawi managed to flee. At this point, Brisard claims that Zarqawi’s escape was organized by Iran as he is believed to be equipped with false passports, radio and other stuffs enabling him to survive.

In the third part of the book, Brisard underlines the growing importance of Zarqawi by referring to him as transforming into reality from a myth. Also, the tone of the narration echoes the speculation of the author. For instance, a comparison is created between Iraq and Al Qaeda to prove that Bin Laden was in touch with Iraqi officials who financially supported him. The speculations further suggest that there was clear and convincing evidence that chemical weapons were being manufactured in Iraq and Bin Laden was equipped with those weapons. Another comparison between Iraq and Al Qaeda apart from the interest in chemical weapons is revealed as the common hostility toward U.S. Declarations of Saddam Hussein was considered to be no stranger to the attacks of 9\11.

Zarqawi on the other hand renewed alliance between autonomous Islamist groups of Kurdistan headed by Barzani and Talabani apart from Afghan and Chechen fighters in the region. However, in 2003 the Islamist groups were at unrest and members of Ansan Al-Islam fled to Iran. It is also suggested that Iranian officials refused a request for the extradition of Zarqawi who was imprisoned in Tehran during his flight to Iraqi Kurdistan. However, anti-American attacks were on the increase in the region as Brisard suggests. On April 9, an American was kidnapped and executed by Zarqawi’s followers and the video type of the murder was released on the internet. Although Zarqawi was in the prison, there began a long series of kidnapping and executions. Following his escape from the prison, Zarqawi introduced the notion of “Tawhid and Jihad” meaning unity and holy war. Brisard quotes from Iraqi intelligence services and claims that Tawhid and Jihad consist of nearly 1500 fighters and more than 20000 sympathizers. Significant names including Omar Yussef Jumab and Abu Ashraf were given with their titles and positions in the organization. Further information about this organization suggests Zarqawi was directing the group’s actions from a foreign country such as Iran and Syria as well as the kidnappings that are 150 in number.

In the 18th chapter Brisard focuses on Zarqawi’s attitude toward the minorities. Although Al Qaeda has always dealt carefully with Iran and the Shiite community, Zarqawi advocates a state of chaos in Iraq. He condemns the Shiites as “the weak link of the Islamic Nation” and provokes resistance against American troops.

In the fourth part of the book, the focus is on the global network of the terrorist group. It is suggested that religious centres in Europe including France, Italy and Germany were affective in fight with terrorism. As a matter of fact, it is stated that the terrorists just obtained the status of political refugees in a particular country then ended up in extremist groups. European countries have tried to arrest these cells one by one and certain home searches turned out to be success. For instance as Brisard states thanks to Italian antiterrorist police DIGOS, most members of the terrorist group Ansar Al Islam were arrested in Italy. Meanwhile, in France an Algerian origin group was arrested and found possessing vials of chemical which foreshadows possible chemical bombings in near future. To sum, the author concludes the book with a quick reminder of the history of Al Qaeda in connection with the life of Zarqawi.

In terms of the content and the organization of the story the book is open to discussions. To begin with it can be suggested that although the scope of the narration as a biographical account is narrow, the chronology is hard to follow. There is no unity and coherence within the course of the narration. The dates, identities and the events referred mostly leads to confusion since the author uses flashbacks and foreshadows unsuccessfully. The reason behind this confusion lies on the fact that Brisard uses a “copy and paste” technique in order to provide the reader with the documents he received as much as possible however, these abstracts and flashbacks become irrelevant since the events are not chronologically explained. With regard to content it can be concluded that no matter how surprisingly detailed and “realistic” evidences and documents Brisard includes in the story, ironically the facts he referred ends up in thesis only. He comes to a conclusion that Iran and Syria are the countries housing and supporting Zarqawi and his sympathizers however other European countries like Germany and France although housing if not supporting the same number of these terrorist organizations are not condemned by Brisard at all. His “selective omniscience” refers to Iran as receiving and concealing terrorists while appreciating Germany and France for their fight with terrorism. In this respect, his perspective and revealing of factual accounts fade into that of a subjective one since he is mostly preoccupied on account of his occupation post 9\11.

In light of this, it can be put forward that Jean Charles Brisard deals with a detailed overview of Zarqawi’s life and his relation with Al Qaeda as well as other specific organizations and names. And with the comments on his character as a leader and a fighter, Brisard enables the reader to see the psychology of one of the most significant terrorists of this millennium.

Note: This book review was previously published in the Review of International Law and Politics.

about book:

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi has now assumed the role of successor to Osama Bin Laden. This Jordanian terrorist has been designated Public Enemy Number 1 in the United States, with a bounty of over twenty-five million dollars on his head. Zarqawi's group, Tawhid wal Jihad, has imposed a reign of terror in post-Saddam Iraq, a bloodbath running the gamut from deadly street attacks to the beheading of hostages. Emerging in the Iraqi conflict as the new leader of Al-Qaeda and casting a shadow throughout the Middle East and Europe, Zarqawi is now the dominant force in the jihadist network.

In Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, Jean-Charles Brisard, international expert on terrorism and terrorism financing, traces Zarqawi's career from its origins to today's headlines, detailing the unprecedented threat he poses to the world. Brisard presents a disturbing and challenging view of United States policy in the Middle East and the war on terrorism. Against the background of an intensive on-the-ground investigation, he reveals the astonishing details of inside intelligence sources, including previously unpublished official documents and photographs, and witness testimonies. 8 page 4-color insert with photos and maps.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly,

Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication. USAK is an Ankara-based Turkish think tank.

Russia-made Explosives Captured in Turkey

2010-12-03T07:41:00.000-08:00

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

Wikileaks Leaks, Turkish General Staff Confirms

ANKARA- The Turkish General Staff declared that two Russian hand-made grenades belonging terrorist organization PKK has been found by security forces in Hakkari province near ıraqi border.

Immediately after Wikileaks had published the documents indicating that Russia gave weapons to the PKK, the Turkish General Staff stated that two Russian hand-made grenades were confiscated in the craggy areas of Semdinli region of Hakkari and these Russia-origin hand grenades belong to PKK.

The latest Wikileaks documents showed that Russia provided weapons to PKK.

PKK is considered as terrorist organization by Turkey, European Union, United States and many other states. The PKK terror cost more than 5.000 civilian lives and many more police and soldiers.

gizemyeldan@gmail.com

3 December 2010

Belgian Leader Insults Turks in TV Show

2010-12-03T07:38:00.000-08:00

By Gizem YELDAN (JTW)

Participating in the “De Pappenheimers” quiz show of the VRT TV, President of the Flemish Parliament Jan Peter Peumans shocked Turkish people in Turkey and Belgium by implying that Turks are the most disgusting nation .

During the “De Pappenheimers” quiz show on Sunday when asked which nation was the most disgusting on the face of earth in famous French philosopher Voltaire's opinion. Peumans answered “Turks” among the choices of “Flemish, Jews or Turks”; although, he knew the answer was Jews, he said Turks instead.

“I really knew it correctly but I do not have any courage to say something new about Jews. They are very sensitive people. I once said something about their liberalism and it really caused me a lot of trouble,” Peumans had said. Following his words, film director Jan Eelen, another contestant, told Peumans that “it appears saying something against Turks is not a problem, then.”

The remarks drew strong reactions from Turks both in and outside Belgium. Turkish Ambassador to Belgium responded immediately. On December 1, 2010, the Turkish Embassy stated that Peumans pledged to provide an explanation. “Peumans said he is sorry because the situation has caused consequences beyond his intention,” read the embassy's statement.

General Manager of Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) Ibrahim Sahin called the situation “disgusting” at his closing speech during the European Media Meeting under the campaign of “Raise your voice against Discrimination”.

According to Ceren Mutus, an expert of USAK center for EU studies this unacceptable statement made by the President of the Flemish Parliament reveals the intolerant and insular face of Europe. “Some circles in Europe, during their campaigns against Turkey's EU membership, put forward such arguments that are enriched with the so-called ‘barbarian’ image of Turks in history. In this regard, they claim that the admission of Turkey to the EU will inevitably pave the way for the destruction of the European culture by its eternal enemy. Furthermore, this incident once more sheds light on the deteriorating situation of foreigners in Europe. The substantial increase of xenophobia in European countires during the last decade has gained its concrete form through humiliation of Turks who make up the biggest group of non-nationals in the EU. However, it should be noted that a Europe which lacks respect and tolerance towards different groups, is destined to lose its credibility and sincerity as an ‘advocate of human rights’, she said.

Jan Peter Peumans is a member of the New Flemish Alliance. He is known for boycotting receptions hosted by Belgian King Albert II as he said he was a republican. The party of which he is a member, the N-VA, supports the idea of the formation of an independent Flanders and secession from Belgium. The party is currently the smallest partner in the three-member coalition government in the Flemish region and has 16 of 124 seats in the region's parliament.

gizemyeldan@gmail.com

3 December 2010

PKK tutelage over pro-Kurdish politics under question

2010-12-03T05:51:00.000-08:00

By Ayse KARABAT, Today's Zaman

First published on 28 November 2010

The polemic between outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan and Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir, reactions to the polemic, increased class struggle within Kurdish society and attempts from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) to capture some of the Kurdish votes has brought PKK tutelage over pro-Kurdish politics into the spotlight.

The pundits stress that the search for a third way in pro-Kurdish politics is accelerating. According to them, this third force, which will be free from both the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) -- a party frequently accused of being unable to step outside the shadow of the PKK -- is essential for a solution to the Kurdish question. However, this third force should not necessarily be a political party; it can be a loose movement based on civil society.

Mazhar Bağlı, a sociologist from Dicle University and an executive member of the AK Party, told Sunday’s Zaman that such a third force is absolutely necessary for the solution to the Kurdish question.

“Both in the western part of Turkey as well as in the eastern, public opinion is no longer willing to accept tutelage over its own demands. This new force should be civilian, nonviolent and should correspond with the Kurdish society and its demands,” he said.

Bağlı cited Öcalan’s recent criticism of Baydemir, emphasizing that developments surrounding this subject should be reframed as the struggle for tutelage.

“The PKK is openly saying that they do not want to share their power with a civilian structure. The threats toward Baydemir are just an attempt to reverse this process, which is against their tutelage,” Bağlı said.

Baydemir recently said that “guns are not a means to solve the problem; the role of guns in the 21st century is finished,” drawing the ire of Öcalan. The PKK leader, who is serving a life sentence on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara, told Baydemir through his lawyers to resign, engage in self-criticism or join the AK Party.

Öcalan targeted Baydemir, saying: “I know the youngsters of Diyarbakır. They will rip his mouth out. They will not allow him to say those kinds of words,” the Turkish media reported on Tuesday.

Baydemir did not comment on Öcalan’s statements, but BDP Co-chairperson Gülten Kışanak expressed her support for Baydemir, saying she appreciated the criticism offered by Öcalan but noted that Baydemir had done nothing wrong.

“Everybody has the freedom to criticize, and Öcalan used this right. He can be critical of anyone, he can be critical toward Baydemir, toward me,” she said. But the BDP officials refused to elaborate on the issue further and tried to downplay the polemic between Öcalan and Baydemir.

Sedat Laçiner from the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), while analyzing the issue to Sunday’s Zaman on Wednesday, recalled the alleged negotiations between state security forces and Öcalan, who is in a hurry to obtain results from the ongoing dialogue as he will lose his bargaining power. That is why he is reacting so strongly to Baydemir’s comments.

According to media reports, Öcalan also told his lawyers that, according to Turkish public opinion, those kinds of people (Baydemir) should be interlocutors (instead of Öcalan).

Laçiner stressed that there is already a rift in pro-Kurdish circles; the number of people who do not support violence is growing and, despite the ongoing dialogue between the PKK and the state, there are forces within the PKK that do not want to lay down their arms.

Bağlı also argues that class conflict within the Kurdish society is becoming more obvious.

“I think this class rift will widen. Different classes use different methods to search for their rights, even if the rights are the same. The rapid urbanization, strengthening of the Kurdish middle and upper-middle classes and increasing levels of education bring with them class distinction. For the bourgeoisie, the idea of guns as a method of claiming rights is not legitimate, unlike for the working class,” he said, giving the different attitudes of the Kurds toward the referendum on a constitutional reform package as an example.

The BDP urged its supporters to boycott the referendum on constitutional amendments on Sept. 12, but some pro-Kurdish circles did not heed these calls.

According to Bağlı, those who voted for the referendum were primarily from the upper or middle class and educated professionals. This in no way means that they do not have demands for Kurdish society.

Şah İsmail Bedirhanoğlu, chairman of the Southeastern Anatolia Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (GÜNSİAD), noted that Kurds are not a homogenous society. There are different political views and the dominance of the BDP cannot be denied.

“But there is rapid social change within Kurdish society, reflected in the number of people who think that violence is not a viable method but who hold that denying Kurds their rights as a group is also unacceptable. Those people are from the middle or upper class and are intellectuals, tradesmen and professionals. In the near future they may gain strength and grow,” he noted.

He said that, regardless of their political views, education in Kurdish is the key issue for all Kurds. He added that Kurds also agree on the need to strengthen local administrations in the Southeast, but not all of them want the vague “democratic autonomy” demanded by the PKK and the BDP. The final basic principle of the “third force” is, he said, the lowering of the 10 percent election threshold.

The CHP is a candidate for being the meeting place of the Kurds who are in search of a third way, CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu claimed.

While visiting Diyarbakır recently, he said the CHP can be the third way in that the AK Party is based on religious ideas and the BDP on ethnic politics. “The people want this third way,” he claimed.

Kılıçdaroğlu added that Kurds have demands, which is natural, but that ethnic politics is wrong and a trap that leads to separation. If we can solve the basic problems, then there will be no need for ethnic politics,” he said.

Sezgin Tanrıkulu, former chairman of the Diyarbakır Bar Association and a possible future member of the CHP, said the lack of a third option, besides the AK Party and the BDP, is not bringing a solution.

“But the CHP should meet with the general principles of democracy. It should use a positive discourse rather than negative, as it did in the past. The more it uses this positive discourse, the more it will gain strength in the region,” Tanrıkulu told Sunday’s Zaman.

He recalled that when the dialogue between Öcalan and the state began, Kılıçdaroğlu did not object to the development, but said that if the dialogue will offer a solution, it is for the best.

“His attitude legitimized the dialogue,” Tanrıkulu said.

Bağlı agrees with Tanrıkulu, although he thinks the CHP will not become the meeting place of those searching for a pro-Kurdish third way.

“I believe that the CHP can play a crucial role in the solution of the Kurdish question. If nationalists within the CHP stop neglecting the existence of the Kurdish question, a solution will be possible,” he said.

The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (By Walter Laqueur)

2010-12-01T01:34:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Zeynep Sengul (Journal of Turkish Weekly)

Review:

To be equipped with the required knowledge in the struggle against terror is today much more crucial than any actor factor. To be able to understand the current developments, we must have the sense of what is going on in the real world. While thinking about these necessities, the author of these lines discovered that the book of Walter Laqueur “The New Terrorism” can satisfy the need of readers.

What makes this book special is its focus on the ideological developments of the terrorist movements. The book subsumes topics such as the “terror and its history”, “the weapons of mass destruction”, “terrorist motives” and “terror and the far right”. It also examines the relation between terror and religion. Afterwards, it tries to differentiate between the kinds of terrorism and defines two types of terrorism: state terrorism and exotic terrorism. In the end, it describes the current situation and gives hints about the future characteristics of terror.

In the first chapter, the author defines terrorism. He makes this definition by explaining what terrorism is not. To the author, terrorism is not kind of a violence that can be a synonym for “guerrilla warfare”. He makes distinction between “terrorism” and “guerrilla warfare”. The “guerrilla warfare” has a positive meaning while the word “terrorism” has a negative connotation. The “guerrilla warfare” is true when the actors try to liberate a territory which is sparsely inhabited such as mountains, jungles. He gives an example for this usage. The news agencies will call the actors of bomb attacks in London or Paris as “terrorists” while the actors of such events in the Middle East or any other peripheral places are defined as the “militants”, “Islamists” or “radicals”. Then, it traces the origins of terrorism. Even in the Bible or in Cicero’s notes, we can find such elements. For instance, the heroes in these stories are executed when they kill the tyrants, but for their honor, the remaining ones erect statues. He gives other religion-oriented groups such as the one founded by Ismaili Sabbah, and the Jewish faction against the Roman Occupation. Then, he asserts that despite these sects or groups which acted violently, there was not any sustained terrorist group in the Middle Ages.

Then, the author comes to the characteristics of the 19th and 20th centuries. He claims that the actors of the nineteenth century knew the fact that they were committing crime in the eyes of the state and any other authority. On the contrary, the terrorists of the twentieth century regarded their cause as a sacred one and acted accordingly. They saw no right to be punished by the state. They were much more radical in their deeds.

After emphasizing on these characteristics of the terrorist actions, the author mentions the weapons of mass destruction. He defines four types of weapons: Nuclear threat, biological weapons, chemical weapons and cyber terrorism. He describes the traits of these weapons and gives the reasons why terrorists prefer certain weapons of mass destruction. For instance, he says that terrorists used chemical weapons often in the past, yet they never utilized biological weapons on a large scale in a terrorist action. He claims that terrorists did not act with biological weapons since they would kill the whole people living there without any discrimination. These weapons would also incapacitate the plantation and fauna. Such kind of action would damage the prestige of the terrorists. This is not the aim of terrorists since their job depends on propaganda by the deed that is the influence of their action increases if the action is publicized. Otherwise, they would not have sympathizers or followers within the public. Lastly, the author mentions a new kind of weapon, which has gained popularity recently. That is Cyber terrorism. This definition regards the computer as the most important weapons of mass destruction since it enables communication among groups and thus provides information necessary to get information to prepare bombs or any other weapon.

The third chapter and the following ones search for the reasons why terrorists commit such crimes. What are the motives for their actions? The author tries to give any possible explanation. Firstly, he focuses on the personality of the terrorists and reaches the conclusion that any single personality can explain the behavior of terrorists since they act violently when they regard themselves pursuing a sacred cause. What ideological or religious elements may influence them to act accordingly?

Here, the author explains the issue of ideological formations on the terrorists. For instance, he challenges that the terrorist motives of 1970’s were left-wing oriented. Their motto was to eradicate injustice. If there were no injustice, then terrorism would disappear. This kind of inspiration changed after 1980’s. The terrorists of the time were right-wing oriented. They were nationalists. Their nationalistic character was resulting from the economic and social problems. Nationalists blamed the minorities within their population. The USA and Germany were ultimate example of such motives. Then, the author explains that the history is filled up with religion-oriented terrorist movements. He gives examples of various sects or cults that acted violently in the past. Then, he comes to the big issue of rising radical fundamentalism in Islam. Firstly, he explains the concept of Jihad in Islam. He says that Jihad means the holy war against enemies or one’s refining his soul against his own instinct. He claims that the concept Jihad is the missionary aggressive element in Islam despite the fact that Muslims claim that Islam is espousing love rather than hate.

The author and other specialists in the West think that the concept Jihad constitutes the ideological basis. Then, he makes a distinction between PLO and HAMAS. He challenges that Islamic element of Jihad is much more clear in these groups. While PLO is a group which was established on the grounds that it would act to improve social conditions and economic problems, Hamas was a religion-oriented group. Lastly, he claims that the growing impact of the radical fundamentalism may be attributed to social problems and bad conditions in the Middle East. The movement itself contains anti-western feeling. People there regard the enemy as the ultimate enemy and accuse the West for their fate. Thus, terrorism there is not completely religion-oriented. We can not completely deny the role of unfortunate, innocent people whose fate was at the hands of imperialistic powers for a long time. Due to this fact, it is highly difficult to avoid such kind of extremism.

As mentioned above, the author also draws our attention to the types of terrorism. The state-sponsored terrorism is the first type he defines. What does the state-sponsored mean? That is, a state supports terrorist activities in a certain state rather than fighting war with that certain state. This was very popular in the past. The states used this method to maintain the balance of power. Yet, the popularity of this mean decreased as there was no need to sustain the system because there were not many actors in the international system as they did in the past. For instance, IMRO, the Macedonian Independence Organization was supported by the Bulgarian government. Other state-sponsored terrorist groups also existed in the last phase of the Ottoman Empire.

The other type of terrorism is the exotic terrorism. The word “exotic” means non-native, foreign, alien in English. Then, what does it mean this type of terrorism? It describes the specific types of terrorism that occur in faraway countries. He gives the Tamil Tigers in Peru, which blame the Indians for the bad conditions in the country. He says that drug smugglers may also be a kind of terrorists in other parts of the world.

In the last chapter, he gives hints about the future of terrorism, depending on the analysis throughout the book. He claims that weapons of mass destruction can easily be reached. This draws a threatening picture for the individuals since there is an increasing fanaticism.

Terrorists do not consider their prestige important as they did in the past although they still depend on the propaganda by the deed technique. Thus, it is important to be calm and as rational as possible in such cases. To calculate the costs and benefits of the behaviors is more beneficial during emergency rather than act harshly and urgently.

To sum up, this book is very practical to read since it has subdivisions for the interested readers. This enables to focus on each part closely. Despite it is a little euro-centric and ignores the motivations of Islamists a little, it can help both common people and specialists working in this field.

about the book:

In The New Terrorism Walter Laqueur, one of the foremost experts on terrorism and international strategic affairs, recounts the history of terrorism and, more importantly, examines the future of terrorist activity worldwide.

Laqueur traces the chilling trend away from terrorism perpetrated by groups of oppressed nationalists and radicals seeking political change to small clusters of fanatics bent on vengeance and simple destruction. Coinciding with this trend is the alarming availability of weapons of mass destruction.

Chemical and biological weapons are cheap and relatively easy to make or buy. Even nuclear devices are increasingly feasible options for terrorists. And with the information age, cyber terrorism is just around the corner.

Laqueur argues that as a new quasi-religious extreme right rises, with more personal and less ideological motivations than their left-wing counterparts, it is only a matter of time before the attainability of weapons of mass destruction creates a terrifying and unstable scenario.

From militant separatism in Kashmir to state-sponsored extremism in Libya and ecoterrorism in the West, The New Terrorism offers a thorough account of terrorism in all its past and current manifestations. Most importantly, it casts a sober eye to the future, when the inevitable marriage of technology and fanaticism will give us all something new to think about.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly,

http://www.turkishweekly.net/book/24/received-books.asp

Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication. USAK is an Ankara-based Turkish think tank.

Book Review: America Alone: The End Of The World As We Know It (By Mark Steyn)

2010-12-01T01:22:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Engin Akcay (Journal of Turkish Weekly, JTW)

Review:

Why America Is Becoming Lonely?
When people see a strong horse and a weak horse,
by nature they will like the strong horse.

Usame b. Ladin, Kandahar, Nov., 2001

Perception has a crucial importance in foreign affairs, as well as matters in psychology and sociology. According to Mark Steyn, who says “America Alone” in his best-seller, America’s global act of striving is also an issue of perception, at international level. In the history “all dominant powers are hated – Britain was and Rome – but they usually hated for right reasons” he says. This sort of hatred has resounded with echoes like that of Afghani El-Qaeda member Maulana Inyadullah’s; “the Americans love Pepsi-Cola, We love death”.

Explaining why “Muslims vs. Jews in Palestine, Muslims vs. Hindus in Kashmir, Muslims vs. Christians in Africa, Muslims vs. Buddhists in Thailand, Muslims vs. Russians in Caucasus, Muslims vs. backpacking tourists in Bali, Muslims vs. Danish cartoonists in Scandinavia”, Steyn declares that they live the fact ‘think globally, act locally’. In this perspective, the picture looks like a clear ‘clash of civilizations’ between “the westerners” and “Muslims”. So how come? By holding manpower… He argues that “in the seventies and eighties Muslims had children while Westerners took all those silly doomsday tomes about overpopulation seriously”.

It is an old discussion over how population is determinative in gaining superiority in global booms. What it does focus on are the nuances concerning the ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of a population. In this context, a connection is made between the population policies and development level of less-developed countries, especially those of the African continent. During the last few decades, family planning was shown as the panacea for third world countries, by international and regional “western” institutions. If that is so, to what extent can demographical statistics change? The author supports this argument with this data; ‘in France, of inhabitants aged twenty and under, approximately thirty percent are Muslim and this is about 45 percent in major city centres… In Belgium Turks and Moroccans under 18 years old are almost 35 percent of same aged Belgians. But, is this a race on giving birth? I do not think this is a case seriously taken by Islamic world as a tactical tool to overwhelm the West, aside from Colonel Qaddafi who predicts “… Allah will grant Islam victory in Europe – without swords, without guns, without conquests. The fifty million Muslims of Europe will turn it into a Muslim continent within a few decades.” Otherwise this could definitely be determined as state policy by Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez and others that have ideological hostility with the USA.

Asking what the West prepared to die for after 9/11, Steyn should actually be asked whether dying was the only alternative in the world for cherishing goodness and keeping a civilization alive. Is it not that possible to sustain it by living? Sometimes, interestingly, to live requires a much more brave heart than dying in today’s world… Each conscious individual has the responsibility for making the world better, not killing for but eliminating hatred. Describing Islamism as “militarily weak but ideologically confident” while “the West is militarily strong but ideologically insecure”, the author emphasizes that the West does not have any strategy to combat terrorism which has strong ideology. Although academic sources indicate when the “Encyclopaedia of Islam” was completed, the concept “Islamism” had virtually disappeared from the English usage, by 1938; it is hard to understand why Steyn insistently uses it to reflect an ideological characteristic via an additional “ism”. It is well known that there is no any Islam-related professional union gathering all Islamic countries under the frame of an ideological aim. In this case the only modern example is – including no ideology – the Organization of the Islamic Conference of which the Secretary General is from secular Turkey and is officially represented in the UN.

Much analysis on combating terrorism and global security highlights that the problem can simply be solved through a comprehensive approach comprising civil initiative and soft-power. Moreover reformed after 9/11 NMSP-WOT – even if not so successful in implementation – is built on this unique perspective. Bringing the issue to the “clash of civilizations” axis and choosing the examples from not only “radical” Islam but also “moderate” Islam does clearly shade the objectivity of the book. Even if quite witty wording is used in the book, it serves for discrepancy rather than reconciliation between the civilizations.

The book conveys from NYT’s Thomas Friedman that the failure to prevent the September 11 attacks is a failure of imagination rather than lack of coordination or intelligence. Like some others Steyn too has a perception problem pertaining to the difference between an ordinary Muslim and the ones using terror with Islamic motives as a tool. When this kind of misperception is reflected at state level some undesired progress easily becomes inevitable in international relations. Touching on the negative impacts of multiculturalism Steyn concludes: “in the absence of cultural confidence, demography will decide the future.” Because of that he believes that the USA is under the demographic invasion of not only Muslims but also of Hispanics…

With given perspective what is perceived is America’s loneliness. However, especially during the cold war period, America was sincerely backed by many countries including Turkey. It is still recalled that Turkey, which Steyn tackles as being in the “opposite” category, supported America both with its “manpower” and military forces in the first instance in the Korean War since 1950 as “strategic partner”. However, not only Turkey and Islamic countries but the European Union also refrained from supporting US global policy when the approach “you’re either with us or against us” steps in the relations as Bush Doctrine bypassing democratic precedents in foreign affairs. In today’s world where globalization eliminated most of the classical understandings, if Steyn is still in favour of the Monroe Doctrine, there is no chance to implement such a policy. The breaking point for the “American Dream” that has been coveted by advancing countries is not 9/11 attacks and the Islamic world have already not assented to them; but the real breaking point is the ego-centric and disruptive policies of the Bush government made after 9/11 bidding defiance to common sense. In this period while terror becomes global, Bush’s effort to globalize war on terror lost its credibility in Iraq thus combating terrorism could not become worldwide.

Praying for “God Bless America” is a conceivable wish that each nation could make for their own homeland. If that is so, is not it time to pray “God Bless Humanity” for the American government calling “good” countries of “angelic axis” to act with itself against “rogue” countries of the “axis of evil”? Who knows, perhaps the remedy for American loneliness is hidden within this Rumi-sounding perspective.

about the book:

It's the end of the world as we know it...

Someday soon, you might wake up to the call to prayer from a muezzin. Europeans already are. And liberals will still tell you that "diversity is our strength"--while Talibanic enforcers cruise Greenwich Village burning books and barber shops, the Supreme Court decides sharia law doesn't violate the "separation of church and state," and the Hollywood Left decides to give up on gay rights in favor of the much safer charms of polygamy.

If you think this can't happen, you haven't been paying attention, as the hilarious, provocative, and brilliant Mark Steyn--the most popular conservative columnist in the English-speaking world--shows to devastating effect. The future, as Steyn shows, belongs to the fecund and the confident. And the Islamists are both, while the West is looking ever more like the ruins of a civilization. But America can survive, prosper, and defend its freedom only if it continues to believe in itself, in the sturdier virtues of self-reliance (not government), in the centrality of family, and in the conviction that our country really is the world's last best hope.

International Strategic Research Organisation, USAK
- Ankara based Turkish think tank, 2004

Mark Steyn's America Alone is laugh-out-loud funny--but it will also change the way you look at the world.

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Journal of Turkish Weekly is an USAK publication...

2010

Book Review: Iran In Crisis? Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response (By Roger Howard)

2010-12-01T01:13:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Emre Ozkan

Review:

In the book, Iran in Crisis, the author Rogar Howard, tries to examine some of the most important and debated issues about the contemporary politics. As it can be understood from the book’s title, the author evaluates the Iran’s policies about nuclear energy and American response to these policies. Many books with this title usually discuss the issue subjectively and neglect to monitor both sides of the coin. Howard’s book is different, offering a balanced and wide ranging analysis of Iranian domestic and foreign policy and the effects of these policies to her relations with the West. In a serious of chapters, Howard discusses the relations of Iran with the USA and analyses the Iran’s domestic crisis in the context of political, social and economic developments.

The book is divided into three main sections. The first section deals with the relation between Iran and the USA and provides a comprehensive overview about the current debates between the two sides. In addition, the author evaluates the possibility that whether Iran is a source of international terror or not? The second section analyses the domestic crisis in Iran. Finally, the author examines the outcomes of his findings about Iran.

As the name of the book is “Iran in Crisis: Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response”, the author starts with Iran and the USA in order to make the issue more understandable. Howard mentions the deteriorating character of relations and states the tension between two sides as the result of combustible mix of Iranian provocation with something belligerent US reactions. Furthermore, common grounds of Iran and the West are examined by overviewing the political influence of the West on Iran. Besides, this section deals with the enormous geopolitical importance of Iran as a leading factor for West to cooperate with Tehran rather than to compete with her. In addition, US’s view of Iran, which is misleadingly affected by neo-conservatives or Republicans, is also assessed in this section.

In the second chapter of the first section, the author examines the attitudes of Iran against the international terror. The author, objectively analyses the weaknesses of Iran and the US accusations. In this framework, the author mentions that the reputation of Iran as a sponsor of international terror is sourced from its willingness to execute its exiled dissidents and to use assassinations as an instrument of foreign policy in the past. On the other hand, the US weakness in relations with Iran is the lack of effort to define what constitutes terrorism. Furthermore, the author questions the accusations which are directed to Iran about the relationship with terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Besides, Iran’s nuclear programme and the US opposition are also discussed in this chapter. According to the author, the regime change within the Iran, which is strongly supported by the US, cannot be a solution under the lessons drawn in Iraq.

The second section on domestic crisis is relatively short and deals with the internal crisis by evaluating political, social and economic structure of Iran. In the first chapter of this section, the author assesses the political tensions by examining the democratic sides of Iranian constitution, the weaknesses of the constitution and intellectual disputes between conservative and reformist opinions. In the following chapter, Howard analyses the social and economic structure of Iranian society. The social and economic unrests -malaise- are deeply examined and named as an alarming trend for the Iran. Emigration of young generation and the weakness of Iranian economy are considered as perilous for Iran’s domestic stability. What’s more, high inflation, dependence on oil, growth of government spending and problems of the banking system are stated as the other important problems of Iranian economy. Finally, the author makes a significant conclusion by emphasizing the close relationship between the fate of Iran’s economy and its political order.

In the last section, the author examines the outcomes about his findings in the previous sections. He tries to predict the results of current developments in Iranian foreign policy and challenges to Iranian regime. Furthermore, author focuses on the status of dissidents in Iranian internal policy. In other words, he questions the possibility of popular rebellion under these circumstances.

Overall, this is an excellent book, and the author Howard evaluates Iran, which is one of the most debated states in contemporary international relations and makes an elaborate analysis about Iran and its policies. The book is highly readable because of the author’s comprehensive analysis about an eminent issue in international politics. It fulfills a gap in international relations by making an objective analysis about the policies of Iran.

about book:

Since the occupation of Iraq in early 2003, Iran has become by default the Middle East's last remaining significant power, apart from Israel. Yet, as defense analyst Roger Howard shows, Iran feels deeply insecure. It is in this context that this book explores Irans' weapons, foreign relations with North Korea and China, politics in the region, and more. Given the regional tension and the overt hostility of the United States , this book provides an essential background for understanding the likely course of events in the Middle East.

Book Review: The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit (By B.A. Roberson)

2010-12-01T00:59:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Murat Sogangoz

Review:

The book mainly focuses upon the new opportunities which Europe have in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War. North Africa is also included in the term ‘Middle East’ by the authors. It discusses about the changes in international politics by the end of the Cold War and the possible chances of Europe to restore its influence in the Middle East.

The book is composed of 9 chapters written by 8 different authors. The first chapter of the book -as the introduciton- was written by B.A. Roberson. In the introduction, it is told about the European legacy in the Middle East and then about the US’ becoming of the dominant actor in the region. Europe has very ancient ties with the Middle East. In the Ottoman period, the European states had Caputilations agreements with the Ottoman Empire. Via these agreements, the European states conducted significant economic relations with the region. The end of the First World War marked the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East region came into the influence of Britain and France. Britain and France controlled the region upon the mandates formed by their manipulations. However, after the end of the Second World War, the European states left their preponderance in the region to the United States. The US and the Soviet Union were the main actors in the region during the Cold War. European states, far from being able to exert influence, could merely support US policies in the region during the Cold War. The main focus of Europe became economic benefits it could reap by increasing its trade with the region. After the Cold War, the US continues to act as the dominant actor in the political sphere of the region. However, some objections started in Europe to the US policies. Europe is in an effort to rebuild its influence via its strong and ever strengthening economy. But the US is still the main military actor in the region and the world, which has also been playing a vital role in the defence of the European continent.

The second chapter of the book was written by Ghassan Salame and titled “Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterrenean: Europe and the Middle East in the post-Cold War era”. There are significant differences between the European view of the Middle East and the expectations of the Middle East from Europe. While the Europeans view the Middle East with security concerns, the Middle Easterners expect Europeans to take steps for economic development, fair resolution of the Palestinian problem and free movement. There are 3 different views of Middle East from Europe: The first group even questions the European links with the region. The second group favors the minimization of relations with the region, and the third group favors the stabilization of the region via solidifying links with the region. But, the third group started to be marginalized in Europe. Because Europe is concerned with ‘more important’ issues like the integration of Eastern Europe, the stabilization the Balkans. The biggest reason of the inability of the Europeans to form an integrated policy towards the Middle East is that: While the Europeans tend to view Middle East with security concerns, no competences exist in the framework of the European Union in the field of security. This leads to the situation that Europe can only exert influence in peace time in the Middle East. In addition, problems like the dominance of the US in the Gulf, its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and many conflicts unresolved in the region limit the scope of the role that Europe may play. However, Clinton administration began to give priority to the Pacific region and this will increase the maneuver capability of Europe.

The third chapter of the book was written by George Joffe and titled ‘Relations between the Middle East and the West: The view from the south’. After the Cold War, there emerged sharp differences between the states in the region in terms of defining their national interests. Concepts like sovereignty, security, economic restructuring got more significant in this new era. The West was the key figure in citing these issues on the agenda of the Middle East countries. The Middle East peace process was also inaugurated with the initiative of the West. After the Cold War, the real pressing issue in the countries of the Middle East is the problem of the governments in providing themselves popular legitimacy. The interventions and reform demands of the Western world are being resented by the peoples of the region, since the conditionality of the international finance institutions like the World Bank and the IMF dictates neo-liberal solutions and these policies proved to be worsening the situation.

The fourth chapter was written by Phebe Marr and titled ‘The United States, Europe and the Middle East: Cooperation, co-optation or confrontation?’ There seems to be no serious differences between the two sides of the Atlantic over the aims on the Middle East. However, there appears to be some different views about policy priorities, tactics and methods concerning the region. These differences do not seem to lead to the break up of the Atlantic alliance, but they may lead to some difficulties in creating out of area missions in the framework of NATO. Persian Gulf is the main cause of differences between Europe and the US. While the US exercises a policy of ‘Dual Containment’ against Iran and Iraq which are hostile to US, European states object to this kind of harsh policies and favor more accommodation with Iran and Iraq, since Europe has more economic interests in the region rather than the US. Then, the problem of burden sharing emerges in the sense that US is assuming most of the bill in achieving the continuous course of trade and the secure flow of energy resources from the region thanks to its military deployments, however, Europe is the main beneficiary of trade with the Middle East without seriously contributing to the regional stability in military terms. The Middle East peace process is an area of common interests, both for Europe and the US. However, any failure in the process may inversely increase the tensions between the two sides about the responsibility of that failure.

The fifth chapter titled ‘Islam and Europe: An enigma or a myth?’ was written by B.A. Roberson. Islamic movements in the Middle East emanate from the low quality of governance, low economic performance and corruption rather than the strength of Islamism as an ideology. The Europeans have started to see Islam as a threat to themselves especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution and due to their experiences with the Muslim societies living in Europe. However, Islam is a pluralist religion composed of many branches and many kinds of different practices, it does not constitute a unit body although it gives its followers a common sense of belonging. So, Islamism does not have a potential of forming a serious threat to the western world, since the main causes of rising Islamism are in the framework of domestic grievances. The Middle Eastern states have a wide range of interests and a single definition of interests in the framework of a united Muslim state seems impossible.

The sixth chapter titled ‘Western Europe and the Iranian revolution, 1979-97: An elusive normalization’ was written by Fred Halliday. After the revolution, the foreign policy of Iran was conducted by a revolutionary agenda in international politics while foreign policy was also influenced by more cautious and realist views. It was expected that Europe would have much warmer relations with Iran compared to the US, since it has more interests in the region economically and historically. But there were some issues like Rushdie, human rights, military expenditure, and the Iranian stance on the Arab-Israeli peace process which were forming a barrier to the further improvements of relations between Iran and Europe. Nonetheless, Europe also developed its trade with Iran despite not involving in closer ties like cooperation for the economic development of Iran. Iran’s confrontation with the US was also another significant factor disaffecting the relations between Europe and the West. At the end of the 1990s, voices for moderation and more accommodation with the external world increased due to the poor economic performance of the Islamic Republic. These voices resulted in the election of Khatami, in 1997, which came with a more moderate stance.

The seventh chapter titled ‘Turkey: Europe in the Middle East, or the Middle East in Europe?’ was written by Philip Robins. It is argued in this chapter that the end of the Cold War altered the strategic perceptions of Turkey in a significant degree. With the end of the Cold War, the main threat, the USSR, disappeared and that weakened the situation of NATO which was established directly against the USSR. This situation led to the questioning of Turkey’s European vocation and even its will to join the EU. However, Turkey is transforming profoundly and its liberalizing economy is strongly connected with the European economy. Thanks to this intensity of economic relations with Europe, there is a strong support in Turkey for European integration. Although it is a reality that Turkey can not exclude itself from the politics of the Middle East, the majority of the Turkish population is not fond of a Middle Eastern identity and Middle East can not be seen as an alternative of Europe.

The eighth chapter titled ‘Algeria: France’s disarray and Europe’s conundrum’ was written by Claire Spencer. The determination of the reasons and the responsible ones for the violence in Algeria constitute a challenge to Europe. This became more difficult for Europe in a situation that the EU was in talks with Algeria for concluding a bilateral EU-Algeria Association Agreement. Also international humanitarian law is weak in terms of external intervention in a situation when a government is not able to protect the lives of its own citizens. For effectively intervening in order to prevent this kind of destabilizing events, a ‘Charter for Peace and Stability’, which was envisaged to be established in the framework of Barcelona process, may be effective. Nonetheless, it is questioned why Europe stayed so late in taking a step during a violent event, although Europe is so keen to establish new parameters for its post-Cold War security structures.

The ninth and the last chapter titled ‘Middle Eastern trade and financial integration: Lessons from the European Union’s experience’ was written by Rodney Wilson. In this chapter, the author defines some priority areas for economic cooperation in the Middle East and for economic integration. It should be firstly decided upon the form of cooperation: will a free trade area or a customs union or a single market be composed? The author states that a free trade area is the most viable form of economic cooperation between the Middle Eastern states, since all of them may easily participate in it. States may also form a monetary cooperation in the form of the Palestinian currency as a symbol while states are keeping their monetary independence or a common currency may also be established and the integration process may be founded upon that.

The book is an important source of information in explaining the situation and the alternatives of Europe in the Middle East. Almost all the authors accept that the Middle East is much more important for Europe than the US. However, while viewing the region with security concerns, the EU lacks an effective mechanism for conducting an effective common foreign policy. This book is original in examining the Middle East in terms of European politics and transatlantic relations, trying to explain the political situation from both economic and security dimensions.

about book:

Bringing together some of the leading commentators on the two regions, this book explores many of the key issues which have informed Europe's relationship with the Middle East from its colonial legacies to an uncertain economic future. It finds that Europe has been increasingly influential throughout the region through its economic strategies, although it is still severely limited in influencing security.

The Ubiquitous Crisis of the EU: Lack of Visionary Leadership

2010-12-01T00:50:00.000-08:00

Mustafa Kutlay, USAK Center for EU Studies

Does history make great men or do great men make history? This is one of chicken and egg questions in social sciences. A probable answer, following the agent-structure approaches, will be both of them make each other. Its at least the case if one studies the history of European integration. The European Economic Community was established in a very special episode of modern history. The war-torn countries of continental Europe exhausted to kill each other and they had consumed all of the means to further harm each other. Moreover, their economies were in cul-de-sac in the sense that the continent was incapable of producing even the very basic consumption goods. In such a kind of environment, cooperation dictated itself. In other words, from a structural point of view, the European countries had to cooperate to overcome the existing havoc at that time.

Explaining European integration by just relying on structural factors, however, may be an inadequate attempt. The agency factor also influenced the course of European history in the post-war period significantly. It was true that the structural conditions, including the attitudes of hegemonic power of the time, were in favour of European integration. Yet, they were the visionary leaders who exploited this opportunity in order to make a dream come true. The founding fathers of European integration saw a window of opportunity in the wake of continental wide crisis and took advantage of the existing situation to kick-off European integration process. Only by the vision of these leaders, ever closer Union came into existence.

Today, the same Union is facing multiple-crises concurrently. On the one hand, theres a financial crisis, which severely shakes the very fundamentals of European Economic and Monetary Union. On the other hand, the EU encounters with domestic and international legitimacy problems. The financial crisis first hit the Greek shores seriously. The first reaction of the leading EU member country leaders was ignorance. Especially Angela Merkel dismissed the idea of bailing-out Greece in order to punish Athens irresponsible economic management. The level of economic and financial integration within the EU, however, was more sophisticated than Merkel assumed. It turned into a matter of moment issue for the crisis to spread out other Southern European countries. At the end of the day, Merkel declined her insistence and Greece was bailed-out with a joint IMF-EU operation. The lack of visionary leadership was at the epicentre of the entire process because it is because of the self-interested and short-sighted polices that the crisis exacerbated in EU. It is obvious that the economic problems of the EU are not only about Merkel, Sarkozy or anybody else. The visionary leadership crisis is the common problem of almost all EU member countries. In other words, its ubiquitous!

The same situation is also the case for EUs international stature and external relations. The EU-US relations are at a very unsatisfactory level; the EU-Russia relations are fragmented and polarizing; the EU-China relations are not pleasing even the minimalists in the EU; Turkey-EU relations had plunged into deadlock over the couple of years. It is really hard to see the EU as a normative power that provides creative solutions to the Hobbsian world of Middle East.

Similarly, the posts which were created by the Lisbon treaty to improve EUs visibility at the international fora were fulfilled by low-profile figures that are neither capable of converging the diversified internal conflicts nor able to sit on the table on equal footing with big states like US, China, and Russia on behalf of the EU. Naturally, the same problem is observable again: The EU suffers from the lack of visionary leaders! Not only in the economic sphere but also in the political platforms, there is an obvious coordination and cooperation crisis due to ubiquitous visionary leadership problem.

Here, it is not argued that the only problem of the EU is about the agents. On the contrary, there are very structural problems that restrict the ability of Brussels to become a more active international player. However, this only exacerbates the wobbling position of the EU because under a period in which EU encounters structural problems, the need for visionary leadership becomes much more imperative than the ordinary times. It seems that only by visionary leaders and far-sighted politicians, the EU may continue its journey. Otherwise, it would seem to be a daunting task to satisfy the European citizens and EU member states in the medium and long term.

Book Review: The Multiple Identities of the Middle East (By Bernard Lewis)

2010-11-27T03:55:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Ozge Taylan

Review:

There are few subjects that are so absorbing as names and identity, and these are basic tools for the historian though they are complex and controversial. Now in his 84th year, the eminent scholar Bernard Lewis has spent his life dealing with history, religion, culture, language and terminology, in a region where all these are as fraught as anywhere. He has published more than 30 books, has received many academic honors and has held posts at numerous universities, though his two long professorial stints were 25 years at the University of London and another 12 years at Princeton University.

The writer has divided up the book into nine main parts: definitions, religion, race and language, country, nation, the state, symbols, aliens and infidels, and aspirations. Bernard Lewis has stated in his introduction that the title is borrowed from the language of psychology and his aim in doing this is to convey the constant change and evolution of identity in the Middle East. He also gives another example of multiple identities in the Western world. Since the foundation of the UK, people have had at least three identities: by nationality, as a British subject, later as a UK citizen, and as a member of one or more of the four components of that nationality, the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish; and by religion. However, any of the other cases of multiple identities is not as complex as the Middle East case.

Within every society there are multiple identities, each with variations and with sometimes conflicting subdivisions. These identities may be social and economic- by status, class, occupation, and profession. Generation and gender provide two major demarcations of identity. In the Middle East as elsewhere, historical and literary records show that it was not by social or economic , nor yet by generational and gender differences, that people saw the basic definition of their own identity, the dividing line between self and other. The primary identities are those acquired at birth. These are of three kinds. The first is by blood, which is in ascending order, the family, the clan, the tribe, developing into the ethnic nation. The second is by place. This may mean the village or neighborhood, province or city, developing in modern times into the country. The third is the religious community, which may be subdivided into sects. The second broad category of identity is that of allegiance to a ruler. This identity is normally acquired by birth. It may be changed by annexation, by transfer of power, or by migration. In most of the world, and for the history of the Middle East, these two identities — the involuntary identity of birth and the compulsory identity of the state — were the only ones that existed. In modern times, under the influence of the West, a new kind is evolving between the two, the freely chosen cohesion and loyalty of voluntary associations, combining to form what is nowadays known as the civil society. He says that only three countries in the region (Turkey, Arabia and Iran) conform to what he calls the European convergence of nation, country and language. But to call this European is misleading. Such a convergence may be the Platonic ideal of modern nationalism, but in reality Portugal is unique in Europe as a country whose boundaries haven't changed for several centuries, whose population is completely uniform in religion and whose political territory exactly coincides with language.

The world today has been shaped by Europe, or the West, whether the world likes it or not. As Lewis says, the scientific study of the history, religions and languages of his chosen region was in the first place entirely the work of European and then American scholars. The very fact that ''this parochial term,'' the Middle East, has come to be used around the world is, as he points out, striking testimony to the way that European influence persists after the age of imperial rule. He is also correct in saying that two ideas, both of European origin, dominated political thought and action in the Middle East for most of the 20th century, socialism and nationalism, and that ''by now both have been outdated, the one by its failure, the other by its success.'' He has stated that nationalism has succeeded needs to be qualified. The colonial yoke was thrown off more because the colonial powers got bored and went home than because of indigenous efforts at insurrection, and Arab nationalism is factitious almost by definition. Then again, the most remarkable and extreme case of nationalism in the region has been Jewish nationalism, or Zionism. This is a movement purely European in origin, and a fascinating example of ''invented tradition,'' not to say of the misunderstood identity. Maybe Bernard Lewis, so learned in examining the confused and misleading identities of Islam and Arabism, could turn more of his attention to that extraordinary phenomenon. As a whole, the book was successful in examining the definitions and giving sufficient information on the subject. As his other books, The Multiple Identities in the Middle East has taken its place among the prominent studies of the Middle East.

As a conclusion, it can be said that Lewis traces the rapid evolution of the identities of the Middle Eastern peoples, by examining religion, race and language, country, nation and state from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 to today's clash of old and new allegiances. He shows in his book how imported Western ideas such as liberalism, fascism, socialism, patriotism and nationalism transformed Middle Easterns' notions of community and their aspirations.

Book Review: Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (By Jonah Goldhagen)

2010-11-27T03:51:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Nermin Aydemir

Review:

The Holocaust has been accepted as one of the most, to many the most, disastrous happening(s) in the history of humankind. As it is known, for about 6 millions of Jews were killed under the rule of the third Reich in the mid 1900’s. Goldhagen’s book of Hitler’s willing Executioners is one of the most thorough studies in this field. However, his way of handling the issue has been perceived as controversial to many and his work has led to serious academic debates.

The author gives a controversial answer to the question of why such disastrous killings took place. According to the author; it was not Hitler, his Nazi regime, SS Commandos, or something else but the anti-Jewish attitude among the entire German population which led the mass killings during those years. Goldhagen labels the entire German nation as perpetrators of the mass murder. The author asserts that not the Nazi party nor the officials but the “ordinary” Germans voluntarily and willingly killed Jews within and outside the country. The Nazi regime only provided necessary conditions for such a mass murder according to the author’s point of view. Goldhagen mentions several times that anti-Semitist tendencies existed for a long time within the German society and the German people reflected this when the necessary conditions were met. The role of the severe economic conditions is represented as having only a slight impact on all these happenings. Germans first excluded and then eliminated Jewish when the “right time” came according to Hitler’s Willing Executioners.

Hitler’s Willing Executioners is a detailed historical study which is based on documentary analysis. Putting all these documents makes the book one of the most profound studies on the Holocaust issue. However, this is also a significant weakness since he gives too many details and says the same thing over and over. On the other side, the one-sided attitude raises to such high levels that even leads to questions of whether this is an academic study or not. Goldhagen acts much like a lawyer than being a scholar. His blind attitude considerably undermines the academic quality of his work. The author persistently explains how the Holocaust happened in a highly tragic manner. He puts so much emphasis on how a great tragedy the Holocaust was that, there is almost no place left for explaining the reasons behind.

Goldhagen persistently underlines the anti-Semitist motives of the German identity. However, he does not point out the factors leading this. His assumption is that the Holocaust happened because Germans were anti-Semitist. But does not explain what make them so. Being anti-Jewish is the independent variable in his thesis but his dependent variables are quite inadequate. Explanatory variables are also really vague and sometimes highly superficial one may have still have questions about why the Holocaust happened after reading his entire book. The author ignores many other serious aspects, which prepared such a brutal case. Goldhagen rarely mentions, or sometimes does not indicate at all, the impacts of social, economic, psychological, and political conditions before and during the Holocaust.

His passionate explanations hinder his academic quality in many aspects. First of all, accusing an entire population for such a mass murder is unacceptable. His blind generalization undermines the persuasive capability of his thesis from the beginning. Labelling an entire population as murders is really controversial. There should have been many fractions within the German identity. For instance, not the entire, but only about 25% of the German population had voted for the Nazi party in the 1939 elections. Goldhagen ignores the economic hardship to a great extent and totally denies the impacts of the coercive means of a totalitarian state, socio-psychological pressure, and invariable psychological propensities. Generalizations are unbelievable. Goldhagen stereotypes Germans as evils and Jews as victims on the other side. Furthermore, Goldhagen also contradicts with himself in his footnotes. He claims that Germans have changed after the Holocaust and now became a democratic society. Is it possible to for such a big change to occur in 50 years time? The author asserts that “ideas about Jews that were pervasive in Germany, and had been for decades, induced ordinary Germans to kill unarmed, defenceless Jewish men, women, and children by the thousands, systematically and without pity" (page 6). He does not answer why such a sense of hatred can be kept silent for decades. On the other hand, anti-Semitism did not only take place in Germany in the 20th century. There were also outbursts of anti- Jewish movements in France and Russia as well.

Besides these, it was not only the Jews, who were killed by what Goldhagen calls “Ordinary German”. Due to his blind perception of the Holocaust as a crime committed by "ordinary" Germans against Jews, he is not especially interested in what Germans did to each other. At any rate, his thesis does not permit him to recognize the existence of any substantial opposition to Hitler among Germans. In addition to 6 million Jewish people; 200-800 thousand Romans & Sintis, and 2 thousand Jehovah Witnesses were killed. There were also German victims in the bloodiest event of the human history. Besides the 200-300 thousand of disabled, 10-25 thousands of homosexuals were murdered as well as the foreign victims. Goldhagen mentions that not only the direct murderers but also people who took indirect roles; such as arranging papers, transmitting Jews should be accepted as the murders. Nevertheless, the author ignores that many European countries sent thousands of Jews to death camps. Furthermore, there were active participants among Lithuanians, Latvians, Poles, and Ukrainians participated in the Holocaust. Goldhagen also does not compare the Holocaust with other mass killings in the human history. Massacres are not only done by Germans, but also by other nations as well. Even if the scope is different, things happened in Bosnia or Rwanda is not less tragic than the Holocaust.

Another methodological problem about generalization is that the Battalion of 101 is taken as the representative of what Goldhagen calls “ordinary” Germans. However, 25 % of the officials in this battalion were members of the Nazi party and all of them were low educated, semi-skilled, marginally employed middle aged men who had been grown under the totalitarian doctrine.

To sum up, Goldhagen’s work is poorly relevant to the general debate in scientific aspect. His single-minded attitude decreases the quality of his work considerably. It seems that Goldhagen had found his conclusions in advance before making the research. The author Goldhagen persistently shows how a tremendous tragedy was the Holocaust, how brutal the Germans acted but rarely deals with explaining why Germans did it.

Book Review: After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (By Anoushiravan Ehteshami)

2010-11-27T03:46:00.000-08:00

reviewed by Arda Bilgen

Review:

Iranian Revolution was one of the most significant events ever witnessed. The revolution changed the regime of a big country and affected the region as it affected the whole world. The regional and global impact of Ayatollah Khomeini was so intense that the Islamic movements in Iran made particular regional countries and Western countries worry. The future of the alternating Iran was vague, it became vaguer after the death of Khomeini; everyone wondered how a leader could replace his charismatic leadership. The events after Khomeini, such as changes in foreign and regional policy of Iran, change in economy, security and defense strategy of the Second Republic should be examined carefully in order to understand the maneuvers Iran makes today. Hence, to be informed of this considerable event and able to interpret the stages Iran passed to reach the current status, revolution, Khomeini and post-Khomeini events and figures have to be learnt. After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic is the right book to read to inform readers on the topic.

The book opens with a preface noting that the information given in the book is invaluable for the reader aiming to find out the noticeable differences between “pre and post” Ayatollah Khomeini reign. The book consists of nine parts which are also divided into chapters in which the reader is mildly bombarded with detailed information on various issues. In the first part named as “political succession in republican Iran”, Ehteshami describes the administrative structure of Iran (highly clerical, theocratic and under the influence of the Fuqaha-Islamic Law experts) after 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and names the era of “inevitable” changes after his deaths as “Second Republic”. Also, succession crisis that emerged in the aftermath of Khomeini and rivalry between republic supporters and monarchy supporters are analyzed, while the familiar names such as Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani are mentioned in interpreting the role of Council of Revolution.

The second chapter mainly focuses on the changes and amendments in the constitution and examines the positive and negative outcomes of them in, with Rafsanjani’s own words, “Iran at reconstruction phase”. The new power distribution and outcomes of general elections in the Second Republic are discussed in the next chapter, while the state’s need and search for new economic policies and system after the failure of Pahlavi’s policies (the growth rate had slowed sharply by 1978) during the reign of Moussavi government is presented in the fourth chapter.

Fifth chapter solely gives information supported by tables and statistics about the economic strategies, difficulties and achievements of Rafsanjani, who implicitly -later explicitly- welcomes liberalization and the foreign investors that are without malicious colonial intentions. The sixth chapter provides information about the regional policy of Iran, the impact of the state in the aftermath of the revolution and its maneuvers during the Iran-Iraq War. In the following two chapters, we are informed of the foreign policy of the Second Republic and its domestic-foreign security and defense strategy which is exalting the right to retaliation and giving the reader an idea about what kind of a policy Iran pursued. The last chapter including a conclusion part views Iranian revolution in a wider sense and scrutinizes the issue to present the various views on the characteristics of the revolution, whether it is progressive or retrogressive; social or political and views on the place of Iran in capitalist system.

The 1st chapter of the book is mainly about the succession problems arose after the revolution and also after the death of Khomeini. The author says that since the defeat of Mossadegh, the political continuity in Iran has been questioned and adds that even in Shah’s reign lasted for 26 years; his reign was challenged as well. In other words, in Iran, succession has been a blurry concept. After the revolution, the problem was solved when the clerical forces gained upper hand in coalition under the guidance of Khomeini. Later, Ehteshami argues that the emergence of a succession was natural because there were ambiguities and unclear points. In other words, change was inevitable and it was mentioned after Khomeini’s death in 1989. While the debates about the qualities of a leader were going on, the author says, there were also debates about the functionality of Velayet-i Faqih system which Khomeini was in favor of. It is hard to determine which change had bigger impacts on Iran, the revolution or period after Khomeini; in both cases citizens and administrators could not find a model to grasp. The author gives information about the supporters of republic and monarchs in this chapter and relates their stances with the succession problem. After the failure of the clergy to address economic issues and Khomeini’s death, elite groups of Iran confronted and deepened the crisis. Then, the relatively free conditions and the acceptance of the United Nations Security Council resolution ending Iraq war solved the conflict and Ali Khamanei became the supreme leader. Briefly, Ehteshami argues that in the first years of the republic and during the last times of Khomeini’s reign, there were succession problems, ambiguities and confusion that were solved by the passage of time after the death of Khomeini and the occurrence of domestic and international events.

In the 2nd chapter of the book, by giving reference from Richard Cottam, Ehteshami argues that Khomeini’s leadership style was unique and most of the times rigid, unwillingly making concessions and hardly allowing any individual or faction to gain preeminence within his government. His personal traits and the policy of the state were meant to be parallel by the world; however, this tough and inward image of the state slowly began to change after the acceptance of the truce which ended the Iraq-Iran War and was mediated by the UN, Security Council resolution 598 (SCR 598). Even if it might be impossible to assign an exact date of the foundation of the Second Republic, 1988-89, the short period after the acceptance of SCR 598 seems like the most appropriate foundation date in terms of the wind of changes in the state, as Rafsanjani declared that “this cease-fire will open a new chapter in our history”. The death of Khomeini in 1989 was also another factor giving courage to leaders, like Khamanei, to voice the need of review of the Islamic revolution due to the lack of a centralized and powerful executive administration. In the same year, as Khamanei became the supreme leader of Islamic Republic of Iran on 5th of June, he stated that it would be the suitable time to consider reviewing/reforming the 1979 constitution which was vaguely defining the roles and responsibilities of various centers of power in the republic. Moussavi, the head of judiciary of Islamic Republic of Iran between 1980 and 1989, also declared that the main problem of IRI was the lack of concentration or power in executive branch. Those inclinations for change resulted as the constitution change in 1988. The changes and amendments in constitution, especially Article 60, were a little bit radical; the office of the prime minister was abolished, the Faqih system had remained almost the same and kept its significance, judicial system was renewed as well to have a more legalistic and constitutional structure. In other words, after 1988, changes in domestic and foreign policy, and policies concerning economy and social issues began to change while the state’s Islamic nature, conduct of affairs by reference to vote republican regime, Islamic based laws and legal guardianship remained the same. Ehteshami believes that the Second Republic was a sharp departure for Islamic Republic from its past, as it as observed that Khomeini’s heirs were not spending their time on land reform or nationalization of foreign trade but spending time on privatization, business incentives, free-market mechanisms and productivity after 1988.

The changes in the positions and power allocation in the state had been mentioned before. In the 3rd chapter, the author points out that the significant point as, the clerics’, individually or collectively, continuation of domination the most crucial levers of power; their positions had a “make-up” rather than changing. Fuqaha’s authorities were vast, as well. Besides that, the order was still based on two crucial positions, the Leader and the President. The first executive president of the republic after changes was Rafsanjani; he was holding a fundamental position in Iran by chairing many bodies and having vast authorities. The other institutional bases of power helping the conduct of the state were council of guardians, majlis, expediency council, assembly of experts, national Security Council, cabinet. Ehteshami argues that Rafsanjani’s pragmatic Islamism and strives of marginalization of extremists were much more progressive than Khomeini’s Islamic totalitarianism. Significantly, Rafsanjani was in favor of the new adjustments and reconstruction policies in economic area; the technocratic de-ideologized cabinet containing a high proportion of engineers he formed indicated his openness and liberalization intentions. The state was taking steps to be more democratic as well, balance of power between the president and the faqih was attained and the oppression during Khomeini was abandoned. In other words, without the changes in constitution about centralization of power and Rafsanjani’s wish to renew the image of IRI, Iran would not experience stability and rapid growth, he notes.

In the 4th chapter, Iran is described as a state in search of an economic system by Ehteshami. During Pahlavi’s time, the state was in favor of capitalist development and deemed as a dependent capitalist, semi-periphery 3rd world country, which consumes goods and services supported by Western powers and in return sells relatively cheap oil to them. After the fall of Pahlavi, there was an intense competition for power amongst various bourgeois and petit-bourgeois factions, but the overthrow of the big bourgeois gave the emerging state opportunity to reshape the structure of economy. Khomeini chose to nationalize the productive units and workshops for the sake of preventing the collapse of economy; the state had the right to control %85 of units after the revolution. However, he stressed that their economy was not a socialist one but was a mixed economy with a profound social conscience. Article 44 of the 1979 constitution was dividing the economic sectors into three; state (controlling foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, postal services), co-operative and private (controlling supplementary for agriculture, industry, trade). The author says revolutionists were in favor of state control but Western-imposed embargo and post war period required Iran to secure the flow of hydrocarbons and expanding industrial and agricultural output. The private sector, however, despite its eagerness of providing necessary opportunities, could not succeed it at once, due to the mismanagement, lack or clear directions and goals during Moussavi government. In other words, the dependency for oil could not be reduced. Moreover, Ehteshami indicates that in 1986-7 oil crisis, the government had to impose new taxes and raise the existing tax rate to subsidize the dying external funds. Even comprehensive privatization and lifting restrictions could not manage to create an alternative economic system, even though Rafsanjani took concrete steps, the economy remained as medium 3rd world country economy depending on the West.

The author, in the 5th chapter, noted that Rafsanjani had alluded that Iran was going to pursue a Western model of economy when he welcomed the countries willing to invest in Iran without having colonial and expansionist powers. In 1989, when the Islamic model of development was quitted, the income had decreased by %45. His sole aim was to adjust economic policy to suit new circumstances and trends of economy by greater domestic and foreign participation, Ehteshami notes. To achieve this, in 1991 and 1992, denationalization of mines, stocks, factories, fishery, oil refining, and railway sectors gained momentum and to boost the industry and trade, free trade zones were formed. While banking sector was highly under the domination of state in 1979, they were privatized in 1991 and opened to foreign currency. In 1993, currency devaluation and tariff cut began hurting local industry, loans to be paid to World Bank, high inflation, and changes in the revenues of oil after Operation Desert Storm occasioned this painful period of time. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani was attempting to revise Iran’s position in the market and industry; neither nationalizations nor denationalizations were ideological but were based on the requirements.

It has been mentioned in the 6th chapter of the book by the author that the regional policy of Iran was pretty much shaped by Iraq war, after the post-revolution period. During Pahlavi’s time, while Iran was running smooth relations with the states, even with Israel, his designs for the Gulf region, the closeness of the relations between Iran and Israel and Iran’s powerful position in the region began to worry Arab states Iran was already in competition with Saudi Arabia, both in the fields of politics and economy, thus Pahlavi chose to collaborate with some Arab countries to balance this vulnerability resulted from the competition. Furthermore, to reinforce this positive, cooperative image, Iran established fruitful and pragmatic economic relations with non-Arab states like Pakistan and Turkey. Iran’s regional policy was based on “continuing war till victory” and retaliation during the early 80s, however, after accepting the truce mediated by UN and end of Iraq war, there appeared an inclination to upgrade the relations with various states, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, even with Western states. Still, for Ehteshami, it can be said that Islam played a major role in Iran’s regional policy before and after the revolution.

In the 7th chapter, the author talks about the dynamic foreign policy of Iran. Without a doubt, its policy shows progress, while the state was isolated from the West and in favor of non-alignment, supporting populism and anti-imperialist approach in 1979 right after the revolution, the liberal wing which ousted from the revolutionary coalition in 1988 considered minor changes in the policy of the state. Later, after 1988 Rafsanjani emphasized the importance of diplomacy and intended to normalize the relations with regional actors and the West, except the US. The primary aim was to regain its power and become the major actor again in the region. As it has been mentioned before, the year 1988 was the period when various kinds of changes Iran experienced. The same would be said about the foreign policy. The rise of Gorbachevism and the death of Khomeini had paved the way for changes; however the transition period to peaceful coexistence with other states was not so easy. Recovering the state’s debilitation of war and recovering economically and militarily were two of the objects Rafsanjani had, says Ehteshami. For the president, those two goals were the key points determining the foreign policy of the state and reasserting its influence in the region.

The conjuncture was also requiring Iran to take measurements about the loss of power in region. The US influence in Gulf region, riots against Iran in Arabic countries, its isolation from Arab world and international institutions, naval defeats forced Iran to run smooth relations based on conciliation with states. By the end of 1989, Iran was almost fully integrated in international order, but feared that Syria-Saudi Arabia-Egypt’s close contacts would decrease its recently regained influence and significance. In 1991, Iran was accused of supporting the Gulf War for its own interest, however it was not true. It was a fact that Iran had some benefits in case Iraq would be defeated but it seemed impossible for Iran to encourage the war just to weaken its stubborn and potentially dangerous neighbor, Ehteshami underlines. About five years later than the war, Iran again wanted to be the most powerful in the region, but it was hard while the doctrine of Clinton, the US president, was designed to squeeze Iran and Iraq in the region (dual-containment policy). Notwithstanding, Iran had succeeded good relations with non-Arab states, including Far-Eastern states that Iran had economical ties with and some Arab states. Also, the state reinforced the security relations with the US and increased its oil wealth. From the author’s point of view, Iran has three reasons to change its policy: firstly, the international system was highly interdependent and Iran was unable to function very effectively on its own. Secondly, the economic system had serious problems to be reformed and thirdly some of the problems were unable to be solved without the foreign assistance (lack of capital and skilled work force). Briefly, for the author, the orientation of the foreign policy of Iran was Islamic based, non-aligned and pro-South. Iranian authorities have declared that as long as there will be investment in their country, Iran will have the potential to be the major regional power.

In the 8th chapter, it has been argued that one of the second republic’s fundamental goals was to strengthen the defensive forces; even though the economy was kind of in decline and the amount of money spent on military was increasing. For Ehteshami, Iran cared about the military deterrence, moreover, many sectors such as energy and reconstruction inevitably interacted with each other to build up a strong, deterrent military. Iran, on the other hand, was reliant on the military hardware of the Western powers, Russia and China mainly. To break this vulnerability, Iran began modern arms production and made agreements on trading arms for oil with Ukraine. In other words, Iran has pursued a multi-layered arms procurement strategy not to be totally reliant on a few countries. Iran’s military preparations are watched carefully by the West because in the region, Libya, Syria and Iraq were weak and Iran was highly disliked by Israel. As the German company Siemens agreed on completing a semi-constructed nuclear power plant and as Russia and China helped Iran show development in nuclear power in terms of supplying qualified workers and equipment, US sanctions were slowly imposed and many countries were compelled to cancel or suspend cooperation with Iran due to security reasons. Clinton’s dual containment policy was also serving to balance Iran’s leap forward.

In the last chapter, the author argues the outcomes of the revolution. He asks whether the revolution fulfilled its agenda properly or not, and whether it presented an alternative model of development for 3rd world countries. The revolution would be perceived as an importance event because the balance of power was disrupted, a new unstable and hostile regime was established, Soviet Union had concerns about the new formation and the fear of the rise of Islam was highly common. There were nuances between time periods of Pahlavi, post-revolution and post-Khomeini, without a doubt. Islamic Republic of Iran generally pursued policies based on social justice, divine law, economic self-sufficiency, an independent foreign policy and non-alignment; however, it failed to reach the modest aims and was incapable of universalizing the revolution, from Ehteshami’s point of view. Maybe, that’s a natural outcome of pursuing a “neither East nor West” policy giving significance to South-South ties. The author believes that the revolution was unique in terms of its bottom; it was not a revolution of the oppressed class, as a result it could be perceived as a political revolution rather than a social one. He points out that although the regime may change, there is no guarantee that the society as a whole will be transformed to justify the label of social revolution. Weakness of any domestic bourgeois in the developing country has enabled elites which have to be said to have become a new class in Iran, but it is hard to state that the revolution is social by only focusing on this event. By 1993, in Iran, ulama were remaining as the dominant elite, Iran was known as a semi-industrialized periphery country, in which the economic regulations had to be done.

In terms of the content and the organization of the book, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic,, the only critic that can be done is about the excessive number of names and Persian terms that are needed to be explained in more details. A reader who is unfamiliar with Islam or Eastern languages might easily lose his concentration while reading terms like faqih, majlis, hojjatoleslam. Moreover, the reader is bombarded with the names of the Iranian persons from government or military, which becomes a hard task for the reader to remember; besides the many times mentioned names of the popular figures like Khomeini, Khamanei, Moussavi and Rafsanjani. Besides those, the quotations and their significance/relevance to the topics in chapters were satisfactory, as well as the intensity of the given information. The tables and statistics used to support the given information were making it easy for the reader to compare the aforementioned years of transition. It seems that Anoushiravan Ehteshami has successfully categorized the various topics and ordered them according to the relevancy and chronological order. His satisfactory mixing of analysis and historical background facilitates the reader’s endeavors both to grasp the picture as it is and also form his own point of view about the transformation period and the difference between different Irans in the course of time. Even though the book was first published in 1995, more than a decade ago, it is still capable of giving us the vision to evaluate the recent happenings in the region.

To conclude, it would be for the benefit of the reader who is eager to learn the transition period between three eras; time span before the revolution, during Khomeini’s unquestionable dominance and post-Khomeini period till 1993 to read this well-organized book. As the author gives the hint in the introduction, the book is invaluable for the reader in terms of its simply presentation of information and canalizing them to critically think about the events in historical context and bear that in mind while making an analysis of today’s Iran and regional tableau.

about book:

This book offers a comprehensive study of post-Khomeini Iran, exploring the Rafsanjani administration from economic, political, international, and strategic perspectives. Anoush Ehteshami assesses the critical dilemmas of the regime both previous to and since the death of its first spiritual leader.